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Since 1997, conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) have operated in several Latin 
American countries, highlighting the increased relevance of redistributive policies in the 
region’s political arena.  The development of such CCTs has a number of political implications.  
Recent electoral results seem to indicate that the economic effects of poverty and lack of 
opportunities have influenced political choices: electoral behaviour seems to be determined 
by personal current economic situation which could be affected by CCTs.  
 
This study aims to contribute to these debates and particularly to the literature on the effects 
of CCTs on voting behaviour by comparing the effects of the two largest CCTs in operation. 
The objectives of this work were to analyse the extent to which CCTs could have been used 
to shape the electoral behaviour of its beneficiaries. This work relies on retrospective voting 
theories in order to study the effectiveness of such programmes on voting attitudes and 
political attainment.  
 
In terms of data and methods, this study uses longitudinal socioeconomic and electoral 
secondary data from the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI) as well as from the Ministry of Social 
Development and secondary data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) and electoral data from the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court (BSEC).  It combines an 
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analysis of this data using econometric techniques with a more qualitative account of the 
political context in each country.   
 
This work was able to associate the influence of the different types of implementation of the 
programmes with their effects on voting behaviour. Results suggest that the differences of 
the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour are linked to the diversity of implementation of the 
programmes. For example, it seems that while in Mexico the programme was implemented 
as means tested, with mandatory conditions and operated at state level, making it easier for 
local governments to establish a clientelistic-like usage of the programmes which shaped 
recipients’ voting behaviour, in Brazil access to the programme follows a self-rated poverty 
index linked with the office of the  cadastro unico (a Single Registry of Social Programmes 
of the Federal Government) highly associated with PT´s government.  
 
Moreover, in countries such as Mexico and Brazil, the introduction of CCTs has come at a 
challenging time in their political development: democracy still needs to evolve towards a 
more predictable and conciliatory political model where the implementation of public 
policies has foreseeable effects in terms of their relative success and influence on the 
citizen’s electoral behaviour. The research also considers the relationship between such 
programmes and the conduct of politics in these countries, particularly the nature of political 
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Since the late 1990s, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) have become a very popular 
policy in Latin America as an effective tool to reduce poverty. Such policies seek to fight 
poverty in two ways; first, following a short-term strategy through a conditional cash transfer 
to the female head of the household and in the long term, through the investment in human 
capital of the children living in the household with the intention of breaking the 
transgenerational cycle of poverty. Because of their success, CCTs nowadays are the most 
replicated and largest social assistance programme in the region.  
For the purposes of this research, CCTs are defined as “programmes that transfer cash, 
generally to poor households, on the condition that those households make prespecified 
investments in the human capital of their children” (Fiszbein et al., 2009:1). Because of these 
characteristics, this new concept of social assistance policies was introduced across the globe 
and wherever they are deployed, CCTs share some common features. First, the target 
population are families (in opposition to individuals) selected by statistically based systems 
to ensure that the resources of the programme reach the most needed; second, there is a 
prohibition of any kind of intermediaries between the government and the beneficiaries with 
the purpose of reducing corruption and old clientelistic practices; and finally, and perhaps 
the most important concept of all, the fulfilment of a set of conditions required to receive 
income grants: a) members of the household have to attend a monthly healthcare workshop; 
b) to have at least one medical check per year, and; c) mandatory children’s school 
attendance.  
The introduction of CCTs in the Latin American context usually followed either an economic 
or a political crisis; scholars such as Fiszbein et al (2009) and Das et al (2005) suggest that 
those circumstances influenced the creation of these programmes as an innovative social 
programme to combat poverty. However, there were other factors that could have 
influenced the rationale behind the creation of these programmes. In terms of the political 
context, it is important to consider that, since CCTs were implemented in countries where 
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vote-buying and patronage are important, it is believed that such programmes were aimed 
at the poor population as a strategy to win votes and political sympathy rather than to 
alleviate the situation of poverty among its beneficiaries (De la O, 2013; Zucco, 2011). 
Nonetheless, in the last decades with a new wave of democratic actions (e.g. the creation of 
stronger democratic institutions, greater social participation and an intense and real 
electoral competition) mainly driven by citizens’ pressure, there is evidence that actions such 
as the increased transparency in the operation and the continuous evaluation of social 
assistance policies by international organisations has reduced the manipulation of such 
policies as clientelistic weapons. Contrastingly, recent studies suggest that recipients of CCTs 
tend to reward the incumbent party after a short period of exposure to the programme, 
presumably to keep the benefits of the programme (Diaz-Cayeros, et. al, 2007; Bohn, 2011; 
De Janvry, Finan and Sadolulet, 2012; De la O, 2013).  
To provide the reader with some context, it is important to mention that Mexico and Brazil 
share one same challenge: the fight against poverty. Despite being major economies, as both 
countries are considered in the group of the twenty most powerful economies in the world, 
it is well known that they both have large numbers of people living in poverty and that 
income inequality is widespread among their population. The latter has restricted both 
countries’ economic growth potential as poverty has a negative direct effect on 
consumption, labour force and human capital. CCTs were introduced as a response to 
periods of economic crisis, hyperinflation rates, volatility in natural resource prices and 
devaluation of the currency. As with most antipoverty programmes, CCTs were designed to 
combat inequality but also to protect their population from economic fluctuations. 
In order to reduce these negative effects of poverty in economic growth these new policies 
were implemented. The allocation criteria of CCTs were focused in order to prioritize the 
most vulnerable. As those vulnerable economically speaking are also the most vulnerable in 
terms of vote buying or clientelistic practices, a set of measures such as rules of operation, 
targeting criteria and, impact evaluations were established in order to reduce their potential 
missuses.  
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1.1. SOCIAL POLICY IN MEXICO AND BRAZIL  
 
The aim of this research was to understand and to identify the linkages between CCTs and 
voting behaviour through an empirical study of the Mexican and Brazilian conditional cash 
programmes over the past 3 and 4 presidential elections, respectively. Because of this, this 
section provides an overview of how social policy has evolved in both countries.  
The introduction of CCTs in Latin America can be traced back to the late 1990s, with the 
leading countries being Mexico and Brazil. The replication and implementation of such 
programmes in other countries of the region has gradually expanded reaching almost the 
entire continent. This study, however, focuses on the pioneer countries (Mexico and Brazil). 
In this section a brief summary of social policies in Mexico and Brazil is presented, aiming to 
provide a contextual framework that will serve to explain how these policies have evolved, 
highlighting the similarities and differences between the two countries. 
We cannot talk about CCTs in Mexico without mentioning the National Solidarity Program 
(Pronasol). This programme, implemented from 1988-1994, was directed to indigenous, 
rural and marginalised areas and aimed to encourage community participation through a 
discretionary selection of both projects and beneficiaries (Kaufman and Trejo, 1997; Diaz-
Cayeros, et. al, 2016).  The rationale behind the focusing on community participation policy 
making was mainly rooted in the following understanding: lifestyle and political behaviour 
are all affected by society and the natural environment (Hanson, 1988; Davis, 2011). As from 
a social perspective, a community can be defined by describing the social and political 
networks that connect individuals, community organizations, and its leaders (Minkler et al., 
1997). By understanding these essential social structures, Pronasol was able to identify 
leaderships, understand the community behaviour patterns and to strengthen their political 
and social networks.  This could have been the real intention of the programme instead of 
community participation.  
The National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) 
characterised the programme as being politically manipulated by the governing Institutional 
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Revolutionary Party (PRI) and ineffective in combating poverty. Statistics show that while in 
1988, at the beginning of the programme there were 46.1 million of people living in poverty, 
in 1994 after 6 years of Pronasol the number of people living in poverty had increased to 47 
million (CONEVAL, 2017). As stated by Diaz-Cayeros, et. al (2016: 90; 112) even though 
Pronasol´s resources were directed towards the less well-off, the programme failed to 
alleviate poverty because it was administered with the main goal of strengthening PRI´s 
electoral hegemony which had been challenged at the 1988 elections.  This was done by 
targeting its resources to places where party loyalties were eroding and by locking in voters 
through political clientelism rather than reducing poverty.  
Pronasol´s failure to reduce poverty along with the political and economic problems faced 
by Mexico intensified in 1994. Despite the introduction of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 mainly promoted by President Salinas under the logic that the 
agreement will promote the growth and development of Mexico (Stanford, 2013; Weisbrot, 
et. al., 2018), at the dawn of the year, Mexico suffered a major macro-economic crisis with a 
devaluation of its currency. This led to a fall of 6% of the GDP in 1995 that, in addition to the 
increasing rates of poverty among the country led to terrible consequences for the health, 
nutrition and education of Mexicans (Levy, 2006). Poverty rates increased from 52.4% in 






































Figure 1.1. Mexico: Poverty Levels Based on Consumption Baskets
Food Capabilities Patrimonial
Source: Own elaboration based on CONEVAL estimatesSource: Own elaboration based on CONEVAL (2017) estimates. 
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As a result of this crisis and the increasing poverty rates, under the administration of 
President Zedillo the Programme for Education, Health and Food (Progresa) was 
implemented in 1997 in order to counteract poverty.  The newly introduced programme 
aimed to replace all other social programmes in operation and gather them into one single 
poverty relief programme and can arguably be the start of CCTs in Mexico. Progresa was 
launched initially as a pilot serving up to 300,000 families in 6,344 localities in 12 states with 
a total budget of US$5.8 million1 (Levy, 2006). Progresa was designed to make cash transfers 
to the female heads of households in order to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty 
in exchange of certain conditions, including regular medical checks and school attendance 
that should be fulfilled by the beneficiaries (Levy, 2006). According to Rubalcaba and Teruel 
(2006) the programme targeting was made by identifying geographically the areas with high 
levels of poverty and once such regions were identified a second selection was made based 
on socio-economic characteristics. Such localities must have had access to communications 
(local roads), health and educational services. Once the localities were selected, a socio-
economic census was conducted in order to discriminate between potential beneficiary and 
non-beneficiary households (Levy, 2006).  
Progresa was designed to achieve its goals by having three main components. First, a 
nutrition component was directed to pregnant or breastfeeding women, children between 
four months and two years old, and undernourished children between three and five years 
old. Second, the health component required regular attendances to health clinics for 
monthly check-ups. Finally, the educational component was designed to increase the school 
enrolment of children, aiming to achieve an attendance rate of at least 85 per cent (Levy, 
2006). Over the following years the programme was gradually introduced in other states, 
targeting the poorest people in the most marginalized areas first (Levy, 2006; Gantner, 2007). 
By year 2000, three years after its implementation Progresa was extended to over 2.6 million 
families in the country and reduced poverty from 60% to 53.6% (Zedillo, 2000). Under the 
 
1 The cash transfer reached approximately $20 per family. 
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tenure of President Fox Progresa changed its name to Oportunidades (Human Development 
Program) and was extended to semi-urban and urban areas, increasing its budget by 70% 




As we can observe in the figure (1.2.) above, according to the evolution of poverty in Mexico 
poverty decreased constantly since the implementation of Progresa in 1997 until 2006. 
However, in 2008 after an economic crisis, poverty has increased in terms of all of its three 
dimensions.  
For this study’s purposes it is necessary to define what those dimensions are. According to 
CONEVAL, there are three types of poverty: a) patrimonial poverty which is defined as not 
having sufficient household income to acquire a certain basket of food products and to cover 
the necessary expenses in health, clothing, housing, transportation and education; b) 
capabilities poverty is defined as not having sufficient household income to acquire a certain 
basket of food products and to cover the necessary expenses in health and education and; 
c) food poverty is not having the necessary income to buy a basic food basket (this type of 
poverty is related to extreme poverty).  
Oportunidades was created to fight those three components of poverty but with the main 
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Figure 1.2. Mexico: Evolution of Poverty 











Source: Own Elaboration. Estimates from CONEVAL based on information from the ENIGH
Source: Own elaboration based on CONEVAL (2017) estimates. 
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evolved into a more sophisticated and larger programme. Some of the main changes from 
its initial settings are the inclusion of poor people living in urban areas; economic incentives 
to students that finish high school before 22 years old; the inclusion of the Food Support 
Program (PAL) for Oportunidades´ non-beneficiary families; and the creation of the “Solid 
Floor” programme, which aims to replace dirt household flooring with cement flooring 
diminishing the prevalence of infectious diseases such as diarrhoea and respiratory 
conditions (INEGI, 2015). Finally, in 2013 another component was added to Oportunidades 
with the incorporation of the National Crusade Against Hunger. Incidentally, this component 
was inspired by the Fome Zero strategy from Brazil (see below).  
As for the Brazilian case, CCT´s were introduced after the economic crisis and the 
hyperinflation rates of the 1990s. Before the introduction of CCTs, Brazil’s social policy was 
not universal, with benefts provided clientelistically and always linked to the labour market 
(Draibe and Arretche, 1995). At the end of the ‘90s under Cardoso’s administration there 
was a change in the economic and political paradigm of Brazil. As a well-known scholar, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the mastermind who controlled hyperinflation by 
implementing the Plano Real (real plan) and a several neoliberal policies that included “high 
interest rates, pegged exchange rates and intermittent pressure on congress to reduce the 
federal deficit” (Kingstone and Power, 2000, p.8). He managed to reduce inflation rates from 
2948% in 1990 to 3.2% in 1997. At the end of his second term in office he left a healthier 
economy. Inflation was under control (See Figure 1.3.) and GDP growth reached 5% (See 












                          
 




The rationale for the creation of a strategy to eradicate poverty in Brazil was grounded in the 
fact that, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), in 1999 there 
were more than 44 million people living with less than 1 dollar per day. Building on Cardoso’s 










































































Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database.
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Figure 2. GDP Growth (annual %)
Mexico Brazil
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the World Development Indicators Database. 
World Bank (2018). 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the World Development Indicators Database. 
World Bank (2018). 
Figure 1.3. Brazil A nual I fl tion Rates, 1985 – 2015. 
 24 
Inacio Lula da Silva with the goal of eradicating hunger, poverty and social inequality and the 
inclusion of the less well off in the Brazilian society under a safety net. Similar to Mexico, the 
Brazilian programmes followed a targeting strategy in addition to a profound change in the 
bureaucratic system by the unification of a diversity of social programmes into one single 
office (Betto, 2004).  
Parallel to Oportunidades, Fome Zero focused on rural and urban households living in 
poverty. This programme was effectively a cluster of social programmes comprising six 
subcomponents. It included “Carta Alimentaçao”, “food supply and distribution 
programme”, “food and nutrition education programme”, “health and nutrition 
programme”, “Bolsa Escola” and “Bolsa Família” (FAO, 2009).   
Nowadays, Bolsa Família is the most important programme since it covers most of the 
Brazilian population living in poverty. In terms of budget, it increased from US$ 1.1 billion in 
2003 to US$ 6.5 billion in 2009. Some scholars have argued that the success of this 
programme is due to the continuation of its predecessor Bolsa Escola (conditional only on 
school attendance) from the Cardoso to the Lula da Silva administration as the expanded 
Bolsa Família (Neri et al 2012).  
Even though CCTs account for a small proportion of social spending, such programmes have 
had a significant success in reducing poverty. Nevertheless, scholars suggest that this success 
has a strong relation to the amount of public expenditure on this matter. To provide some 
perspective, the amount of social expenditure in Latin America has increased since 1997, 
going from 14.7% up to 18% in terms of the GDP in the ten-year period from 1997 to 2007 
(CEPAL, 2014). However, the situations differ widely when talking about Mexico and Brazil. 
While in Mexico the expenditure has been calculated to be between 10% to 11% which is 
lower than the average in the region in Brazil only in 2012, circa 26.8% of its GDP was devoted 
to social programmes´ expenditure (CEPAL, 2014). 
As mentioned before, Oportunidades seemed very successful from 1997 to 2006; however, 
in the last decades poverty rates started growing after 10 years of success. Differently, the 
Brazilian CCT Bolsa Família has contributed 21% of the reduction in inequality and in terms 
 25 
of extreme poverty it explains 8% in reduction of poverty which continues to decrease (See 
Figure 1.5) (Soares et Alii, 2006; Soares and Satyro, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Poverty Percentage in Mexico and Brazil 




As seen in Figure 1.5, the evolution of poverty shows that Mexico has a larger percent of 
people living in poverty than Brazil. By comparing the data provided by CONEVAL from 
Mexico and IBGE from Brazil, it seems that Brazil has been more successful in reducing the 
share of people living in poverty. It could be that the reduction of poverty in Brazil has been 
a result of Bolsa Família as from its 13 million beneficiary families, around 4.3 million have 
crossed the line of extreme poverty.  However, this has not happened in Mexico despite the 
increasing coverage of Oportunidades in terms of the number of beneficiaries (See Table 1.1) 
went from 300,000 beneficiary families in 1997 to more than 6 million in 2015.  
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on CONEVAL (2017) and IBGE (2014) estimates. 
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Table 1.1 Oportunidades Coverage 1997 – 2014 
Year Municipalities Localities 
Beneficiary 
Families 
1997 456 10,789 300,705 
1998 1,485 34,414 1,595,606 
1999 1,986 48,719 2,306,325 
2000 2,166 53,232 2,476,430 
2001 2,310 67,539 3,116,042 
2002 2,354 70,520 4,240,000 
2003 2,360 70,436 4,240,000 
2004 2,429 82,973 5,000,000 
2005 2,435 86,091 5,000,000 
2006 2,441 92,672 5,000,000 
2007 2,444 92,961 5,000,000 
2008 2,445 95,819 5,049,206 
2009 2,445 97,922 5,209,359 
2010 2,445 97,053 5,818,954 
2011 2,448 97,437 5,827,318 
2012 2,449 105,588 5,845,056 
2013 2,451 109,852 5,922,246 
2014 2,456 116,025 6,129,125 
2015 2,456 115,561 6,168,900 
Source: Own elaboration using data from Sedesol (2015) 
 
 
Differences in the evolution of poverty between Mexico and Brazil could be related to the 
higher percent of GDP destined to Bolsa Família when compared to Oportunidades. 
According to the OECD (2007), social spending in Brazil is the highest among the Latin 
American countries, amounting to 31.3% of general government expenditures in 2014. The 
social expenditure as percentage of GDP in Brazil for the period from 1997 to 2007 increased 
from 12.2% to 23.7%, 5% higher than Latin America’s average.  As it regards to Mexico, social 
expenditure as percentage of the GDP went from 8.8% of GDP in 1997 to 12.4% in 2006 
(Sedesol, 2015). Perhaps the higher expenditure has made the Brazilian programme more 
successful at fighting poverty when compared to the Mexican programme. As Cecchini 
(2017) and Soares (2012) posit in the case of Brazil, the Bolsa Família programme contributed 
to an 8% reduction in the poverty headcount index, an 18% reduction in the poverty gap and 
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a 22% reduction in the severity of poverty. However, according to the ECLAC (2015) there 
are other key factors significant for reducing poverty in Brazil such as; the decrease in 
unemployment rates from 11.5% in 2002 to 7.4% in 2012; a political context that could 
prioritise public policies aimed to eradicate poverty and reduce inequality; economic growth; 
non-contributory social protection; the implementation of labour market policies and better 
taxation policies. The latter takes relevance as a reduction of poverty in real terms took place 
between 2002 and 2012, as the incidence of poverty declined from 44% to 28% of the 
population, and extreme poverty from 19% to 11% of the population (ECLAC, 2015).  
Having explained the relative success of the programmes in reducing poverty in both 
countries, the next section focuses on explaining the effects of CCTs on elections. 
1.2.  THE EFFECTS OF CCTS ON ELECTIONS 
 
Despite the efforts to bring more democratic regimes to the zone, democracy in Latin 
America still needs to evolve towards a more predictable and conciliatory political model 
where the implementation of public policies has foreseeable effects in terms of their relative 
success and influence on the citizens’ electoral behaviour. Some of the most recent electoral 
results in Mexico and Brazil seem to mainly reflect the economic conjunctural effects of 
socioeconomic conditions on political choices. Taking this into account, it seems logical that 
policy makers need to consider the impact of CCTs on voting behaviour, such as a shift in 
voting preferences towards a certain political party. In this context, the observed electoral 
behaviour seems to be determined more by the current economic situation of the 
households than by the classical driving forces that explain electoral and political choices, 
which can be party identification or ideological orientation. Consequently, key 
macroeconomic variables and social indicators have left behind forces that usually have 
shaped voting behaviour. Drawing from Fiorina (1981) we can say that voters are purely 
results-oriented in assessing the incumbent party’s performance. Along with the Downsian 
tradition we can observe that voters look for convenient and reliable information about the 
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likely effects of either the incumbent or opposition party policies proposed for the future 
(Downs, 1957; Campbell et al., 2010; Diermeier, D., & Li, C, 2018).  
Given this context it is worth noting that CCT programmes in both countries have been 
maintained have been maintained through three different administrations and through 
different political parties. The Mexican CCT was initiated by the PRI under the name of 
Progresa and was continued by the PAN under the name of Oportunidades. Likewise, in Brazil 
Bolsa Família was introduced under the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and 
continued throughout the Workers Party (PT) administration. The electoral consequences of 
CCTs cannot be explained without considering their success in the fight against poverty as 
discussed in the previous section.  
There is a significant literature demonstrating the relationship between CCTs and the voting 
behaviour of beneficiaries. A number of studies argue that CCTs are very popular in electoral 
terms. This dissertation builds on this literature and examines if the electoral effects of CCTs, 
defined as the vote for the party that introduced the programme, are different in the short 
and long run. While beneficiaries may reward the party that introduced the programme in 
the short run, their voting behaviour may change in the long run and they may then vote for 
a different party. The rationale for this is that the longer a CCT programme is in existence, 
the less likely it is to be abolished regardless of the party in power, since abolishing successful 
programmes has a large political cost. In other words, political parties and their candidates 
are guided to continue or even to expand those social policies as a response to the increasing 
popularity of the programme. Scholars such as Diaz-Cayeros, Estéves and Magaloni (2008) 
argue that parties tend to target social benefits towards their most loyal voters (core voters). 
In that sense, the core voting base of the party is more responsive to any transfer given by 
the party who holds the office (Diaz-Cayeros, et. al, 2008). In terms of Diermeier and Li (2018: 
2) voters need not to necessarily be aware of their ideological position; as they only care 
about policies (such as CCTs) that may influence their experience.   
Following a Downsian (1959) model, the hypothesis of this study is that after a longer 
exposure to the programme beneficiaries as voters tend to focus on their future economic 
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expectations. In that sense, it is argued that the political cost of eliminating such programmes 
is higher than the cost of continuing them. It is to be noted that a diversity of political parties 
and actors (not only the incumbent) will promise to perform, continue, and even expand 
such programs once in office. In such situations, beneficiaries have no fear of losing their 
social assistance programmes and may switch their political preferences if a contesting 
party’s programme is more in line with their interests and economic expectations. According 
to the economic voting theory, economics always plays an important role when electoral 
decisions are made. Following this logic, beneficiaries as instrumental rational actors will vote 
in a rational way based on their own individually determined interests (Key, 1966; Downs, 
1957; Fiorina, 1981).  
The literature on the long-term effects of CCTs on voting behaviour is scarce with most of 
the studies focusing mainly on; a) the short-term performance of the programme, b) the 
increase of turnout rates following the implementation of the programmes, and c) how 
beneficiaries are responding to both national and personal economic conditions. It is 
important to mention that studies focusing on the socioeconomic effects on CCTs are more 
extensive and examine the effects in both the short and long run. The present study focuses 
not only on the short-term effects of the programme, but also explores the effects in the 
electoral behaviour of CCTs’ beneficiaries in the long-term.  
This study attempts to contribute in three different aspects to the existing literature. First, it 
compares two large scale CCTs in operation (Progresa-Oportunidades and Bolsa Família) with 
enormous similarities in the targeted population in order to observe how recipients respond 
to the implementation of the programme in both the short and long term, with the intention 
of testing two different theories of political economy (prospective and retrospective). 
Second, this study seeks to disentangle the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour and to 
identify which variables (i.e. years of education, region, gender or income) are strong enough 
to change voters’ preferences and ensure their loyalty to the incumbent in both the short 
and long term. Finally, this study contributes to the existing literature by combining both 
individual and aggregate level data from both countries in order to measure the effects of 
CCTs on voting behaviour of beneficiaries more accurately. While some other studies have 
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relied only on either individual or aggregate data, by combining both levels this study 
identifies which conditions shape beneficiaries’ decisions when casting a ballot.  
The key assumption of this research, following Cox and McCubbins´ core voter model (1986), 
is that beneficiaries may see the implementation of CCTs as an indication that the 
incumbent’s policies are not only acting in their favour but also in favour of those who are 
less well off. In that sense, building upon Diermeier and Li (2018), incumbent policy makers 
may introduce office-motivated policies towards their electoral base so that they can, on the 
one hand, consolidate their constituency by providing them better benefits, and on the 
other, expand their electoral base by amplifying these policies. As a result, supporters of non-
incumbent parties could be willing to change their political preferences to support the 
incumbent party or candidate in the following election in order to maximize the future 
expected utility; this support may also continue through following elections. 
This research aims to demonstrate that beneficiaries of CCTs act rationally when casting a 
ballot in favour of the party in power or against it. This can be explained through various 
theories based on economic voting theory, retrospective and prospective voting theory. This 
study seeks to contribute to the research on the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour not only 
in the short term but also the longer term. It does so by assuming that recipients will vote 
for the party in power in the short term, seeking to maximize their utility based on economic 
voting theory (Downs, 1957), but that in the longer-term beneficiaries may or may not vote 
for the incumbent party, as there is no risk of losing the benefits. In addition, better educated 
beneficiaries or those with a relatively higher income tend to be more critical when casting 
their vote.  
Accordingly, beneficiaries tend to vote both retrospectively and prospectively. In order to 
clarify the latter, the retrospective voting theory maintains that voters consider past 
performances of the incumbent to evaluate future welfare. In addition, retrospective voting 
also presumes voters are more concerned about policy outcomes.  The prospective voting 
theory presupposes that voters only look to the future and take electoral choices according 
to economic expectations (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). When 
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beneficiaries vote for the incumbent to maintain their economic benefits, they are casting a 
ballot retrospectively; in other words, they choose to vote for a specific party based on an 
extrapolation of their current situation. This voting behaviour strategy is rational if voters are 
actually seeking the maximization of their utilities (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fiorina, 1981). 
In other words, for the purpose of this research, recipients would vote retrospectively in the 
short run when they reward the party that introduced the CCTs, but in the long run they 
would vote prospectively as they consider CCTs to be secure. This explains how CCTs could 
be a key determinant of voting behaviour in the short-run this topic will be discussed in more 
depth in the following chapters. 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The objective of this dissertation is to determine the effects CCTs on voting preferences in a 
time frame of 18 years. Both Mexico and Brazil share similar economic characteristics and a 
similar antipoverty strategy. By comparing these two countries, it was possible to analyse 
qualitatively the conditions, context and objectives of the two different CCTs in operation 
and to investigate to what extent such differences and similarities shape voting patterns of 
its beneficiaries.  
In order to analyse the possible effects of CCTs on voting behaviour, using the retrospective 
- prospective theory I draw upon three research questions: 
1. Are CCT beneficiaries voting following their self-interest rather than political ideology? 
2. Does time influence their voting behaviour? (short v. long term) 
3. Do CCTs increase incumbent support amongst both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries?  
In order to address these questions, statistics and econometric techniques have been used 
to analyse the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour, while qualitative comparisons between 
the Mexican and Brazilian cases bring to the table the importance of the type of 
implementation of the programme when analysing the findings.  
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Considering the above, the following hypothesis was evaluated:  
H1. The more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support for the 
party that governs at national level. 
 
The hypothesis assumes that beneficiaries are more rational and income-oriented rather 
than ideological; meaning that they will look more into their pocket (immediate benefit) and 
not into their political affiliation.  
1.4.  DATA 
 
In order to test the hypothesis regarding the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour, this study 
used data from different sources, given the aim of this work to test the effects of CCTs at two 
different levels of observation and two periods of time. A dataset for the Mexican case was 
created by using three different datasets. First, data from the Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) was used in order to reflect the effects of the programme on 
the likelihood of beneficiaries to vote for the incumbent party at the municipal level. The 
ENIGH dataset includes household socioeconomic information from a representative sample 
of all the municipalities in Mexico.  It was therefore used to determine which household 
characteristics were associated with a higher likelihood for voting for a certain party and to 
reflect the likelihood for a change in voting behaviour. However, with this data geographical 
voting patterns could not be obtained. A second source of data from the Federal Electoral 
Institute2 (IFE) was therefore used to demonstrate the effect of CCTs on voting behaviour at 
a municipal level. Given the main aims of this study, a dataset reflecting the evolution of the 
socioeconomic characteristics and the voting decisions of the beneficiaries was necessary. 
Therefore, both ENIGH and IFE datasets were merged into a new dataset at a municipal level 
that could allow an analysis of these characteristics. Finally, in order to observe individually 
the voting attitudes of the Mexican electorate a third dataset was required.  For this the 
 
2 Now National Electoral Institute (INE). 
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Mexico Panel Study, a large longitudinal dataset on voting preferences, was also analysed. 
This made it possible to assess the political attitudes of the Mexican electorate individually.  
Similarly, for the Brazilian case, two different types of data were used at municipal level. Data 
from Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and the National Household Survey were 
analysed. By using these surveys, it was possible to include the number of households 
receiving the programme on the basis of individual characteristics such as income, age, 
gender and years of schooling. In addition, data from the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) was 
used to identify results regarding vote share per candidate, party and demographic group. 
At the individual level, the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) was used to measure self-
reported vote and compare it with certain demographic and income characteristics as well 
as partisanship, government performance, political ideology, CCT coverage and political 
participation.  
Multivariate analyses were performed to examine the impact of CCT coverage as well as the 
impact of municipal and individual characteristics on voting behaviour in Mexico and Brazil. 
By aggregating households’ characteristics at the municipal level and then comparing them 
across time periods, changes on voting behaviour of the beneficiaries were analysed. 
1.5. STRUCTURE 
 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The next chapter (second) presents the 
historical and political background of both countries, focusing on the evolution of the 
democratic and political processes in Mexico and Brazil. The third chapter presents the 
literature review, which focuses on CCTs and their effects on political behaviour and 
socioeconomic outcomes. While this study will not focus on the socioeconomic effects of 
CCTs we cannot deny that some their results may have an influence on beneficiaries’ 
electoral decisions. The fourth chapter explains the methodological approach, the data used 
for the analysis as well as the difficulties encountered and how those difficulties were solved. 
Chapters five and six presents the results of the statistical analysis in both Mexico and Brazil. 
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Chapter seven presents the main conclusions, presenting the limitations of the study, ideas 
for new research and suggestions of influence of CCTs on voting behaviour. 
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This chapter describes both the historical and political context of the previous and current 
poverty relief policies that have been introduced in Mexico and Brazil. As briefly mentioned 
in the introductory chapter, Oportunidades and Bolsa Família are the oldest and largest 
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes in operation based on the number of benefited 
families and on the amount of their annual budget. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the 
historic reasons that led to the introduction of CCT´s in the region as well as the different 
stages in the design, implementation, and expansion of such policies. In this chapter 
similarities between Mexico and Brazil in terms of the general political and historical 
background and in their attempts to combat poverty and to provide public welfare to their 
citizens are presented. However, this chapter, also highlights important differences in the 
design and creation of the CCTs in each of the countries of focus.  
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes emerged in Mexico and Brazil during a time where 
democracy was more or less established. For much of the last century almost all Latin-
American countries were governed by authoritarian regimes with different degrees of 
intensity. Argentina, Brazil and Chile suffered the most with authoritarian military regimes. 
Relatively speaking the authoritarian regime in Brazil was less brutal than in Argentina and 
Chile but the military regime from Brazil was in power for longer when compared to the other 
countries in the region. By contrast, in the case of Mexico there was no such military regime. 
However, the country’s political system was dominated by a single ruling party created after 
the Mexican revolution which ruled the country for over 70 years.  
After the collapse of Latin America’s economy and increasing poverty and inequality rates 
during the 1980s Mexico and Brazil embraced new poverty relief programmes. The 
emergence of CCTs in Latin America was a response to the adverse consequences of 
stabilisation policies. The main idea of the designers (mainly former academics such as 
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Santiago Levy, who went into politics) of CCTs was to achieve sustained economic growth, 
but in order to reach that goal it was essential to increase the state intervention, making it 
clear that any linkage to political parties was prohibited, in social matters through a broader 
strategy that would allow significant and permanent progress in improving social conditions 
(Levy, 2004). In that sense CCTs, in contrast to previous poverty relief programmes, were 
born with the intention of eroding clientelism, promoting social participation and limiting any 
chances to politicize such policies (De La O, 2015).  
Despite the ambitions of the new democratic era and the introduction of CCTs such 
programmes coexisted with past clientelist policies. The previous poverty relief policies that 
remained in operation were considered as clientelistic as these programmes were delivered 
by the government in exchange for political support.  (Stokes, 2005; De la O, 2007; Weiss-
Shapiro, 2008; Zucco, 2011). Clientelism as defined by scholars, is the relationship 
established between a patron who offers goods in exchange for the concession of political 
favours or rights from the client (Fox, 1994; Sobrado Chavez and Stoller 2002).  As Fox posits, 
it is when “a wide range of political systems, including many that hold regular elections, 
oblige the poor to sacrifice their political rights if they want access to distributive 
programmes. Such conditionality interferes with the exercise of citizenship rights and 
therefore undermines the consolidation of democratic regimes” (Fox, 1994: 152). And while 
the previous social programmes were established on clientelistic bases, the new CCTs aimed 
to break the clientelistic cycle. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.  
In order to present the historical and contemporary circumstances, this chapter presents a 
summary of the political context of Mexico and Brazil before and at the time in which CCTs 
were introduced as a new poverty relief policy, followed by a brief description on how the 
programmes were created. While in both countries CCTs developed from existing social 
programmes, in Mexico CCTs started with Progresa, then renamed Oportunidades and in 
Brazil it started as Bolsa Escola becoming later Bolsa de Familia. The final section of this 
chapter focuses on the very important differences between the Brazilian and Mexican CCTs. 
Even if both are CCTs with compulsory conditions for their recipients, both were 
implemented differently, and their outcomes have been measured in different manners as 
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well. These differences are crucial for understanding possible differences when it comes to 
their effect on voting behaviour. 
2.2. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
2.2.1. MEXICO 
 
After the Mexican revolution, political power was held by several revolutionary leaders or 
“caudillos” across the country. Caudillos played a significant role in politics, mostly at state 
and municipal level making the country’s governance and succession of power difficult to 
manage. Therefore in 1929 Plutarco Elías Calles3 in an attempt to integrate all local 
leaderships into one single political force, created the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), 
later to become the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)4.  
Like its predecessors, the PRI operated on the basis of the principles of loyalty and reciprocity 
with the party creating adequate incentives to guarantee the support of its members in 
return for the opportunity to access political power. The hegemony of the party and its 
capacity to hold the presidency and almost every single political position remained 
untouched until 1997 when it lost the Chamber of Deputies majority and in 2000 when they 
lost the presidency (Weldon, 2002). Among other factors, an important explanation for the 
PRI’s hegemony was the use of clientelistic practices as well as the influence of the outgoing 
President in the appointment of his successor (Fox, 1994; Rubio, 1998; De la O, 2007).  
From its origin, PRI’s political power was concentrated within the incumbent President’s 
circle. It is worth mentioning that under Lazaro Cardenas’ tenure (1934-40) the first and 
perhaps the most significant transformation of the party took place.  Renamed as the Party 
of the Mexican Revolution (PMR), the ruling party adopted a corporatist structure, gathering 
peasants, mass organizations, workers’ unions, and the military. In this regard, four sectors 
were created to concentre the electoral core of the party, later becoming the clientelist 
 
3 Was a general of the Mexican army and President of Mexico from 1924 to 1928.  
4 The PNR became the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PMR) and later acquires his final name Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI). 
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network machinery of the successful PRI. Cardenas’s political orientation was rather socialist 
in the sense that he believed that the keystone to foster Mexico’s development was the 
creation of industrial communities through the distribution of land, the nationalization of the 
oil industry and through the expenditure on health and education (Aspe and Sigmund, 1984; 
De la O, 2007). 
It was under the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946) that the PRI obtained its 
current name. It was not only a change of name, but it also implied a change in ideology 
under the slogan “Democracy and Social Justice”. During this period, Avila Camacho created 
the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) in 1943 in order to provide health insurance 
to workers and their families, thereby establishing the country’s first welfare programme. A 
golden economic period reigned in Mexico from 1958 to 1970 because of the so-called 
stabilizing development created by Economy Minister Antonio Ortiz Mena, bringing annual 
rates of growth of up to 8% for the hitherto weak Mexican economy (Buffie, 1989). However, 
despite the strengthening of the economy at the macroeconomic level, income distribution 
did not increase amongst the poorest. The stabilizing development ended under the 
administration of Luis Echeverria (1970 – 1976).  While he presided over increased 
expenditure on social services and made access to health in rural areas one of the main goals 
of his administration, following the abandonment of Ortiz Mena’s economic model, 
economic crisis and high inflation rates prevailed until 1994.  
At the end of Luis Echeverría’s (PRI) tenure, Mexico was under great pressure regarding the 
balance of payments, its currency had devalued by nearly 50% and the once strong economy 
under the “stabilizing development” fell into a recession (Pastor, 1989).  The new President, 
José Lopez Portillo (1976 – 1982) took office during a financial turmoil. One of his first actions 
as president was to install a stabilization programme in order to address Mexico´s foreign 
debt account deficit with the International Monetary Fund (Pastor, 1989). At the end of the 
1970s, Mexico´s national income improved as a result of changes in the oil market; in 1979, 
the country´s oil reserves were at their best as the newly discovered Cantarell oil field 
boosted Mexico’s GDP by 9%, leading to a more expansionary fiscal policy (Buffie, 1989). 
During the second oil shock in 1979, Mexico’s economy benefited from the increasing oil 
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prices, enabling Lopez Portillo to expand even more the governmental expenditure 
regardless of the worldwide recession and the diminishing oil exports; this resulted in large 
fiscal deficits leading the country to a debt crisis at the end of his administration (Buffie, 
1989).  
Because of the generalised discontent about PRI’s economic performance in 1982, the 
opposition party PAN started to win political positions mainly in the north of the country. In 
that same year, in the northern state of Chihuahua 11 municipalities were won by the PAN, 
marking the beginning of the democratization on the country and the erosion of the 
hegemony of the PRI. In 1986, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, a member of the PRI and President 
Lazaro Cardenas’ son, created the “democratic current” inside the PRI, a movement which 
sought to democratize the selection process of candidates within the party. Two years after, 
following the PRI’s nomination of the candidate for the presidency (Carlos de Salinas de 
Gortari), the “democratic current” movement left the PRI causing a huge internal crisis within 
the party.  
Cuauhtémoc Cardenas ran for the presidency as candidate of the National Democratic Front 
(NDF), a left-wing coalition, which in 1989 became the Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD). In the 1988 election Cuauhtémoc Cardenas took almost a quarter of PRI’s loyal 
supporters. However, he lost in a very close contest against the PRI´s candidate Carlos 
Salinas. The election was followed by a post-electoral dispute where the NDF denounced 
fraud and-vote buying practices. As a result, Carlos Salinas’ tenure suffered from a lack of 
legitimacy upon taking power. After the presidential election, a democratic spirit remained 
in the country. Consequently, in the following year of 1989 Ernesto Ruffo, PAN´s candidate 
for governor of Baja California was elected; for the first time a non-PRI candidate became a 
state governor.  
As a candidate, Carlos Salinas promised severe changes in Mexican social policy to reduce 
poverty and after the post-electoral dispute, these changes sought to address and mitigate 
the general discontent among the population. Part of these changes included the creation of 
the National Solidarity Program (Pronasol) in order to respond directly to the electoral 
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challenges experienced after his appointment. Unlike other social policy predecessors, 
Pronasol was focused on the municipal level and targeted the urban poor, peasants and 
indigenous people.  
In the aftermath of the 1988 election, President Salinas had not only to govern with an 
increased proportion of opposition members in the Congress (though not enough to control 
Congress) and with a governor from the PAN, but he also had to deal with opposition within 
the traditional political class. To deal with the internal opposition once in office, President 
Salinas decided to integrate his cabinet with old guard politicians as well as with young 
technocrats; those young politicians were his inner circle. Carlos Salinas was a pragmatic 
politician, he wanted to maintain and boost not only his political support among rural areas 
but PRI’s; as pointed out by De la O, Carlos Salinas “argued that political support in the rural 
areas collapsed because time after time the government had promised much and done little” 
(De la O, 2007: 47). With that objective in mind Salinas’ administration created Pronasol.  
It was designed as a means-tested programme aiming to reduce poverty by providing food 
support aid, credits to farmers, grants, and scholarships for children, building and 
refurbishing public schools, communal electrification, and other similar measures creating 
social funds (Székely & Fuentes, 2002: 131; Becerril-Velasco, 2015). The programme sought 
to encourage community participation by conditioning the allocation of resources to certain 
communal activities (Piester, 1997: 469). As stated before, however, the programme was 
highly criticized as being corrupt and clientelist, as it was used more as a political tool for 
electoral purposes than as an effective poverty-reduction programme (Molinar and Weldon, 
1994: 136; Diaz-Cayeros, et. al, 2016: 90; 112).  
During his period in the presidency, Carlos Salinas launched several liberal and pro-market 
reforms. As a strategy, he decided to provide absolute economic power to the Ministry of 
Finance. As part of that strategy, President Salinas created, along with the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE), Pronasol as a powerful 
mechanism for the coordination of social development concentrating all the political power 
to the presidency.  
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Historically, Mexico’s social policy focused on giving affordable food to the urban and rural 
Mexican population; in Mexico food was always seen as the principal clientelistic resource to 
link strong social organizations with the government (Ansell and Mitchel, 2008). For example, 
the National Food Company (Conasupo), a powerful institution created by the hegemonic 
PRI during the ’60s overseeing food prices control, was used as a clientelistic tool to obtain 
benefits among the electorate in three different ways. First as an important boost to party 
loyalty among food consumers; according to Cornelius (1975) almost 70% of Mexican 
households used to receive Conasupo handouts. Second it was used to facilitate relations 
between PRI and its corporatist sectors, as all of their associates were ellegible to receive 
Conasupo´s handouts and products. These sectors include the Confederation of Mexican 
Workers (CTM), the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) and the National Confederation 
of Popular Organizations (CNOP).  
Carlos Salinas merged Conasupo with Pronasol in order to reorganize and expand the PRI´s 
presence across the country.  This increased the targeted population and delivered food to 
more than half of the inhabitants of the country. Besides Conasupo, the Salinas government 
created two parallel infrastructures to decrease malnutrition among the less well off in the 
most impoverished areas. Diconsa was a rural food support programme seeking to abate 
poverty by providing basic and supplementary food supply to rural communities and to 
encourage community participation, and Liconsa, the milk supply welfare programme, which 
was created to ensure effective milk supply among the population.  
In 1992, the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) was created through a massive reform 
of the Federal Public Administration. The newly created ministry combined the powers of 
the formers Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE) and the Ministry of 
Programming and Budget (SPP). The latter was the entity responsible for the operation 
Pronasol. Sedesol inherited the control of Pronasol but also the faculties of SEDUE, which 
were urban and land planning, human settlements, regional development, housing and 
ecology. Sedesol also retained the power to formulate, conduct and evaluate the country´s 
general policy of social development of the SPP making this ministry one of the most 
powerful of the country in terms of expenses. To this day, it is directly from Pronasol, the 
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flagship programme of Carlos Salinas´ government, that Sedesol takes up its social vocation 
and founding objective: the alleviation of poverty. (Meza, 2019). 
Due to Sedesol´s massive concentration of political power, Carlos Salinas decided to appoint 
Luis Donaldo Colosio as its first minister. Later on, Luis Donaldo Colosio was appointed as 
PRI’s presidential candidate. However, tragically in March of 1994, in Lomas Taurinas, an 
impoverished neighbourhood in Tijuana, Luis Donaldo Colosio was shot dead during a 
campaign rally, forcing President Salinas to reorganise his and PRI´s succession. Carlos Salinas 
appointed Ernesto Zedillo, Luis Donaldo Colosio´s campaign manager as the new candidate.  
The appointment of Ernesto Zedillo, who served under Salinas administration as Minister of 
Programming and Budget (the ministry in charge of Pronasol before Sedesol) and as Minister 
of Education, surprised Carlos Salina´s inner circle and the party members. Ernesto Zedillo, 
who had never been elected for a political position before, became President in December 
1994. 
In contrast to the 1988 contested and disputed electoral results, in 1994 Ernesto Zedillo won 
with 50% of the vote, on the basis of the largest turnout rate recorded. However, during his 
administration, Mexico’s economy suffered one of its most serious financial crises. After just 
20 days of Ernesto Zedillo’s commencement, the Mexican stock market’s value collapsed. As 
a result, more than half of the population fell into poverty and the country’s GDP shrank by 
7 % (Gil Diaz & Carstens, 1996; De la O, 2007). As part of the government’s attempts to 
address this economic crisis, in 1997, the flagship of Carlos Salinas’ administration Pronasol 
was replaced by the Program of Education, Health and Nutrition (Progresa). The new 
programme was designed to gather all the existent poverty relief programmes in operation 
(15 subsidised food programmes) into a centralised public spending programme for social 
development (Levy, 2006). Progresa aimed to solve the increasing poverty problem by 
initially providing social security to the poor through cash transfers to the households. The 
benefits of the programme were structured in a novel way, so that income transfers not only 
increased the family's financial resources, but also provided incentives to participate in other 
programme activities. The scale of the cash transfer was large, equivalent to an average 
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increase of 25% in the total income of families living in extreme poverty (Gertler and Boyce, 
2001).  
The programme was also designed to include a set of restrictions5 to break patronage 
practices and thereby make the programme unusable as a clientelistic tool. The restrictions 
also meant that the programme would not be identified too closely with the administration 
thereby preventing it from being exploited for partisan purposes. Progresa was introduced 
as new decentralized agency, in coordination with the ministries of Social Development, 
Health and Education. In contrast to Pronasol the Congress was in charge of establishing its 
budget, and its operating rules were published annually, including the number of families 
that could be enrolled, along with the amounts of aid offered and the requirements for 
beneficiaries. Enrolment had to cease several months before elections, and no payments 
would be made in the weeks before voting days. Payments were made through specific bank 
accounts appointed to each family or by the telegraph company if banks were unavailable. 
This strategy decreased the number of intermediaries or agents thus decreasing the 
probability of clientelistic misuse (Bate, 2004). 
This change in approach was in part due to the vision of its creators (Cristovam Buarque a 
politician from Brazil and Santiago Levy and José Gómez de León both academics and 
politicians from Mexico) regarding the importance of evaluation for fine-tuning the 
programme’s operations, to generate credible information and empirical proof of its 
achievements (Bate, 2004) but also as a result of the international pressure by organizations 
such as the World Bank (an external investor in the programme) to democratize the country 
and put aside clientelistic uses of social programmes.  
Ernesto Zedillo’s decision to curtail Pronasol was a risky political move: as Fox (1994) 
highlights, less than 40% of Pronasol´s budget was really committed to antipoverty spending. 
 
5 Constraints were made at beneficiary level, creating a direct relationship between the government and the 
beneficiary household by excluding any kind of intermediaries as middlemen. In order to strengthen ties 
between beneficiaries and government the basic aim behind it was to prevent abuses of policy such as 
corruption or the clientelism as had been the case with the previous programme PRONASOL. 
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Zedillo was determined to tackle the increasing poverty rates in the country.  However, as 
stated in the previous paragraph, Progresa´s budget was now determined by the congress. 
The programme faced political adversaries among the opposition parties at the congress, 
members of the cabinet and PRI’s congressmen. Within the congress, the programme was 
perceived as a new and sophisticated political mechanism created by the new technocracy. 
Antagonism to the programme did not only came from the opposition parties but from the 
PRI itself as Progresa was designed to eliminate both Conasupo and Diconsa, strongly hurting 
PRI’s clientelistic muscle. Internally, the main problems were with the Minister of Social 
Development and the other 2 Ministries (Health and Education) that as these ministries were 
forced to fund Progresa. Scholars such as Rubio (1988) and De la O (2007) have tried to 
understand Ernesto Zedillo’s motivations for promoting Progresa, positing that he was a sui 
generis president of Mexico, emanating from the PRI but not a proper man of party or 
“PRIista”. He despised being not only the leader of the party but the non-democratic ways of 
the presidential candidacy process. That is why once he took office; he established a formal 
distance between the presidential figure and the activities of the party.  
Progresa's launch took place in August 1997, one month after the mid-term election. During 
those elections, the PRI lost for the first time in its existence its majority in the lower 
chamber. Three years later in the 2000 presidential election the hegemonic PRI was defeated 
by the National Action Party (PAN).  Despite what opposition parties believed in 1997, 
Progresa was resistant to any political manipulation by local and federal authorities; it is 
worth saying that also changes in the electoral procedures, the autonomy of the electoral 
authorities and increased transparency of elections facilitated Vicente Fox’s election as the 
first non-PRI candidate to win the presidency in 2000. Vicente Fox’s administration not only 
continued Progresa but extended the programme to urban areas, changing its name to 
Oportunidades in 2003 (discussed later in Chapter 5).  
2.2.2. BRAZIL 
 
While Brazil´s regimes changed from populism (1930 – 1945) to a dictatorship (1964 – 1985) 
the underlying pattern was one of conservative regimes relying on patronage to retain 
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power. The north of Brazil was, among other regions, the most affected by poverty and 
hence, more prone to succumb to clientelistic practices run by either local or federal 
governments.  In Brazil, weak party identification and strong clientelistic networks have 
always helped the incumbent to build a long-term relationship with its constituents. 
Following the latter, scholars such as Stokes (2007), Montero (2011) and Zucco (2011), have 
said that given the country´s large territorial extension it has been easier to conduct 
clientelistic practices in the less populated territories and rural areas. 
The first period of Brazilian Democracy (1946 – 1964), was surrounded by political instability: 
over the first 15 years period nine different presidents took office. As a result, in 1961 the 
political system changed from presidentialism to parliamentarism in an attempt to bring 
about political stability.  However, this political system lasted only 3 years (Power, 2010). In 
1964 a military coup established an authoritarian dictatorship which lasted until 1985. The 
coup against the left-wing President Goulart was supported by the Governors of Minas 
Gerais, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The military dictatorship lasted twenty-one years 
repressing civil liberties, censoring media, limiting suffrage (by setting literacy rules) and 
hounding political opposition. Despite the civil and political repression, the regime enjoyed 
substantial support in the 1970s because of the “Brazilian Miracle”, an exceptional economic 
growth period (Montero, 2014).  
Despite the previous success of the Brazilian Miracle, at the end of the decade a second oil 
shock hit Brazil’s economy leading to a trade deficit that impoverished the country, the north 
of Brazil being the most affected region. During the 1980s that region suffered the most and 
was more prone to succumb to clientelistic practices helping local incumbent authorities to 
maintained long term patron-client relationship (Stokes, 2007; Power, 2010; Montero, 2011, 
Zucco, 2011).  
In response to the democratic wave in the Latin American region during the 1980s, the 
military regime relaxed civil restrictions and held Presidential elections in 1984. In January 
1985, during the first elections held after the military dictatorship, the winning candidate 
Tancredo Neves died before taking office and his political partner and elected vice-president 
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Jose Sarney became the first civilian president in 21 years. During his presidency a new 
constitution was promulgated in 1988 which laid out the procedures for direct elections, 
reducing the voting age to sixteen and granting suffrage to individuals unable to read or 
write. Under this new framework, in 1989 Fernando Collor de Mello became the first 
democratically elected president since 1961.  
Fernando Collor de Mello promised during his campaign improvements in economic and 
social conditions. Since the beginning of his tenure his administration launched radical 
economic reforms to control inflation (which was up to 84% per month) and to stimulate 
Brazil’s economic growth. The “Collor Plan” was introduced to battle Brazil´s worst economic 
crisis (1987 – 1992): a -0.14 percent of GDP growth rate and hyperinflation of 1300 percent 
annually (Power, 2010). However, in 1992, the president was involved in a corruption scandal 
leading to an impeachment trial against him. In December of the same year Fernando Collor 
de Melo was deposed as president and was replaced by the vice-president Itamar Franco. 
The country continued to endure a severe economic crisis as hyperinflation persisted; along 
with the impoverishment of more than half of the population, such crisis led later to the 
introduction to the Plano Real designed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. 
As candidate of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a 
former ministry of economy of the interim President Itamar Franco, was elected as President 
over the Workers Party (PT) candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. President Cardoso was 
recognized as the key driver of the economic reform (Plano Real) during Franco’s tenure. The 
plan was successful and stopped inflation after almost fifty years and instituted a fiscal 
adjustment and for the first time in eight years. During his administration, Brazil grew 
constantly at 3.2 percent between 1994 – 2008, while inflation for the same period averaged 
8 percent annually (Codato, 2006).  
Aside from having to overcome the country’s economic problems as a Minister, as President, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso had to face another of Brazil’s biggest problems: poverty. Under 
the dictatorship poverty had dramatically increased across the country, with the countryside 
the most affected as agricultural subsidies and large development programmes were 
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suppressed (Ansell and Mitchell, 2008). The growing urban concentration led to the creation 
of poor neighbourhoods within the cities (favelas) where crime and poverty became a huge 
challenge for the young Brazilian democracy. During the decade of the ‘80s the government’s 
efforts focused on increasing food distribution campaigns across the country. Unlike in 
Mexico, in Brazil large food distribution programmes like Conasupo did not exist; instead food 
distribution was managed through community kitchens and school meals. As in Mexico, food 
prices were controlled by the government, and rural credits and subsidies were given to 
producers across the rural areas. However, due to the high inflation rates and financial crisis 
those subsidies were cancelled (Ansell and Mitchell, 2008). 
These problems along with the financial crisis led President Cardoso to implement a CCT 
along the lines of the Mexican Progresa, as an attempt to minimize the effects of the 
economic crisis for the impoverished population at the municipal level. In Brazil unlike 
Mexico, state or municipal governments are in some cases more important than the federal 
government (Montero, 2011). Aware of the importance of local leaderships, the first CCT in 
Brazil (Bolsa Escola) was launched in 1995 in the Federal District (Brasilia)6, the program was 
administered at the municipal level by a municipal civic committee whose members were 
appointed by the mayor. From the beginning the programme sought to fund those 
marginalized municipalities by requiring education as a necessary condition to access the 
programme (Ansell, et al., 2008; Zucco 2011). Later, this pilot became the second CCT in Latin 
America and the largest CCT programme in the region with more than 13 million household 
beneficiaries. In 1999 Bolsa Escola was expanded nationwide under the name of Bolsa 
Alimentaçao and restructured CCTs started as municipal initiatives but were later adopted 
nationally at the end of the Cardoso administration. 
As a result of the effectiveness of the Plano Real in curbing hyperinflation, Brazil’s new 
economic context led to the stabilization of the political system with low electoral volatility 
and high presidential competition during the re-election of President Cardoso in 1998. In the 
period from 1988 to 2012 the presidential competition was dominated by two parties: the 
 
6 Lindert, K., et al (2007). 
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PSDB and the PT. Political contestation changed from single party domination to alliances 
between larger parties and small ones. Plano Real not only brought economic stability, but it 
additionally brought the consolidation of democracy. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was able 
create consensus among political forces while promoting and implementing major reforms 
in macroeconomic and social policies and the political system (Power, 2010). 
Because of the increasing political participation and the consolidation of democracy during 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s tenure the PT grew exponentially in terms of seats held in the 
congress. Lula´s success in the election of 2002 despite Cardoso´s good administration was 
due to the increasing PT’s party organization at both lower and regional levels delivering 
substantial electoral benefits  by stimulating in 2000 the creation of local PT branches across 
Brazil (Van Dyck,  2014). By 2002 the party managed to hold up to 30% of the seats and 
become the leader of the leftist faction in congress. In the same year, in his fourth run for 
the presidency, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as candidate pledged to maintain Cardoso’s reforms 
and to continue with the same macroeconomic route. Lula da Silva won the election over 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, becoming president in 2003 and kept his word in maintaining 
the principles of the “plano real” and developing responsible economic policies.   
2.3.  CCTS’ DEVELOPMENT 
 
Both Bolsa Família and Oportunidades share the same foundations. Both programmes were 
created with the intention of involving the less well-off population not as mere recipients but 
as actors in the fight against poverty. Those ideas were drafted by politicians Cristovam 
Buarque and Santiago Levy and José Gómez de León (Brazilian and Mexican respectively). In 
this section the evolution of the development of Bolsa Família and Oportunidades are 
discussed within the specific context of the country is presented.  
2.3.1. MEXICO: FROM PRONASOL TO OPORTUNIDADES 
 
Mexico’s social security law was introduced in 1943 with the aim of providing health 
coverage, social security and pensions to the employed population of the country. As a result, 
 49 
an autonomous federal institution was created. The Mexican Institute of Social Security 
(IMSS) is an institution funded by the state, the employers and the employees. The benefits 
though are exclusively provided to contributors and their families leaving the rest of the 
population (unemployed and informal workers) without protection. It was not until the ‘70s 
that the first efforts of the Mexican government to meet the needs of the most vulnerable 
populations were carried out. To combat poverty several social programmes have been in 
place since 1977.7 All these attempts were designed to break the intergenerational circle of 
poverty, whereby “poverty generates poverty” (Rodriguez 2009:276). These efforts 
comprised various programmes such as the Public Investment Program for Rural 
Development (PIDER), the Coordination of the National Plan of Economically Depressed 
Regions and Marginalized Groups (COPLAMAR), and the Mexican Food System (SAM). These 
three programmes (PIDER, COPLAMAR and SAM) can be considered as the precursors of 
poverty alleviation programmes, but they were isolated programmes which did not attract 
the political importance and interest of the successor Pronasol. This may have been because 
the number of impoverished people was not as big as it was to become during the next 
decade. It was until the mid-80s that poverty relief became one of the priorities of the 
government agenda when as a result of the continuous economic crisis impoverishment 
reached alarming levels (Palacios, 2007:146).  
As discussed in the previous section of the chapter, another important policy introduced to 
mitigate the effects of poverty was the National Company of Popular Subsistence 
(Conasupo). The Company, created in the 1960s, focused on agriculture, food production 
and the rural economy and sought to boost economic activity in rural areas. The company, 
however, was characterised by widespread corruption and electoral manipulation. It was 
liquidated in 1999 by the Ernesto Zedillo administration, and with the liquidation of the 
company two important subsidies were cut off (for tortilla consumption and bread). 
Historically Mexico’s social policy focused on giving affordable food to the urban and rural 
 
7 Since 1977 to 2014, 8 different programs have been in place in order to reduce poverty: a) 1977, Coplamar; 
b) 1980, Mexican Alimentary System (SAM), later called National Alimentary Program (PRONAL); c) 1988, 
Pronasol; d) 1993, Procampo; e) 1997, Progresa; f) 2002, Oportunidades; g) 2008, Vivir Mejor and; h) 2013, 
Crusade against Hunger (Rodríguez, 2009). 
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Mexican population; food was always seen as the principal clientelistic resource to link 
society with the government (Ansell and Mitchel, 2008). 
Conasupo was used to create patron-client networks in three different ways: first to increase 
party loyalty among conasupo’s food consumers, and according to Cornelius (1975) almost 
70% of Mexican households used to received Conasupo’s benefits; second, the company 
served to calibrate the electoral machinery between PRI and its corporatist sectors8 
(workers, peasant and popular organizations); and third, the company allowed PRI to expand 
its clientelistic network outside its corporatist structures (Ansell and Mitchell, 2008; Díaz-
Cayeros et. al., 2008). 
a. Pronasol 
 
In 1988 after being elected president, Carlos Salinas decided to merge Conasupo with the 
National Solidarity Program (Pronasol), seeking to reorganize and expand government social 
aid across the country. The expansion was aimed to increase the targeted population. 
Besides Pronasol, two parallel infrastructures were created to bring food to the most 
affected areas by poverty (Diconsa and Liconsa). Diconsa aimed to abate poverty by 
supplying basic and supplementary food to rural communities and on the other Liconsa hand 
was created to ensure effective milk supply among the population.  
Pronasol started the era of poverty relief programmes and set the standard in the fight 
against poverty. Its main objective was to reduce poverty in indigenous communities and in 
rural and urban areas through the execution of 6 basic components: food, health, education, 
housing, employment and productive projects. The programme was created as a response 
to the economic crisis and the structural adjustment policies which were implemented in the 
1980s.  These policies were characterized by the consolidation of public finances, 
macroeconomic stabilization, and structural changes in the economy which led to growing 
social demands that were beyond the capacity of institutions to respond (Palacios, 
 
8 PRI’s corporatist organization serves to control unions in the country, only those linked to the ruling party 
could be a recognized trade union. The party created strong bonds with leaders by rewarding its leaders with 
positions at the congress 
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2007:155). These factors made Pronasol necessary as the structural changes in the economy 
made poor people poorer. Although peasants were granted property over their land, 
allowing them to sell it, the overall economic conditions, including high inflation rates and a 
weak currency exchange rate, made rural areas even poorer. 
One of the most important features of the programme was the launch of community work 
programmes, through the “solidarity committees”. Such committees established a new type 
of institutionalized social organization which became were the main channel for conveying 
the demands of the community to the both the municipality and the federal government. 
The rationale behind this idea was to eliminate the extreme bureaucracy existent in the 
previous social policies by creating a direct dialogue between the people and the government 
(Palacios, 2007:156). 
Pronasol’s aims were threefold: first, at a basic level it aimed to provide social welfare, 
improving living standards by meeting beneficiaries’ basic needs; secondly, the programme 
tried to encourage and create self-employment opportunities by providing specialized 
training on farming, forestry and extractive activities; and finally, it aimed to stimulate 
regional development through the construction of basic infrastructure which could have an 
impact on the local economy (i.e. road construction) as well as by implementing specific 
regional programmes and by promoting municipality’s development. 
The implementation of Pronasol started as an attempt to reduce the massive government 
subsidies by means-testing. The programme worked through a scheme based on 
mechanisms of co-responsibility. Carlos Salinas’ Pronasol was always considered as a 
compensatory programme not a poverty relief strategy since the constant economic crisis 
hit populations living in poverty conditions hardest (Rodriguez, 2007). Despite government 
efforts to improve living conditions among the less well off, these had not been enough to 
tackle the structural causes of poverty. In addition, the 1994 financial crisis eliminated any 
positive outcome in terms of poverty reduction that past poverty relief policies could have 
achieved. After 1994 new anti-poverty policies were born in a complex institutional context; 
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public opinion consistently pointed out that the programmes were opaque in their objectives 
and were created and used for electoral purposes (Palacios, 2007:175). 
Notwithstanding the programme being an innovative instrument of social policy, sought to 
mobilize and create social capital as a mechanism to combat poverty (Cordera and Lomelí, 
2005:16) its main problem was the generalised perception of the programme as the 
president’s social policy flagship, meaning that the programme was related only to Carlos 
Salinas and not to either the PRI or the Government. Pronasol was significantly important 
because it aimed to manipulate beneficiaries’ voting intentions and to promote the idea of 
partnership between the state and society in terms of the provision of loyalty and political 
support to the President and PRI (Cornelius et al. 1994; Fox, 1994; Diaz-Cayeros, et. al., 2008; 
Green, 2008).   
b. Progresa 
 
The 1994 economic crisis had a fundamental impact on the design of social policy and a new 
scheme of operations was established. The scheme combined measures which, firstly, 
provided the population with social assistance, health, education, job training and housing, 
and, secondly, directed a set of targeted actions to those living in extreme poverty, with the 
objective of investing in the human capital development of individual members of the 
impoverished households. To address the second objective, in 1997 the Program of 
Education, Health and Nutrition (Progresa) was implemented. The purpose of the 
programme was to increase the human capital of the impoverished population by combining 
food subsidies with a set of mandatory activities related to health and education objectives 
in order to receive financial support. The programme was focused on women and children 
living in rural areas in extreme poverty. In addition, Progresa sought to replace both Pronasol 
and Conasupo with the aim of ensuring greater efficiency in public spending and more 
transparency in its allocation (as noted earlier, less than 40% of the budget of Pronasol was 
really designated as antipoverty expenditure) (Fox, 1994). 
Progresa promoted cross-cutting actions for education, health and nutrition for those 
families living in extreme poverty. By doing so the programme sought to strengthen their 
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human capacities, raise their standard of living and promote their incorporation into national 
development (Conprogresa, 2000). The programme combined the traditional role of social 
assistance with a new perspective of social investment: it was expected that in the short-
term the programme would increase the poor households’ income by means of the cash 
grant while in the long-run, by investing in human capital, the programme would ensure 
better health, more education and higher incomes (Lindert, et al. 2006). According to Bate 
(2004): 
The programme would simultaneously address three key elements of human capacity 
building: education, health and nutrition. It would continue to provide aid in cash, not 
in kind. It would expand the conditions that families must meet to remain in the 
programme. And it would put women at the center of the programme by making 
payments directly to them, and not to fathers. 
The latter goals were to be fulfilled by the following components of Progresa: a) educational 
support through scholarships and school supplies in order to encourage school attendance; 
b) basic health care for all members of the household with free food supplements to 
pregnant and lactating mothers and to children under two years old; and c) cash transfers to 
support food consumption and nutritional status of the households (Sedesol, 1998; 62). 
One of Progresa´s most important features was the targeting method. The programme relied 
on a new and more accurate “poverty map” in order to target the neediest families by 
improving the quality of Mexico’s marginality index by aggregating a variety of social 
indicators, developing a points system that took into account various factors to objectively 
rank households as poor and by using a ranking system it sets the basis for a transparent and 
non-political allocating system (Bates, 2004). 
The programme was administered by the Ministry of Social Development which was 
responsible through the National Coordination of Progresa to design, coordinate and 
evaluate the implementation of the programme. The operation involved federal and state 
governmental levels: at the federal level through the ministries of Social Development, Public 
Education, Health and the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS); at the state level 
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During the administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) Progresa was renamed as the Human 
Development Program (Oportunidades) in 2002. The newly branded programme sought to 
continue with the strategy employed in Progresa by retaining its main characteristics while 
integrating new actions with the objective of extending access to both rural and urban 
households living in poverty conditions. As a result, in 2007 a decade after Progresa was 
launched, around 5 million families in 2444 municipalities were beneficiaries of 
Oportunidades (Sedesol, 2008). 
The programme aimed to fulfil the new government’s objectives in Social Development: first 
to increase basic human capabilities of all members of the households living in poverty 
through a strategic triad of comprehensive actions in education, health and nutrition, with 
the participation of the three government levels and second to improve access of the families 
to development opportunities, promoting security and self-sufficiency of individuals 
(Sedesol, 2003: 15). 
As with Progresa, Oportunidades was designed to break the intergenerational circle of 
poverty. The circle becomes a complex network of factors that prevent individuals from 
improving skills and education and even accessing the programme on the same footing as 
the rest of the population (Sedesol, 2003). In contrast with Progresa, Oportunidades had a 
National Coordination mechanism which brought together the activities of the Ministries of 
Social Development, Health, Public Education and the Mexican Institute of Social Security in 
one single office. Oportunidades was more innovative compared to the previous Progresa 
programme as it was extended to semi-urban and urban locations, the educational support 
was addressed to the young of the household to make them complete high school. The 
programme provided support to its beneficiaries once they stopped receiving benefits to 
transit to the productive stage as well. Finally, it used a formal methodology applied to the 
selection of poverty lines with the purpose of identify the target population more effectively. 
 55 
It is important to note that the programme was sustained by Fox’s successors Felipe Calderón 
from PAN and Enrique Peña-Nieto from PRI but, after the 2018 election, after twenty-one 
years of existence, the programme was curtailed by the new President Andrés Manuel Lopez 
Obrador arguing that the programme failed to reduce poverty.  
2.3.2. BRAZIL: FROM BOLSA ESCOLA, BOLSA ALIMENTEÇÃO, AUXILIO-
GAS, TARIFA SOCIAL DE LUZ AND CARTÃO-ALIMENTAÇÃO TO BOLSA 
FAMILIA 
 
As a result of the hyperinflation and debt crisis in the ‘80s poverty increased severely across 
Brazil, with the countryside being the most affected. Consequently, the rural population 
started to move to urban areas with the hope to find better opportunities. This migration to 
the urban areas led to the creation of large, impoverished concentration areas (favelas). 
During the 1980s the government’s efforts to reduce poverty were centred on boosting food 
distribution.  
 Cristovam Buarque (1987) proposed amongst other measures, that ensuring scholarships to 
the less well-off children of Brazil would maintain them in school, and this would make 
education the engine of the Brazilian model of development (Valencia 2013). This idea was 
replicated by Luis Inazio Lula da Silva in the 1990 Workers Party (PT) manifesto and then in 
1994, during Lula’s second run for the presidency (Aguilar and Araujo, 2002). In the same 
year Cristovam Buarque ran as candidate of the PT for governor of the Federal District, and 
included this proposal in his electoral platform he included this proposal. Cristovam Buarque 
won the election and once in office in January of 1995, his administration started Bolsa 
Escola. The programme was replicated across many municipalities, states and by the federal 
government (Suplicy, 2006; Draibe, 2006; Sugiyama, 2012). In 1995, other municipalities 
initiated similar experiences such as the Programa Garantia de Renda Familiar Mínima 
(Guarantee Program of Minimum Household Income) from the city of Campinas and in the 
municipalities of Ribeirao Preto and Santos, governed by the PSDB and PT respectively 
(Cardoso, 2011). 
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Between 1997 and 1998, different municipalities governed by different parties generated 
conditional cash transfer programmes and by the end of 1998 more than 60 programmes 
were in operation at local level (Draibe, 2006: 147). Between 1995 and 1999, the states of 
Amapá, Mato Grosso du Sud, Alagoas, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Goiás and Acre also 
introduced conditional cash transfer programmes (Aguiar and Araujo, 2002: 44). Given the 
importance of these programmes at local level, the administration of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso adopted and adapted such policies. In 1998 his administration introduced the Bolsa 
Criança Cidadã, to support municipalities in developing a programme of a minimum 
guaranteed income for the less well-off including the conditionality of school attendance; 
the programme was renamed in 2001 as Bolsa Escola. 
It was under the leadership of Fernando Henrique Cardoso first as finance minister in 1993 
and then as President from 1995 that the country’s economic volatility was stabilised. In 
response to the effects of the economic crisis, the government introduced a new national 
social policy with a broader scope than previous attempts. In 2001, under Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s administration the first nationwide CCT in Brazil was introduced under the name 
of Bolsa Alimentaçao. In 2003, under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva´s administration, Bolsa Família 
emerged as the fusion of four major CCT programmes implemented in Brazil: Bolsa Escola 
(to increase school attendance), Bolsa Alimentação (for maternal nutrition), Cartão 
Alimentação (bank card to buy selected food), and Auxilio-Gas (gas subsidy). Later, a fifth CCT 
was included; Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (a programme directed to 
eradicate child labour).  
The logic behind the fusion of CCTs was to integrate in one single programme all different 
cash transfers avoiding duplication and rationalizing operating costs. The new-born 
programme had a special twist being aimed at families not individuals. 
a) Bolsa Escola 
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Bolsa Escola, was a conditional cash transfer programme aimed to promote school 
attendance. As other CCTs it used a system to select its beneficiaries like the Cadastro Unico9, 
the programme reached 4.6 million of beneficiaries (De La Briere and Lindert, 2005). By the 
end of 2002, Bolsa Escola was in operation in around the 99.7% of Brazil´s municipalities 
(Draibe, 2006). 
b) Bolsa Alimentação 
 
Bolsa Alimentação was a conditional cash transfer programme which aimed to promote 
health care and nutrition among young children and pregnant mothers. The programme 
used the Cadastro Unico to select its beneficiaries reaching circa 900,000 households in 2003 
(De La Briere and Lindert, 2005). 
c) Auxilio Gas and Tarifa Social de Luz 
 
Both the gas and electricity subsidies were designed to help poor households pay their gas 
and electricity bills. Both subsidies reached up to 4.4 million households who were selected 
based on the Cadastro Unico.  
d) Cartão Alimentação 
 
Cartão Alimentação was a cash transfer programme (not conditional) which aimed to provide 
money to poor families to buy their basic food necessities. The programme used as method 
of selection the Cadastro Unico as a first step then the selection was confirmed or modified 
by the municipal councils. The municipal council was decisive in terms of eligibility (De La 
Briere and Lindert, 2005).  
e) Bolsa Família 
 
While Bolsa Família is very similar to the Mexican CCT Oportunidades, it is more flexible 
regarding the conditions imposed on its beneficiaries; the programme emphasizes poverty 
alleviation in the short term rather than the accumulation of human capital in the long term. 
 
9 The Cadastro Unico (Single Registry), is the mechanism that enables the MDS to identify the necessities of the 
poor segment of the population. Initially was used to collect data for the Bolsa Familia programme nowadays 
is used by more than 20 programmes (World Bank, 2015).  
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Bolsa de Familia was not a geographical randomized experiment, making it harder to 
evaluate the efficiency of the programme (Fiszbein and Shady, 2009).  
Bolsa Família born as part of a social protection umbrella called zero hunger (Fome Zero). 
Later the programme was strengthened with decentralised management (Hall, 2006; Da 
Silva, et al. 2010; World Bank, 2010). As part of the strategy the Ministry of Food Security 
and Fight against Hunger was merged with the Ministry of Social Welfare in order to create 
a new Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MSD). This action minimized 
the difficulties in programme administration by concentrating it in one Ministry. It unified 
the operational structure, beneficiaries’ records, data collection and reporting and transfer 
systems.  Even so, the collection of data, the registration of potential beneficiaries into a 
unified household registry (Cadastro Unico), and the inspection of the compliance with the 
conditions are among the actions remaining at the municipal level (Hall, 2006). 
The Cadastro Unico is a database that allows the government to know with accuracy the 
socio-economic situation of the potential beneficiaries. The information consists of general 
characteristics of the households: access to public services, income level and basic data 
about each member of the household. It is used by the MSD for the selection of potential 
beneficiaries of Bolsa Família. In a first step, the municipalities are responsible for the 
integration of data; afterwards, the Federal Government consolidates them to a single 
database. Nowadays, the Cadastro Unico has more than 21 million registered potential 
beneficiaries. 
Bolsa Família has two main objectives; a) to reduce poverty and inequality by direct cash 
transfers to poor families and; b) to reduce future poverty and inequality levels by investing 
in human capital (Lindert, 2005). To meet those objectives, the programme focuses on three 
main aspects: income transfers, conditions that need to be fulfilled and complementary 
programmes. The income transfer promotes immediate poverty alleviation, conditions are 
made to strengthen access to basic social rights (education, health and social care), and 
complementary programmes aim for the development of families in order to overcome the 
situation of vulnerability (MSD, 2012). The programme provides a monthly grant, up to a 
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maximum of R$172 (US$ 80), to poor and extremely poor beneficiaries. In the case of poor 
households, the grant is given to those with a total monthly income of less than R$140 (US$ 
65), who have children up to seventeen years old with a maximum of five per family and/or 
to a pregnant woman. Grants are conditional upon a minimum school attendance of 85% for 
children from 6 to 15, minimum school attendance of 80% for those aged 16 and 17. It also 
requires nutrition monitoring for pregnant and nursing women, prenatal and postnatal 
monitoring for children aged 7 or younger and complete immunizations for all children. As 
for the extremely poor, which are households with a total income per month of R$ 70 (US$ 
32), they receive besides the conditional grant a monthly extra grant of R$70 (US$ 32) and 
this grant is not subjected to any condition. In addition, all beneficiaries receive an energy 
subsidy of R$ 15 (US$ 7) every two months (Hall, 2006; Hall, 2008; Lindert, 2005; Soares et 
al., 2010). 
2.4.  IMPLEMENTATION 
2.4.1. PROGRESA – OPORTUNIDADES 
 
Progresa was initially implemented as a pilot programme in a set of randomly selected 
municipalities in seven of the poorest states in the country (except from Oaxaca due to avoid 
conflicts with the teacher’s union). Once its effectiveness was proven, the programme was 
then gradually introduced throughout the country (Levy, 2006). The rationale behind a 
phased strategy was to be able to evaluate the programme’s impact on the benefiting 
communities in comparison to those who did not receive these benefits (Levy, 2006).  
Progresa´s targeted population were those households living in extreme poverty mainly in 
rural areas measured in multidimensional terms. Two methods of selection were applied in 
a consecutive manner, first to select locations marginalized and second to identify the 
poorest households within those locations. To select and then incorporate the targeted 
locations, a central criterion was preferred; ordering localities by using a marginalisation 
index. Once identified by following the marginalisation index, a set of locations that have 
 60 
access to education and health services were considered eligible by following a distance 
criterion (Conprogresa, 1999). 
After the randomized trial in seven states the programme was extended to 300,000 families 
across 6344 localities in 12 states with a budget of approximately US$ 5.8 million. The success 
of this phase led to the programme being gradually expanded, reaching more than 6.5 million 
families, almost 24 percent of Mexico’s population by 2012. In terms of its geographical 
coverage, Oportunidades is now in operation in 187,000 localities in all the 32 states of the 
country and Mexico City covering 100% of the nation’s municipalities with emphasis on the 
most marginalized households, deploying an annual budget of US$ 4.5 billion (Levy 2006; 
Gertler, et al. 2012). 
Similar to Progresa, Oportunidades applied a rigorous system of identification of its 
beneficiaries. The programme used the National Survey of Income and Expenditures of 
Households (ENIGH) ran by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) to 
identify possible beneficiaries by a proxy means test of socioeconomic and demographic 
indicators among all the households in the eligible municipalities. Families incorporated into 
Oportunidades received their benefits based on their poverty conditions subject to 
compliance with the imposed conditions: regular attendance (once a month) to medical 
check-ups at the health services and regular assistance to the school. 
Once a community was identified, a second household survey was performed in each locality 
to gather information about the socioeconomic characteristics of every household and then 
determine which families qualified as poor or extremely poor. The list was forwarded to 
community assemblies for an error test and feedback; feedback was of key importance as it 
helped to determine if families were erroneously excluded or included (Parker, 2003; 
Skoufias et al., 2001).   
In accordance with the rules of operation (Sedesol, 2010), the design, measurement and 
identification of the families that were likely to be beneficiaries, was performed following an 
objective, homogeneous and transparent methodology. This methodology was based on an 
estimate of the household income, through a set of socioeconomic and demographic 
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variables that could vary according to the size of the locality in which they live. By using this 
methodology, the Oportunidades office could identify households with socio-economic and 
demographic conditions similar to the conditions of those households with an income per 
capita below the poverty line. Incorporation, reinstatement and permanence in the 
programme was defined based on the household’s socio-economic (monthly per capita 
income estimated) and demographic conditions, except for those households living in 
localities with full coverage, in which case, every single household of the locality was eligible 
regardless of their per capita monthly estimated income (Sedesol, 2010). 
Following the approach adopted by Progresa, the Oportunidades conditions of eligibility 
were extended to those households who fulfil the following priority criteria:  
a) The estimated household monthly income per capita should have been below the 
line of minimum welfare.  
b) The household must have had inhabitants aged under 22 years. 
c) Households whose monthly income per capita was below the line of minimum 
welfare and had women of reproductive age.  
d) Also, were eligible to remain in the Program, households whose monthly income per 
capita was less than the average of the permanent check of the socio-economic 
conditions. 
2.4.2. BOLSA FAMILIA 
 
Bolsa Família was designed as a targeted policy, being accessible only to those who fulfil the 
eligibility criteria. The basic selection criterion was to focus exclusively those who live in 
poverty and extreme poverty. Accordingly, the programme is intended for persons classified 
in the Cadastro Unico (single registry) as poor or extremely poor. In addition to the income 
criteria, a set of populations excluded from other social policies were included in Bolsa 
Família, notably people who live in rural settlements, on the street, on indigenous territories 
(MDS, 2005:13).  
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The single beneficiary registry is a database which aims to unify and support Brazil’s many 
social assistance programmes. The Cadastro Unico was a response to the necessity to 
improve both the effectiveness of the country’s safety net and the coordination between 
ministries, thereby cutting the double-counting of beneficiaries and ensuring better and less 
expensive administrative costs. The registry was designed in order to identify families 
classified as poor10. The programme provides a monthly grant to poor and extremely poor 
under five different types of benefits:  
• Basic Grant: is a monthly non-conditional grant aimed at the families considered 
extremely poor with a value of R$70 (US$ 32) and this grant is not subjected to any 
condition. 
• Variavel Grant: is given to poor or extreme poor families with a value of R$ 32.00 that 
has among its members children aged between 0 and 15 years, pregnant women and 
breast fed. This grant is given to each family and the can receive up to five benefits 
(R$ 160.00).  
• Variavel Jovem Grant (BVJ): is a benefit aimed to adolescents between 16 and 17 
years old the value of the grant is R$ 38.00. This benefit is granted to every household 
in the programme which has teenagers between 16 - 17 years old and attends school. 
Each household can receive up to two BVJs (R$ 76).  
• Variável Gestante Grant: aimed to help pregnant women. It is worth to mention that 
a female teenager who receive the Variavel Jovem Grant (BVJ) may also receive the 
Gestante grant.  
• Caràcter Special Grant (BVCE): this grant is awarded only in extreme case where a 
change of the family situation from the supplementary programmes (Auxilio Gás, 
Bolsa Escola, and Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão Bolsa Alimentação) to the Bolsa Família, 
will cause them financial losses.  
• In addition, all beneficiaries receive an energy subsidy of R$ 15 (US$ 7) every two 
months (Hall, 2006; Hall, 2008; Lindert, 2005; Soares et al., 2010). 
 
10 Families whose income per capita was less than half a minimum wage. 
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On 14th of May 2012, during the Rousseff administration a new benefit was created; the 
grant of Superação da Extrema Pobreza na Primeira Infância (Overcoming Extreme Poverty 
in Childhood) aimed to provide additional support to those Bolsa Família’s recipients with 
children between 0 and 6 years. Its value is variable, as it is complementary income benefit 
granted by Bolsa Família to achieve family income to the sum of R$ 70.00 per capita. 
Bolsa Família is decentralized in terms of its management. While the operation is managed 
between the federal, state and municipal governments, the MDS is the responsible 
institution for the Program and other initiatives of income transfer. The national government 
transfers public money to local governments and they deliver grants to Bolsa Família 
beneficiaries. Within municipalities, the municipal social assistance institution is responsible 
for the operation of Bolsa Família. The institution has the responsibility to establish 
programme’s guidelines and to oversee the management of the benefits. The municipal 
manager has the power to decide on where and how potential beneficiaries are enrolled. 
The alteration of enrolment records is one of the main actions of the municipality in the 
process of management. 
It is mandatory for the municipalities to execute and oversee the operation of Bolsa Família.  
In that sense, it is possible for the MDS to assess how the implementation of the Program 
will differ between municipalities, ensuring that the programme could identify different 
needs between municipalities or regions. The national government assigns the safety net 
budget and guidelines to the municipalities and these will implement the programme in 
accordance with the social assistance infrastructure they possess. As a result, the operation 
of the Program differs from city to city in terms of the implementation. 
2.5.  SUMMARY 
 
In summary, while Mexico did not have a military dictatorship regime like Brazil, the ruling 
party had managed to stay in power for more than 70 years. Poverty relief programmes were 
focused on providing affordable food to urban and rural areas and were a clientelistic 
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resource to link social organisations to the government. After Carlos Salinas’ tenure, Ernesto 
Zedillo came to office and after just 20 days Mexico’s market value collapsed. As a result, 
more than half of the population fell into poverty, shrinking the country’s GDP. In order to 
overcome this poverty crisis in 1997 Progresa was created by gathering all the existent 
poverty relief programmes in operation (15 subsidised food programmes) into a centralised 
public spending in social welfare (Levy, 2006). This programme had the aim of increasing 
human capital of the impoverished population combining food subsidies and mandatory 
activities related to health and education in order to receive a monetary grant. Then in 2002 
Progresa was renamed to Oportunidades aiming to enhance access to both rural and urban 
households in poverty conditions. By 2007 the programme aided 5 million families in 2444 
municipalities.  
Similarly, in Brazil the authoritarian military dictatorship lasted twenty-one years with short 
democratic interludes during the 1950s and 1960s (Fausto, 2014). The authoritarian regime 
focused on clientelistic practices run by local or federal governments building a long-term 
patron client relationship. After the dictatorship, Brazil returned to democracy in 1984, later 
in 1989 Fernando Collor de Mello became the first elected president, but in 1992 was 
impeached after a corruption scandal and Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected in 1995 
(Fausto, 2014). During his tenure, he started programmes focusing on community kitchens 
and school meals, However, due to the effects of the economic crisis at a municipal level he 
implemented the first Brazilian CCT Bolsa Escola. This programme was a CCT aimed to 
promote school attendance. Other programmes were also developed such as Bolsa 
Alimentação, Auxilio Gas and Tarifa social de luz as well as Cartão Alimentação but in 2003 
were merged to form Bolsa Família. 
Bolsa Família and Oportunidades are very similar, but the first is more flexible with regard to 
the fulfilment of the conditions imposed to its beneficiaries while the second specified 
mandatory activities related to health and education in order to receive the monetary grant. 
Oportunidades was designed as a geographical randomized experiment in order to evaluate 
its efficiency but Bolsa de Familia was not making it harder to evaluate. These programmes 
share the same foundations and were created with the scope of involving those in economic 
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hardship in the fight against poverty and in contrast to previous poverty relief programmes 
were born with the intention of eroding clientelism and promoting social participation. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As explained in the previous chapters, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature 
in terms of the effects of CCTs on political support towards the incumbent party. With that 
in mind, the first section of this chapter presents a review of the effects of CCTs on voting 
behaviour, looking first into how CCTs are seen as fiscal interventions which follow different 
strategies for the allocation of resources depending on their political benefit.  
Then, the theories of voting behaviour are reviewed, the complementary rational and 
sociological approaches. Within the rational approach, the prospective theory from Downs 
(1957) and the retrospective theory from Fiorina are presented, while in the sociological 
approach, findings by Klesner are discussed. Existing literature focusing on the two 
theoretical approaches of voting behaviour from Mexico, Brazil and other Latin American 
countries is presented. However, existing literature on the effects of CCTs on voting 
behaviour is scarce when compared to literature focusing on the socioeconomic outcomes 
of the programmes. Moreover, most of these studies are single-country studies and to this 
researcher’s knowledge, literature aiming to contrast the effects of the programmes on 
voting behaviour between countries is scarce. However, it is important to note that there is 
relatively little evidence regarding the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour. Moreover, 
literature is even scarcer when looking into the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour after a 
long period of exposure to the programme. This is followed by a brief discussion of 
clientelism and the differences between programmatic and non-programmatic policies.   
Then a brief summary on studies available concerning the socioeconomic outcomes of CCTs 
including their effects on individual health and economics is presented. As following their 
introduction to the social policy arena, CCTs have been perceived to be an effective tool for 
reducing inequality and improving school enrolment and health among the targeted 
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population and these positive outcomes could also serve as motives shaping voting 
behaviour. Finally, a brief conclusion of the chapter is also included.  
3.2. EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH 
TRANSFERS ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
 
This section considers the debate on the effects of CCTs in the context of the wider literature 
on voting behaviour. It presents first a brief description on how CCTs are seen as fiscal 
intervention and of why most programmes are directed to the less well-off particularly in 
Latin America. This is followed by a discussion of the two main approaches to the targeting 
of redistribution policies used by political parties to gain voters. The section then reviews the 
literature on the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour in terms of the rationalist and the 
sociological perspectives: the first of these focuses mainly on explaining how beneficiaries 
make informed political choices while the second examines whether beneficiaries may 
change their voting behaviour as a result of the conditionalities of the CCTs (such as school 
attendance or healthcare) increasing political participation within their communities.  
 CCTS AS FISCAL INTERVENTIONS 
 
CCTs are often seen as a fiscal intervention as taxpayers´ money is redistributed. Explanations 
of the effect of fiscal interventions on voting behaviour are grounded on Key’s (1966) model 
of fiscal interventions which argues that voters tend to reward the incumbent for 
programmes implemented and received during their period in office. However, the model 
also argues that there could be a counter effect when the expansion of social programmes 
is at the voters’ expense (by means of increases in taxes), leading to support for other parties 
as an electoral punishment to the incumbent. The electorate often responds to economic 
situations, forcing the political parties to target interventions at the poorest as they are more 
likely to respond to economic boosts than voters in a better economic situation (Diaz-
Cayeros et. al., 2007; Nichter, 2018). The large numbers of individuals living in poverty 
become relevant to this study because both CCT programmes operate in countries with high 
poverty rates. Around 50% of their population was living in poverty from the period of 1990 
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to 2002, (46.32% and 48.14% in Mexico and Brazil respectively) (World Bank, 2018). 
Following Key’s (1966) theory, those receiving benefits are more likely to vote for the party 
in power, while those who are not beneficiaries may vote for the opposition as a punishment 
against the incumbent for not including them in the programme. For example, those citizens 
from the north of Brazil who are recipients of Bolsa Família are more likely to vote for PT 
when compared to citizens from the same region sharing the same socioeconomic conditions 
but that were not eligible to receive the programme. However, as in the sociological 
approach, it is important to consider that voters may often perceive fiscal interventions as 
actions improving the welfare of the community provided by the incumbent government. 
Under those circumstances, non-recipients will change their political patterns in favour of 
the incumbent as a response to their expected future utility.  
 MODELS OF REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES  
 
Aside from targeting the less well-off through fiscal interventions, political parties tend to 
consider other characteristics in order to allocate social programmes. Two main models for 
the allocation of redistribution policies have been described with the main objective to grasp 
how likely voters are to respond to economic promises.  The first one was presented by Cox 
and McCubbins (1986) and the second one was suggested by Diaz-Cayeros (2007) and 
Weinschenk (2010).  The first model was introduced by Cox and McCubbins (1986) and built 
upon the distributive politics theory. Voters were divided in three groups: core voters, swing 
voters and opposition supporters. Voters differ from each other to the extent of how likely 
they are to respond electorally after an economic transfer is given. This theory argues that 
core voters are more responsive than the other two groups because of the adherence 
dimension, which is defined as a personal linkage between the party and a specific group of 
the electorate. Scholars such as Nichter (2018) called this form of adherence “relational 
clientelism” which he defines as an ongoing exchange relationship that is extended beyond 
the electoral period. “Relational clientelism” as described by Nichter (2018) refers to the 
awareness of the political parties of the electorate’s needs and desires which is reflected on 
making promises focused on such needs in order to obtain a greater electoral response. By 
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targeting their existing electoral base, or core voters, parties increase their voter’s 
adherence. This model is similar to Fiorina’s (1981) theory of party identification, which is 
rational as voters are loyal to their parties because of a series of retrospective evaluations. 
In other words, partisanship is the accumulation of personal experiences along with 
evaluations of the incumbent´s politics; such evaluations are useful to identify and to 
understand changes in party identification (Weinschenk, 2010). 
Drawing upon this model Diaz-Cayeros, et. al., (2007) identified as core supporters the 
electorate that seeks to maintain long term relations with the incumbent mainly based on 
loyalty. Following Kahneman and Tversky (1982) candidates who are more risk-averse11 will 
rationally take a decision to focus redistribution on their core supporters as they are easier 
to target in order to obtain the highest electoral utility. In contrast, a candidate who is more 
risk-seeking will tend to target more resources to those who are less responsive to transfers. 
Evidence from low-income countries, where clientelistic practices are more common, shows 
that risk aversion is also applied by citizens, as they have shown preferences for parties 
providing immediate benefits. This explains why among politicians from this region, common 
clientelist policies include the distribution of benefits in a disproportionate way to the less 
well-off (Scott, 1969; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013; 
Nichter, 2018). 
Notwithstanding, there is a second model of distributive politics suggesting that political 
parties should provide benefits to those who are not their core supporters (i.e. swing voters). 
The reason behind this is that core supporters will vote for them regardless of whether 
transfers are made or not. By focusing on swing voters, parties should have higher chances 
of increasing their electoral performance. This model is particularly relevant for close 
elections where swing voters may have more influence. Given the fact that swing voters are 
 
11 According with the psychology of preferences a risk-averse decision is the one in which the decision maker 
will chose the option that leads to the highest utility. As an example of the above if someone must decide 
between two options. The first option guarantees a sure gain. The second option instead is a risky gamble that 
offers a greater gain with a small chance of winning nothing. Under these circumstances most people will prefer 
a certain gain rather than a small risk to not win. In opposition, a risk-seeking preference is common when it is 
necessary to make a choice between a sure loss and a substantial probability of larger loss. (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982; 160) 
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more prone to respond to economic stimulus, scholars have suggested that targeting 
resources to voters who have no attachments to a party may be more rational than focusing 
benefits only on the core supporters. (Diaz-Cayeros, et. al., 2007; Weinschenk, 2010).   
Both models follow the same assumption: voters are rational and tend to reward parties and 
politicians for the benefits received. Several studies have demonstrated that when a 
country’s economy grows and remains stable, there is a positive correlation between 
personal economy evaluations and vote share for the incumbent as a good personal 
economy is perceived as a benefit from the incumbent (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Alesina 
and Rodrik, 1994; Lewis-Beck and Steigmeier, 2000; Diaz-Cayeros et. al., 2007; Stokes, 2007; 
Green, 2008; Fried, 2011; Zucco, 2013).  
 THEORIES OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
 
Scholars have tried to understand the responses of voters towards these redistributive 
policies. In order to do so, two main approaches have been described. The first approach is 
the rational approach and is supported by Downs (1957) and Fiorina (1981). It highlights that 
citizens vote seeking for their own interests.  The second is the sociological approach and is 
supported by Kelsner (1997). This approach argues that some individuals may cast the ballot 
focusing on improvements within the community disregarding whether they are recipients 
of the programme or not. Even if they are not opposing theories as it is a rational choice to 
cast a ballot for the incumbent if benefits are seen within the community, evidence from 
each of the theories will be discussed separately.  
3.2.3.1. RATIONAL APPROACH  
 
As briefly explained in the earlier paragraph, the rational approach draws mainly from the 
works of Anthony Downs (1957) and Morris Fiorina (1981). Both pointed out that citizens 
tend to act rationally based on their own interests. However, Downs´ theory is prospective, 
meaning that ballots are cast looking into the future, while Fiorina´s is retrospective, meaning 
that ballots are cast looking into the past. Downs (1957) suggested that voters act in 
accordance with their rational expectations and will cast a ballot by calculating the expected 
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utility of their choices (prospective theory). In his prospective voting theory, Downs (1957) 
suggested that voters respond better to future economic policies that a candidate or party 
may promise to enact once in power. He argued that the most difficult challenge regarding 
voting behaviour is the decision whether or not to participate in any election; in the end, 
rational citizens will vote for the political party or candidate that best represents their future 
personal interests. Downs suggested that under incomplete information about the 
opposition’s promises, voters would choose to continue to favour the incumbent if they 
perceived a good economic performance during their tenure. For example, in the 
presidential elections of Mexico and Brazil over recent years, opposition candidates were 
willing, at least in terms of their political discourse, to maintain and to expand social policies 
such as Oportunidades and Bolsa Família in order to provide the less well-off better life 
opportunities. According to Nichter (2018), once the marginal utility of income is diminished 
poor citizens will give more value to economic benefits than their ideological preferences. 
Under these premises, opposition parties are able to benefit from programmes that are 
already in operation by promising the continuation of such policies and further expansion. 
By doing so such parties could diminish the electoral effects of the programme in favour of 
the incumbent. In the case of Mexico this strategy might help to explain the PRI´s return to 
power in 2012. 
In contrast, Fiorina (1981) introduced the retrospective economic voting theory which states 
that voters consider past events when casting their ballot. Regarding voters’ response to 
economic conditions or to implemented policies during a certain period, Fiorina observed 
that voters tend to combine both approaches (prospective and retrospective). The 
retrospective theory, according to Fiorina, can be seen in two ways, as a "simple" vision which 
is one that reflects citizen's direct experiences with economic or political events individually 
and as a "mediated" vision, which reflects the sum of opinions regarding the economic 
performance or the general political situation (ibid: 80). 
According to these theories, we may expect that any change in vote position can and will 
only occur when voters have a widespread discontent with the policies implemented by the 
government, this dissatisfaction being always influenced by economic discontent. Following 
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the same logic, scholars (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck 1985; 1988) suggest that voters do 
consider past governmental performance but only to make projections about future 
behaviour. Therefore, they are unlikely to vote for the incumbent if economic conditions are 
getting worse. 
3.2.3.1.1. EVIDENCE OF A RATIONAL APPROACH AMONG VOTERS FROM MEXICO  
 
Using data from Pronasol, studies from Molinar and Weldon (1994) regarding the 
relationship between public expenditure and electoral response found evidence that the 
programme spending was related to the incumbent´s electoral response capacity. They 
concluded that Pronasol was key for the PRI electoral recovery during the midterm election 
of 1991. In contrast to these findings by Molinar and Weldon (1994), Dion (2000) argues that 
the PRI´s electoral recovery in the 1991 elections was mainly due to macroeconomic 
variables, such as inflation and growth, and not to the distribution of Pronasol handouts.  
Once Progresa was introduced, Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Estevez (2007; 2008) pointed 
out that even if CCTs were introduced as a programmatic policy, where the allocation of 
public goods is rules-based making them less prone to political manipulation, could in fact 
affect voting behaviour. Following the prospective voting theory CCTs beneficiaries could 
change their voting preferences from the incumbent to another candidate or party in the 
subsequent electoral period by making rational decisions about their future utility rather 
than acting in line with their ideological predisposition. In their study Diaz-Cayeros, et. al. 
(2007) used survey and municipal level data combined with econometric matching 
techniques to analyse the effect of CCTs on incumbent support in Mexico’s presidential 
elections. They concluded that during the 2000 presidential election CCTs beneficiaries were 
about 17% more likely to support the incumbent PRI than non-beneficiaries, while in 2006 
they were 11% more likely to support PAN (new incumbent). They also found that contrary 
to Kitschelt’s (2000) theory which posits that clientelism tends to fade with higher levels of 
development, in the Mexican context this was not the case as clientelism seemed to be 
stronger in areas with middle levels of development where there are larger levels of private 
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goods provision rather than in the poorest areas of the country (Diaz-Cayeros et. al., 2007; 
2008).  
Another important consideration when looking into the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour 
is the time exposed to the programme. Tina Hilgers posits that “the core element of 
clientelism is a long-term relationship of unequal power in which identifiable actors exchange 
goods and services that often involve political allegiance” (Hilgers, 2008; 7). Time and actors 
are two important elements for this work´s purposes as one of its main objectives are to 
identify if the longer the exposure of the CCTs to its beneficiaries have influenced voting 
preferences. Continuing with the discussion about the association between poverty and 
redistributive politics, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni (2007; 2008) argue that CCT 
interventions in Mexico were mainly targeted at the poorest municipalities of the country 
for two main reasons: poverty alleviation alongside to the higher likelihood of less well-off 
individuals responding electorally to income transfers. They also show that the PRI’s electoral 
strategy of Pronasol went further from their core supporters as the programme made more 
per capita transfers to municipalities where PRI’s support was diminishing. Bruhn (1996) also 
argues that the distribution of Pronasol was driven by political interests. As a final remark, 
they posit that only private goods can be used by the political parties to create credible 
threats to the electorate (such as conditional cash transfers) in order to obtain political 
support (Diaz-Cayeros et. al., 2007: 32-36). 
 In contrast to Diaz-Cayeros et. al., (2007) study, Green’s (2006) study is one of the two 
exceptions in literature about the effects of CCTs on political behaviour that did not find a 
positive relationship between the programme and vote share in the Mexican federal 
legislative elections in 2000. She used a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the 
political effects of Progresa in the 2000 presidential election. Her study was mainly focused 
on the short-term effect, only three years after the programme was implemented. By using 
the highest and lowest income percentiles of the target population, Green (2006) found that 
the programme had no significant effects on the incumbent vote share. The latter outcome 
was in spite of the mechanisms characterizing the political system during the PRI’s tenure, 
whereby clientelistic relationships between the incumbent and the citizens were possible 
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because of corporate control of the population. Some of the political manipulation 
mechanisms that have been described in the literature included: threats of losing services 
such as water availability or gas infrastructure development; the offer of better 
infrastructure; threat of job loss; offering money in exchange for the voting ID; and offering 
money in exchange for votes for the incumbent (Aparicio, 2002). Green (2006) explains that 
PRI members were more likely to run the Progresa office as they were closer to the federal 
government. As a result, the political party was in control of the municipality and brokers 
were more likely to manipulate the municipality for voting for the incumbent or for not voting 
for certain parties. In addition, she also infers that recipients of the programme, as expected, 
will vote for the incumbent party as a result of the cash grant but those who are not 
recipients are more likely to vote against the new incumbent as they could have considered 
themselves to be unfairly excluded from the programme. 
By the same logic Menocal (2001) using data from Progresa, reproduced the study made by 
Molinar and Weldon (1994) for the Mexican presidential election of 2000. Interestingly, her 
results found that the public expenditure in terms of handouts distributed in 1999 did not 
show any changes in the voting patterns. However, when the number of benefited 
households was considered in her model, evidence of political bias appeared.  
Ana de la O (2013) reached similar conclusions by using a difference in difference approach. 
She took the year 1997 as baseline for her experiment and relied on data from a field 
experiment conducted in municipalities with full enrolment. She divided the observed 
population in households exposed to the programme from the beginning (circa 21 months) 
and those households exposed for only a few months before the 2000 presidential election. 
By doing that she found an increase in turnout rates of 7% and an increase in the incumbent 
vote share of 4%, which was not enough to keep the incumbent in power (though it is 
important to bear in mind that the exposed population to Progresa in that year was not 
extensive). She suggested that this 4% increase in incumbent vote-share was due to the rapid 
increment of Progresa’s enrolment (16%) in the 6 months prior to the election. She inferred 
that CCTs did have an effect on voting behaviour patterns as a result of the increment in the 
number of the beneficiated household leading to a greater support towards the incumbent 
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in the short-term. Most interestingly, De la O’s results suggest that during the 2000 elections, 
the increase in the vote share for the incumbent PRI, did not imply a decrease in the vote 
share for PAN (presidential election winner), the ideological opposite of PRI. Instead, she 
found that there was a decrease in votes for the leftist PRD. As she states, Progresa was a 
geographically randomized programme - those municipalities which benefited from Progresa 
from the very beginning had higher turnout and vote-share rates in favour of PRI than those 
municipalities who were included in the programme later. Her work suggests that the effect 
of Progresa on voting behaviour was stronger in the short-term rather than the long-term.  
She concludes that the programme would have the effect of increasing the voting of the 
ruling party that created and implemented the programme and that regions that receive 
more resources would present a higher turnout.   
Contradicting Ana de la O’s (2013) results, the work of Imai, Kosuke, et al. (2006) shows that 
CCTs may not have an effect in terms of political support in the localities where the 
programme was firstly introduced as she sustains. Imai, Kosuke, et al. (2006) posits that De 
la O’s methodology and data was wrongly used. As she managed to compare total votes with 
vote share, in their work (Imai, Kosuke, et al., 2016, 3) they show that De la O’s positive 
results about the “partisan effects of this nonpartisan programmatic policy were due to an 
unfortunate interaction between simple coding errors and highly unconventional model 
specifications in the data analysis” and after correcting De la O’s errors, reach the conclusion 
that CCTs have no relationship with electoral behaviour in Mexico’s presidential election in 
2000.  
3.2.3.1.2. EVIDENCE OF RATIONAL CHOICE AMONG VOTERS FROM BRAZIL  
 
Following the studies by Menocal (2001) and Ana de la O (2013) from Mexico, several studies 
from Brazil have also found a relationship between the number of recipients and votes for 
the incumbent. The studies of Marques et al. (2009) and Abensur et al. (2007) regarding the 
2006 Brazilian elections found that the greater the number of benefited families of Bolsa 
Família, the greater the proportion of votes received by the incumbent specially in the 
impoverished regions (Northeast). A more recent study using Brazilian municipal level data 
 76 
by Canêdo-Pinheiro (2015), found that an increase of one percent in the number of Bolsa 
Família beneficiaries raised Lula's vote by 0.55 percentage points, while the same variation 
in the GDP growth rate increases the voting only by 0.21 percentage points. His results 
suggest that the impact of the CCT on voting was greater than the impact of economic 
growth, but as in Menocal (2001) work this does not seem to be the main explanation for 
PT’s vote share success in the less developed regions. He concludes that voters in the less 
developed regions, are more reliant on the government assistance and are more prone to 
vote for the incumbent, regardless of their party preferences.  
The latter can be explained because all parties were in favour of continuing the programme. 
In terms of the economic voting theory, they may still be rational if in a competitive electoral 
race both incumbent and opposition parties have on their platforms the continuation and 
the expansion of the CCT among the population. De la O (2013) concludes that CCTs lead to 
a higher electoral participation. In the long-term, she sustains that once the programme gets 
institutionalized beneficiaries may vote for any party as they have no fear for the programme 
being curtailed. The underlying rationale is that they do not see any threat of losing their 
benefits if they shift their vote. She also concludes that the reason why voters may shift to 
the opposite party is that such party may offer more in terms of not only continuing the 
programme but expanding it. Both Diaz-Cayeros, et. al (2007) and de la O’s (2013) studies 
suggested that changes in vote share are not ideologically motivated but are more likely 
utility driven, as expected by the retrospective voting theory (Fiorina, 1981). 
Similarly, Layton and Smith (2011), posit that social assistance programmes do affect 
electoral behaviour because beneficiaries have a strong self-interest in maintaining their 
benefits. They also sustained, as with De la O (2013), that in case of doubt about whether 
the opposition party will continue such programmes, those who receive the benefits will vote 
for the incumbent because they want to secure their economic condition. Nicolau and 
Peixoto (2007) found that Bolsa Família had a positive impact at the municipal level on the 
president-elect's vote in 2006 regardless of the region or its socioeconomic situation. They 
conclude that Lula obtained higher voting percentages in municipalities that have received 
higher resources from Bolsa Família.  
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In that sense CCTs beneficiaries are likely to vote, once the programme gets institutionalized, 
for those parties or candidates who promise to improve their socioeconomic status. 
Beneficiaries in such scenarios take into consideration not only the incumbent’s past 
performance but the chances of increasing their benefits if they shift their vote. This logic 
presupposes that beneficiaries are rational and utility oriented rather than ideologically 
motivated (Stokes, 2005). Most of these perspectives are based on the pocketbook theory 
which suggests that voters are mostly influenced by their personal conditions more than 
anything else (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). This leads us to infer that voters will support 
political parties that have shown the intent to preserve the benefit or their economic 
interests and will reject those who may be a threat to their interests.  
In the same light, Hunter and Power (2007) raised a number of explanations about Lula's 
performance in the presidential election of 2006 and how successfully he managed to change 
the electorate’s behaviour. They suggested that one of the key explanations, in accordance 
with what was previously presented, is related to economic factors: the less well-off voters 
would have voted largely for President Lula in return for having improved their living 
conditions. They also posited that the key to understand Lula's victory are focused social 
policies (such as Bolsa Família). 
In both of his first studies on CCTs and its effects on voting behaviour, Zucco (2008; 2011), 
followed a similar approach to De la O (2013) and found that the Brazilian Bolsa Família had 
generated electoral boosts in favour of the Workers Party. Zucco highlighted that, although 
the programme was an important factor in the changing electoral support for the party 
during the 2006 presidential election, it was not as important as the country’s strong 
economic performance. Similar to Zucco (2008), Carraro et al. (2007) found that Lula's votes 
were concentrated amongst the less developed municipalities mainly due to higher handouts 
from Bolsa Família. However, their results were not robust enough suggesting that, perhaps 
Lula´s electoral victory was due to the changes in the labour market, low inflation and the 
export success of the Brazilian economy than to the Bolsa Família benefits. 
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In a third study, Zucco (2013) looked at the effect of Bolsa Família in the long-term by 
analysing 3 presidential elections (2002, 2006 and 2010).  He found that Bolsa Família had a 
significant effect on boosting vote shares for the incumbent party during the 3 past elections. 
In addition, Zucco also found that the increase in the incumbent’s vote share was constant 
among Bolsa Família beneficiaries but such an effect tended to fade if the resources provided 
to the beneficiaries started to decrease. This is perhaps the only long-term effect study on 
the literature about the CCTs on voting behaviour.  
Similar to De la O (2013), Zucco (2013) found that CCTs do not generate any kind of 
partisanship or party identification. Instead, beneficiaries tend to be strictly utility oriented. 
In the same vein, Diaz-Cayeros, et. al., (2007) maintain that “poor voters in vast areas of the 
developing world not only respond more to transfers than to ideology, but their partisan 
loyalties are significantly more responsive to these transfers than to symbolic appeals” (p.7). 
In contrast to these studies, Bohn (2011) found no significant effect of Bolsa Família on Lula’s 
re-election in 2006. Dismissing quasi-experimental techniques on the grounds that the 
programme had been implemented on a non-randomized basis, Bohn relied on a probit 
model to examine the effects of the CCT on the 2002 and 2006 Brazilian presidential 
elections. Bohn found that Lula’s re-election was due to three factors: first, Lula’s electoral 
base started to grow since 1994; second, most of Bolsa Família beneficiaries were already 
Lula’s supporters in 2002; and finally, she points out the possibility that the existing social 
policies in the country like the Assistance Program for the Elderly were the key constituency 
that contributed to Lula’s electoral success in 2006. In order to examine beneficiaries’ 
socioeconomic background and past voting behaviour, she used individual level data from 
the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from Lula’s first candidacy in 1989 until 
2006. As a result, she found that Lula’s constituency was gradually increasing during every 
election hence the shift in Lula’s electoral base did not occur during 2002 and 2006 where 
Bolsa Família was expanded considerably as Zucco (2013) suggested. Based on her results 
she concluded that Zucco’s (2013) statement about the increased in Lula’s electoral base 
amongst the poorest was not because of the expansion of Bolsa Família but was due to other 
programmes such as the Assistance Program for the Elderly. 
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Zucco and Power (2013) challenge Bohn’s findings and argue that Bolsa Família did have a 
significant effect on changes in voter patterns amongst beneficiaries and contributed to the 
increased electoral support that Lula received during the 2006 election. They posit that while 
Lula’s successes in the elections of 2002 and 2006 were almost identical in terms of electoral 
support, in 2006, Lula received great support from the poorest areas in Brazil where he had 
not been strong. In order to prove that Lula’s electoral base shifted from middle- and high-
income supporters towards the most needed they rely on six different surveys. By doing so 
they showed that the individual level data used by Bohn (2013) tend to overestimate Lula’s 
support as they conducted three different analyses using the same data used by Bohn. First, 
they tried to replicate Bohn’s results and estimates; second, they made corrections to her 
independent variables and finally, using a non-parametric matching they tried to address 
covariate imbalance as the non-randomly assigned nature of Bolsa Família. In all cases, the 
results obtained from their analysis were the same; Bolsa Família was positively associated 
at individual level support for Lula (2013: 8) and in contrast to Bohn’s statement their results 
showed that within the poorest population in Brazil, there was a shift in electoral support 
towards Lula in the 2006 election. As a conclusion, they suggest that the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey used by Bohn do not reflect the reality of the results of the 
2006 elections as it was conducted nine months after the election of 2006 and may be highly 
biased. 
3.2.3.1.3. EVIDENCE OF RATIONAL CHOICE AMONG VOTERS FROM OTHER LATIN 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
 
Among the studies that examine the link between CCTs and political participation in other 
Latin American countries, the most relevant is the one by Manacorda, Miguel and Vigorito 
(2009).  This study found that the Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social12 (PANES), 
a large-scale Uruguayan temporary CCT created with the intention to face the 2000 
economic crisis, increased political participation and the intention to vote among women. 
 
12 As Bolsa Família, PANES was a non-randomized programme. 
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They sought to identify the effects of the CCT on voting behaviour in the long-term even 
though the programme was temporary. By using surveys, they found a positive effect of 
PANES on support for the incumbent party amongst beneficiaries. Using a discontinuity 
regression design and post-programme household survey data they could calculate that 
beneficiaries were up to 14% more likely to support the incumbent party in the short-term 
and even after the programme was cancelled until 2008. The results obtained from the study 
of Manacorda et. al., (2009) supports the hypothesis that beneficiaries tend to base their 
electoral preferences upon the past performance of the incumbent rather than partisan 
ideology. Following Key’s (1966) theory on reward-punishment, beneficiaries of social 
programmes that perceive an increase in the household income tend to reward the party 
that provided those benefits. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, when the study 
concluded, a proportion of beneficiaries were still receiving some of the programme 
components13, a factor which could partially influence the results of their study. 
Another relevant study is Nupia’s (2010) quasi-experimental analysis of the effects of the 
Colombian CCT Famílias en Accion on voting behaviour he explored if the incumbent had 
been politically rewarded because of the expansion of the programme and if beneficiaries 
were prone to give up their political preferences so as to benefit from CCTs. Using fixed and 
random effects regressions he tested the effects of CCTs on vote share and the differences 
across voters with different ideologies. He used official voting information at municipal level 
data for the 2002, 2006 and 2010 presidential elections, covering almost 93% of the 
municipalities in Colombia (around the 97% of the Colombian population). He found that an 
increase of 1% in the Famílias en Accion eligibility rate resulted in an increase in the vote 
share for the incumbent of 0.5%. He found that the programme had a stronger effect on the 
vote share in municipalities with a stronger ideological alignment to the incumbent. 
However, in municipalities with a weaker alignment the correlation was still positive and 
significant. He concluded that municipalities with weaker alignment towards the incumbent 
are more likely to sacrifice their ideology in order to reward incumbents in exchange for 
 
13 Panes many components being the most important the cash transfer followed by a food card and a health 
card. 
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economic benefit. As a conclusion, he stated that higher poverty levels could give the 
incumbent a stronger incentive to expand the programme during its tenure as such actions 
could provide political advantages and reduce political competition in the short term.  
Baez, Camacho, Conover and Zarate (2012) also examined the effects of the CCTs in 
Colombia. Using a regression discontinuity technique, they estimated the effect of enrolment 
in the programme on both the intention to vote and turnout rates during the 2010 
presidential election. By using detailed data at individual level and voting booth levels they 
were able to find that CCTs are positively associated with incumbent support and voter 
turnout. Their study shows that turnout rates among beneficiaries are up to 2.5% higher than 
among non-beneficiaries. The latter can be explained mainly by women’s participation which 
as in other CCTs are the main beneficiaries of the programme. The most interesting results 
from their study was means-tested programmes, such as Famílias en Acción or 
Oportunidades, lead to an increase in political activity among beneficiaries.  
3.2.3.2. SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The sociological approach tries to explain voters’ behaviour with an emphasis on the 
influence of social participation on political participation. It is widely known that participation 
in generalized programmes will lead to higher political participation. Regarding social 
participation and based on Klesner (2007), CCTs may have a positive impact on democracy. 
The latter effect arises because by generating more educated, healthier and wealthier 
citizens who have more civic skills, CCTs lead to higher levels of participation in democratic 
activities. While it had been believed that means-tested programmes, such as CCTs, tend to 
reduce political participation (Campbell, 2003), recent studies such as De la O (2011), Zucco 
(2011), and Baez et al (2012) demonstrated that CCTs not only have a positive effect on 
turnout rates but they increase social participation among beneficiaries. The rational school 
and sociological school do not oppose each other, but rather complement each other in 
order to understand voting behaviour with regards to direction of the vote (the rational 
choice) and participation (the sociological school). Both schools are important for the 
hypotheses of this thesis as they help explain vote turnout among CCTs recipients.    
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This school includes two strands or models regarding political participation. The first model 
looks at the distribution of resources, which enables citizens to meet their basic needs; once 
these are met, citizens have the time to participate in the public life of their communities. 
CCTs therefore have a dual effect: on the one hand, through the provision of money that 
leads to an increase in household’s income and thus beneficiaries could have more time to 
engage in public affairs as they do not need to seek other sources of income; on the other 
hand through the implementation of conditional activities related to the programme such as 
the regular attendance to educational talks, nutrition and health centres visits, thereby 
granting citizens greater civic skills (Brady et. al, 1995; Klesner, 2007; Schober, 2013).  
The second model (Mobilization) examines the role that political parties play by exerting 
pressure on individuals to obligate them to participate in political activities. This model 
suggests that CCTs play an important role in increasing political participation amongst 
individuals that receive the programme. The logic behind this argument relates to the 
incentives that politicians may have which mobilize beneficiaries in order to involve them 
into political action and hence obtain high turnout rates. It is believed that if the benefits 
from the CCTs are attributed to the ruling party, it is likely that more beneficiaries will vote 
and will cast a vote in their favour. Thus, combining the rational and sociological schools, 
there would be a higher turnout for the incumbent. However, this role is closely linked to 
patronage practices as the incentives to provide grants in exchange for political support are 
high (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Kitschelt, 2000). 
It is worth remembering that to a certain extent political participation in Latin America is 
strongly linked to the implementation of social programmes as beneficiaries are compelled 
to do certain activities within the community leading to a better organised society. In some 
cases, when beneficiaries have a bad experience with the programme the result is the 
opposite as it may lead to lower social participation. Zucco’s (2011) study on clientelism in 
developing democracies suggests that inhabitants of localities that benefit from CCTs might 
act as if they are following a common social welfare. The reason for this is that even non-
recipients who live in localities with high rates of coverage with the programme, show higher 
support for the incumbent than non-recipients who live in localities with lower rates of 
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coverage. The above might be explained following the sociotropic voting theory, whereby 
beneficiaries vote according to the interest of the community and not by following their own 
narrow self-interest (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). 
Others, such as Klesner (2007), contend that those citizens who have acquired civic skills are 
more likely to participate either in political or non-political activities of their communities. 
Latin America unlike other regions has moderate levels of non-political organizational 
involvement and voluntarism which may be explained mainly by the experience of 
authoritarian regimes past that many countries of the region have in common. Democracy, 
as he argues, encourages political participation while authoritarian regimes discourage it. 
During the last few decades countries like Mexico and Brazil had developed strong electoral 
institutions and a growing democracy. Investment in social capital is an important factor in 
encouraging higher levels of political participation. However, levels of interpersonal trust are 
low in most countries of the region. In this regard Klesner (2007) sustains that interpersonal 
trust has increased in countries where CCTs are in operation, as beneficiaries, due to the 
conditions of the programme, must interact with other members of the community leading 
to the creation of trust linkages between community members. Similarly, Ana de la O (2011) 
sustains that after a long-term exposure to CCTs the programme leads to higher electoral 
participation. 
Following the above and in order to clarify the discussion about the effects of CCTs on the 
enhancement of political participation it is necessary to define what we mean by political 
participation. Booth and Seligson (1978: 6) define political participation as a “behaviour 
influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods". As previously stated, 
public goods are those that are consumed collectively, and no one can be excluded, for 
example, roads, hospitals, urban infrastructure, schools or other services provided by the 
government (Cornes and Sandler, 1986). Furthermore, Booth and Seligson (1978:6) sustains 
that the provision of public goods is not an exclusive activity of the government as 
communities can provide it in the form of social participation “through the collective 
expenditure of such resources as money, labour, and materials donated by residents”.  
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Political participation in relation to social policy has been widely studied in the United States 
(Campbell, 2003: Pierson, 1993; Kitschelt, 2000). The consensus is that means-tested 
programmes do not increase but decrease participation. In contrast to what’s been observed 
in the USA, recent studies on the effect of transfer programmes in Latin America arrived at 
opposite results: means-tested programmes such as Progresa and Bolsa Famila have 
increased political participation among the beneficiaries (Diaz-Cayeros, 2008; De la O, 2011; 
Zucco, 2011). Moreover, other studies not related to CCTs have observed the effects of the 
implementation of social policies in increasing political participation in Latin America. Klesner 
(2007) observed that investment in social capital in countries like Argentina, Chile, Mexico 
and Peru increased political participation amongst its citizens, arguing that citizens living in a 
democratic environment are more likely to participate in political activities. In the same way 
Brady, Verba and Lehman (1995) posit that the increase in monetary resources of a 
household as a result of the implementation of a cash transfer programme could lead a larger 
involvement in the community and by being actively involved beneficiaries’ civic skills 
increased allowing them to participate in politics.  
Garay’s (2007) study on the upsurge of protests in 1997 led by the unemployed and informal 
workers in Argentina draws on the idea that living under democratic conditions and having a 
larger income could lead to greater political participation. Her study hypothesized that the 
Argentinian workfare programme played a key role in the proliferation of complaints because 
of the participation in the workfare programme. She concludes that due to the participation 
in the programme, the unemployed generated a sense of community as well as common 
interests.  
As for the case of Mexico, it is to be noted that the first attempt to include social participation 
through a governmental programme was during the introduction of the Pronasol 
programme. According to its rules of operation the programme aimed to provide public 
goods to the poorest. Instead the programme acted as an effective tool to create strong 
linkages between the beneficiaries and the President. A few years later during Zedillo (PRI) 
administration, the Mexican government embarked on another endeavour with Progresa. 
However, this programme attempted to reduce political manipulation by excluding 
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intermediaries between the federal government and beneficiaries (Cornelius et al. 1994; Fox, 
1994; Rubio, 1998; Diaz-Cayeros, et. al., 2008).   
In contrast to the previous example, Montero (2010) posits that Bolsa Família was not very 
effective in diminishing clientelism in the Brazilian northeast. Although in the 2006 
presidential election Lula had tremendous support in almost all the regions in the country, 
at the local level conservatives retained power by using their past clientelistic practices. 
According to Montero it seems that the generalised economic growth had no effects on vote 
shares towards the incumbent at local level. The latter might be better explained by Weitz-
Shapiro (2012) who pointed out that in any high political competition, the threat of 
patronage is latent, especially in countries where poverty rates are high while among in 
richer countries the incentive to use clientelistic practices is almost zero. Accordingly, with 
Weitz-Shapiro, the social participation theory posits that the higher the income among the 
electorate the lower the clientelistic practices. Consequently Weitz-Shapiro concludes that 
in order to eliminate patronage incentives it is necessary to combine political competition 
and the creation of a larger middle class.  
Similarly, Anthony Hall (2008) found that, after longer periods of exposure, CCTs, such as 
Bolsa Famila, may create a dependency on the cash grant, thereby encouraging clientelistic 
uses of the programme. In addition, Phillip Keefer (2007) found that in younger democracies 
such as the Latin American ones, politicians might not be trustworthy as a result of the long 
periods of dictatorships and clientelistic practices. Keefer sustains that politicians might use 
CCTs as a way of targeting public spending in order to gain political support among a portion 
of the population. He as well as De la O (2013) found out that this effect may disappear when 
the programme is institutionalized, which is when it acquires political credibility. In terms of 
the sociotropic voting theory, whereby beneficiaries vote according to the interest of the 
community and not by following their own benefit (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981) it seems that 
CCTs have increased social participation and created a generalised sense of community in 
areas where there was no integration and participation amongst its citizens.  
 86 
3.3. CLIENTELISM AND THE ROLE OF PROGRAMMATIC AND NON-
PROGRAMMATIC POLICIES 
 
Mexico and Brazil went, with their great differences, from authoritarian regimes to regimes 
with high electoral competition. Competition together with robust electoral authorities and 
rules, high turnout, and pressure and concern from international agencies to avoid the 
political use of social programmes have paved the way for a new political dynamic. In this 
context, conditional transfer programmes (CCTS) have emerged, and have been considered 
an effective instrument to reduce poverty as they serve to increase the economic means of 
the less well-off (Nichter, 2018).  But they have also been seen as a potential tool for 
reducing, though not eradicating, old clientelist practices (Fox, 2012). 
Clientelism, as a socio-political phenomenon has been present and has been the object of 
study across different times and regions of the world. Jean Francois Médard (1976: 103) 
defined clientelistic relationships as those “of personal dependence not linked to kinship, 
which is based on a reciprocal exchange of favors between two people, the employer and 
the client, who control unequal resources”. This definition has changed over the decades and 
with the diversity of practices and actors that make up the clientistic relationship. Although 
clientelism has been the object of study within political science, it has not been able to 
constitute, on the one hand, its own academic field and, on the other, a unique concept 
around which conditions must be met in order to be defined (Vommaro & Combes, 2019).   
Before providing the definition of clientelism that will be used in this study, a brief review of 
the literature available on the broader concept of clientelism is presented.  Following Trotta 
(2003: 24), the existing literature can be grouped according to the following characteristics: 
those that pose clientelistic relationships as expressions of social conflict and domination 
(Berman, 1974; Auyero, 1999; Scheiner, 2007; Hilgers, 2011 ) and those that, like Fox (1994), 
define them as relationships that are maintained for the exchange of political favors for social 
benefits, these relationships are maintained cooperatively between employers and clients 
(Tapia and Gatíca, 2016). 
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When looking into clientelism through the eyes of Trotta, the traditional perspective on 
clientelism defines it as a top-down phenomenon where clientele relations are based on a 
total domination of the client. (Campbell, 1964). In this sense, clients are seen as simple 
actors who, once in the relationship, obey and follow the instructions of the elite. 
Considering this, clientelistic relationship would follow a pyramidal structure with the patron 
at the top, the broker in the middle and the client at the bottom. The idea of domination14 
of the patron over the client and the characteristics of the relationship between these actors 
occurs through the broker, as he is the one in charge of the distribution of resources and 
mobilization of voters (Strokes, 2013). Vommaro and Combes (2019) point out that the figure 
of the broker is vital in the clientellistic relationship as the patron relies on it to channel 
resources to the areas of political interest, brokers have a more or less direct political role at 
the local level.  
In the context of this research, the role of brokers in the distribution of resources through 
non-programmatic policies15 was vital since brokers are the ones to decide whether to grant 
benefits to loyal supporters or to deliver them to swing voters. As will be discussed later in 
the chapter where the types of voters are presented, Stokes, et. al., (2013: 31) argue that in 
developing democracies (such as Mexico and Brazil) swing voters are very sensitive to the 
delivery of benefits since they receive very few benefits and do not have any partisan 
commitment whereas loyal supporters have a strong partisan preference and are less 
sensitive to such benefits. 
Clientelism is a phenomenon that varies depending on the time, the region, and regional 
political characteristics. Social changes have permeated the way in which clientelist reality is 
observed and that is why, speaking within the Mexican context, it could no longer be 
sketched from relations of domination (Molinar, 1991). It is in this sense that authors such 
as Piattoni, Daieff and Nichter point out that the patronage pyramid is actually an inverted 
pyramid, where the base is placed on top. The role of the client ceases to be passive and 
 
14 It occurs by strengthening the client o voter partisan identification 
15 Understood as a policy where delivery of public goods is conditioned on their political support. 
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becomes the active ingredient of the clientelist relationship (Nichter, 2018), and the ones 
responsible for the survival of the clientelistic practice. In this same line, Piattoni (2007) 
argues that clients today are not forced to enter into a clientelistic deal if they are not willing. 
Nevertheless, they choose it to gain privileged access to public resources. 
This paradigm shift leads to the second aspect stipulated by Trotta; clientelistic relationships 
are understood as cooperation between clients and patrons. This is in line to the rational 
choice approach discussed further in this chapter.  The clientelistic relationship is understood 
as an exchange in which both parties seek to maximize profit. In this sense, it is important to 
mention the study by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) theorizing about the nature of the ties 
between citizens and politicians which they define as a transaction. In this transaction 
citizens' vote exchanged for direct payments or continuous access to goods, services and or 
employment. They argue that granting a benefit to a citizen is to a certain extent a 
clientelistic practice as it is possible that in the absence of the benefit, voters would change 
parties (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 14). 
In this sense, as it was reviewed in the previous section, a significant number of studies have 
been carried out based on the work of Downs (1957) in order to study from a rational 
approach the effect of redistributive policies on electoral behaviour (Coughlin, 1986; Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; 1996; 1998). Once 
the change in the structure of the clientele pyramid has been observed, newer research has 
focused on studying the active role of clients (Auyero, 1999; Hilgers, 2008; Daieff, 2015; 
Nichter, 2018) to explain that the actions taken by citizens on a frequent basis reinforce and 
explain the emergence and survival of clientelism. Nichter (2018) points out that this survival 
is due to the fact that citizens often seek to maintain the clientelistic relationship if the state 
is not capable of mitigating some of their vulnerability (ie poverty). This means that when 
citizens have a perception that social policies are inadequate or have been politicized, they 
seek to maintain continuous exchange relations with politicians or parties that provide 
benefits. In this sense, the link that results from the patron-client relationship is the product 
of a maximization of mutual utility (Piattoni, 2001).  
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Differences between programmatic and non-programmatic policies and clientelism.  
 
One of the great challenges surrounding the conceptual definition of clientelism has to do 
with the way in which power relations and other forms of political exchanges differ. Because 
of this, it is important to group the different distributive policies into two main categories: 
programmatic and the non-programmatic. While the first have clear, transparent and public 
operating rules which establish who receives what, the second do not have clear operating 
rules. The latter is relevant as much of the existing literature places an important emphasis 
on the concept of clientelism proposed by Fox (1994: 153) "a relationship based on political 
subordination in exchange for material rewards". Such a definition could be seen as failing 
not only to distinguish between clientelism and other forms of reciprocal exchanges between 
actors but also to determine to what extent the use of material incentives by political parties 
are able to influence electoral behaviour (Fox, 2012).  
Specifically, in the Latin American case, it has manifest itself in a diversity of practices, and 
as such has proved difficult to define (Fox, 1994). In this sense, although CCTs can favor large 
portions of society, the benefits are distributed following an orderly and transparent system 
to all those people who can access these benefits regardless of the way they have voted.  
Nevertheless, establishing operating rules does not completely eradicate the possible 
clientelistic uses of the programmes (Nichter, 2018). Because of this Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
(2007) established five key components to identify the typology of links that exist between 
citizens and politicians. These components are: a) contingency of the exchange (if it changes 
the behaviour of the voter); b) the nature of the goods offered to voters (individual or 
collective); c) predictability, the probabilities that the voters react to an incentive; d) 
elasticity, understood as the number of votes that were won by the number of resources 
used and; e) supervision (monitoring) of the amount of information available on the needs 
of the electorate. 
Considering this, authors such as Kitschelt (2000), Nichter (2018) and Daieff (2015) point out 
that programmatic policies should not be considered as clientelistic since, in a certain way, 
they lack one of the constitutive elements of the clientelism; the contingency (contigency), 
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understood as the granting of a benefit in exchange for the vote.  As seen in figure 3.1. Daieff 
points out, based on Kitschelt and Wilkinson, that we must be attentive to the distinction 
that exists between the links that may arise derived from clientelism and from programmatic 
politics. Although the differences between the two are subtle, not having a clear idea of what 




In the same vein, Fox (2012) points out that many definitions of clientelism focus on a subset 
of political bargaining relationships that involve the exchange of private (non-programmatic) 
goods, in contrast to programmatic policies, often associated with public goods 
(programmatic). While private goods are considered more susceptible to discretionary use 
and therefore to be politicized, public goods are granted following rules-based procedures 
and therefore are less susceptible to political manipulation. However, Fox points out that 
because there are very few public goods that can be universal, then there will always be 
room for their discretionary distribution. Although the implementation of programmatic 



















Source: Adapted from Relational clientelism: Defining attributes  
and citizen mecanisms (Nichter, 2018: 9) 
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policies follows strict criteria for the allocation of resources, it is very difficult if not impossible 
to find a developing state where the allocation process and the infrastructure of the 
programmes are completely rule-based. This leaves room to certain degrees of discretionary 
allocation of resources. 
Fox (2012: 198) points out that the key difference for distinguishing clientelism is not 
whether public investment takes the form of public or private goods, but rather whether the 
allocation process is consistently and transparently based on rules, and if citizens have access 
to effective reporting channels in the event of political abuse. 
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Table 3.1. Illustrates the different types of allocation of public resources: on a discretionary 
basis (not programmatic) and those that follow operating rules (programmatic). As seen in 
table 3.1, it can be observed that programmatic policies could be designed creating a space 
for discretionary use and condition the allocation of resources with a political purpose. As 
Fox points out, access to programmes may be conditional of affiliation to the party in power 
considerably prior to the election. 
However, despite the existence of a margin of maneuver for political manipulation within 
programmatic policies, in democracies with effective competition and solid electoral 
institutions there is the impossibility of the verification of the citizen’s vote. This, together 
with constant monitoring, review of the operating rules and the effectiveness of the benefits 
delivered for the purpose for which they were designed of CCTs, clientelism would constitute 
an expensive and inefficient strategy. 
As previously pointed out, clientelism remains an elusive and difficult concept to determine. 
However, for the purposes of this research, it is defined as a) a personalized political 
relationship between actors with unequal resources, b) in which there is an exchange of 
goods, c) generally public. Clientelism is the exchange of citizen´s political support through 
the delivery of goods (tangible or intangible) with selectivity criteria oriented by political 
interests. 
3.4. IMPACT ON SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
While this study will focus only on the effects on voting behaviour, it is important to bear in 
mind that most of the literature about CCTs is about its socioeconomic effects. They are 
fundamental for the accumulation of human capital, as Valencia (2008: 489) argues: “if girls 
from poor families stay in school longer, in the future they will keep their own children in 
school longer”.  
Literature on the effects of CCTs on socioeconomic outcomes is wide and extensive. In most 
of these works, CCTs are addressed in terms of whether they are an effective tool for 
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reducing inequality and improving health among the targeted population. The increasing 
poverty rates among many nations in Latin America has led to the implementation 
of programmes that could, somehow, ease the poverty and health deficiencies that affect a 
large part of its population. In this case, the literature can be explained in terms of the effects 
on socioeconomic outcomes on three main aspects: income, education and nutrition. 
 HEALTH IMPROVEMENT 
 
The health improvement approach places its attention on three important elements of 
health: height and weight, nutrition and child mortality. Based on an extensive range of 
studies, a group of scholars was considered (Fernald et al, 2009; Galarraga et al, 2010; 
Gertler, 2004; Frenk, 2006; Homedes and Ugalde, 2009; Lagarde et al, 2007; Paes-Sousa, 
2011; Rawlings, 2005; Segal-Correa et al, 2008; Soares et al, 2006; Soares et al, 2010) such 
group concluded that CCTs have been a success in terms of nutrition outcomes among the 
targeted population in both Mexico and Brazil. They have found that beneficiary households 
were more likely to consume healthier food (vegetables and fruits) rather than non-
beneficiaries. In terms of weight and height, they have found that children under 5 years old 
and new-borns from mothers on the programme were more prone to have normal height 
and weight.   
As for health, based on studies about the impact of health care meetings, they have found 
that child mortality has been reduced at important rates, attributable to improvements on 
health conditions among beneficiaries. However, most of them have observed no variance 
in terms of vaccination in both countries, and this may be because of high immunization 
campaigns that have taken place in both countries during the last decades; however, 
regarding nutrition monitoring they have found positive effects.  
Authors focused on health and nutrition outcomes (Fernald et al, 2009; Galarraga et al, 2010; 
Gertler, 2004; Frenk, 2006; Homedes and Ugalde, 2009; Lagarde et al, 2007; Paes-Sousa, 
2011; Rawlings, 2005; Segal-Correa et al, 2008; Soares et al, 2006; Soares et al, 2010) 
generally found that CCTs require a better budget allocation and an adequate evaluation in 
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order to reach the more needed. Most of them have agreed that the aim of the health care 
meetings is to achieve disease prevention. On this point, Galarraga (2010) found evidence to 
support the claim that the universal health insurance in countries with low and middle 
income, has a protective effect on health expenditures. Some of the authors cited above 
have concluded that in terms of nutrition and health, where positive outcomes could be 
noticed, there is no differences between early beneficiaries and later groups (regularly those 
who join the programme after one or two years).  
Progresa has been a particular focus for those assessing on the socioeconomic effects of 
CCTs.  Since the beginning of the programme, Progresa was designed as randomly assigned 
with the intention of being evaluated and examined in terms of the possible positive effects 
on the accumulation of human capital and therefore it success in reducing poverty levels and 
to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. Many scholars (Attanasio and Mesnard, 
2006; Berhman and Hoddinott, 2005; Fernald et. al., 2009; Gertler, 2004; Lagarde et. al., 
2007; Soares et. al., 2010), using different techniques as multivariate regression, panel data 
analysis, probit estimates, difference-in-difference estimators, propensity score matching 
among others have tried to estimate its effects. For example, Fernald et. al., (2009) using a 
T-test and a multivariate regression analysis tried to compare the effect of the programme 
on (1) height for age, (2) body mass index and (3) cognitive language and behavioural 
assessments. Their results present no significant differences between early treatment groups 
and late treatment regarding height for age and body mass index; however, their findings 
regarding behavioural problems were the opposite, showing that early treatment led to a 
positive reduction compared to those on late treatment. Nonetheless, they did find that 
children aged between 8 to 10 from uneducated mothers who have received up to 18 
months more of the programme before they have reach 3 years old are 1.5 cm taller than 
those who did not received the programme.  
Focusing on the same and using a panel data analysis approach Berhman and Hoddinott 
(2005) arrive at similar conclusions as Fernald et. al. (2009), finding that amongst the initial 
treatment group in Progresa, children present an increase in height of about 1cm after one 
year of being in the programme. In the same line of study Gertler (2004) found that among 
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children aged between 1 to 3 after an exposure to the programme for one year were almost 
1 cm taller that those who were not exposed. However, those who present higher size are 
those who belong to the oldest group of recipients (Lagarde et. al., 2007).  The main 
conclusion about the increase in height on Progresa’s children is that they received additional 
nutritional supplements which may have boosted the effects of the programme in height and 
not necessarily because of the monetary grant. In contrast to the previous statement, Soares 
et. al., (2010) by comparing the Colombian Famílias en Accion to the Mexican Oportunidades 
were the first to show positive outcomes in both weight and height. Such results are mainly 
attributed to the cash component and not because of nutritional supplements. In the same 
tone Attanasio and Mesnard (2006) find a positive effect of the programme on consumption 
of better and most nutritious food with the first year of being a recipient. 
Regarding the effect of CCTs on nutrition, the debate about the two flagship programmes in 
the region (Brazil and Mexico) has been intense due to the disparity in the results about 
malnutrition. While in Mexico the programme has shown a significant impact on increasing 
height, weight and nutrition, in Brazil Bolsa Família has not being able to increase nutrition 
on children aged 1 to 3 years old. The latter may be due to the relaxed nature of the 
fulfilment of the conditions in Brazil. For example, even though regular visits to the health 
centre is a mandatory requisite of the CCT, in Brazil - in contrast to Mexico - the social health 
service has a reduced amount of coverage services. This may be the key explanation of why 
have not been observed bigger growth rates in children in Brazil (Behrman and Hoddinott, 
2005; Soares et al, 2010). 
Due to the diversity in the design of the different CCTs in operation, the target population 
and the amount of public expenditure transferred to the beneficiaries, the results vary 
considerably. Improvements in health, nutrition and mortality rates among beneficiaries are 
significant and positive among every CCT in place. Nonetheless, regarding nutrition results 
among every CCT are positive, many studies have shown that beneficiary households are 
more prone to consume of food with improved nutritional value leading to both higher 
stature and a dramatic reduction in malnutrition (Britto, 2004; Cohen et. al, 2006; Valencia, 
2008). Regarding health outcomes is clear that the CCTs tend to be much higher in children 
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under three years and have been a major factor in the decline of infant mortality (Gertler, 
2004; Lagarde et. al., 2007). 
 In terms of sickness children under the age of 3 presents a 22% less probability to be 
reported sick after one month of being in the programme, the effect goes further across 
time, after 1 year of being receiving Progresa-Oportunidades children younger than 3 show 
a decrease in sickness report up to 25%. The most shocking effect is that only 20 months 
after of being in the programme, children were 40% less likely to be sick (Gertler, 2004; 
Lagarde et. al., 2007). 
Despite the results of the many studies cited here, one conclusion is constant, further 
research is needed in order to assess the effects of CCTs on health outcomes among poor 
populations at the long-term as most of the studies presented here are focused on the short-
term. 
 SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPROACH 
 
The socio-economic approach places its attention on the effects of CCTs on education, school 
attendance and poverty rates. Scholars like Fernald et al (2009), Skoufias et al (2001), 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez (2012), Gitter and Barham (2008), Gantner (2007), Hall (2008), 
Handa and Davis (2006), Todd, Winters and Hertz (2010), Soares et al (2010), Lindert (2005), 
Fiszbein and Shady (2009) have found that in the case of education, seen as school 
attendance, CCTs programmes have been effective in increasing attendance and reducing 
dropout rates in almost every country where a CCT is in place. This effect is mainly because 
of the school conditionality of the programme in addition the percentage of child 
employment has decreased at similar rates in both countries. 
A main concern in most of the studies presented here is that attendance rates are increasing 
but it does not mean that children are becoming more educated. The school grant is 
conditional upon school attendance, not on school performance. Behrman et. al (2009) 
pointed out that CCTs have led to positive rates in terms of not only school enrolment but 
also grade completion. However, there was no positive effect on achievement scores. In the 
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Mexican case Soares et. al, (2010) and Behrman et. al, (2009) sustains that the latter may be 
due to two reasons, first because of children who are beneficiated by the programme in most 
of the cases have never been in school before or have been out of it for a long period of time 
placing them behind regarding those who have been frequent in school and second because 
of the influence of the CCT on children to enrolment. In the case of Brazil there is a positive 
effect on school attendance and enrolment rates. In terms of dropout Brazil has shown a 
massive decrease of about 9%.  
Regarding poverty alleviation, CCTs are quite effective in attacking poverty in rural and urban 
areas, though more so in urban than in rural areas. Regardless of the positive effect of CCTs 
on poverty alleviation, the programmes still have serious operational problems, for example 
in targeting the population (notably in Brazil). Likewise, a common concern among scholars 
is that such programmes can generate a dependency upon them; therefore, CCTs have not 
fulfilled their main objective of breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty (Skoufias., et 
al, 2001; Lindert, 2005; Handa and Davis, 2006; Gantner, 2007; Gitter and Barham, 2008; 
Hall, 2008; Fiszbein and Shady, 2009; Fernald., et al, 2009; Soares., et. al, 2010; Todd, Winters 
and Hertz, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes and Juarez, 2012).  
There is still an outstanding issue that, even with the increase in family income, has not been 
resolved: the high inequality contexts, which may help to perpetuate poverty. There is also 
an academic criticism about targeting cash transfers to women. Most of the criticisms are 
made around the role of women on the productive activities of the households. Some 
scholars such as Levy (2006) argue that by giving the grant to the mother, it is possible to 
reduce inequalities between men and women within the households, and in some cases 
these grants help women to contribute more than men to the household income, making 
them more independent. According to Lustig et. al, (2011) in 13 of the 17 countries a 
significant decrease in the Gini coefficient has occurred since 2002. This reduction is mainly 
explained first by changes in the composition of labour supply and second because of the 
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes. Thanks to the CCTs, the distribution on human 
capital in Latin American countries is now more equal.  Others, as Glitter and Barham (2008), 
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in support of Levy’s argument, have found that increasing income of the female head of 
households is a powerful way to increase key welfare outcomes for the entire family.  
In the same tone, Behrman and Skoufias (2006: 266) consider that “resources controlled by 
women are more likely to yield greater improvements in child health and nutrition than 
resources placed in the hands of men”. They also found that by increasing women resources, 
they have more bargaining power within the household. Against these positions are those 
like Valencia (2008) who argue that by giving the grant to women, they place on them the 
responsibility of the households as a full-time job, leaving no room for other type of 
economic activities and therefore reinforcing the classical division of labour between men 
and women. 
Cash Transfer programmes seek not only to promote school attendance but to prevent child 
labour. Some scholars (Levy 2006; Rawlings 2005; Morley and Coady, 2003; Cohen and 
Franco, 2006) argue that benefits from education are permanent among the targeted 
population under the logic that when such children become adult those will be more trained 
and educated and will be to find better jobs with higher incomes, leaving poverty behind. It 
is important to note that cash transfers will not by themselves eradicate poverty; they will 
only contribute to national and individual growth. According to this logic, other scholars as 
Todd, Winters and Hertz (2010) argue that if any of the beneficiaries use a part of the 
additional income to invest in any generating activity, the programme will not only prevent 
future poverty of children by breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty but will reduce 
future poverty among parents as well. 
3.5. SUMMARY 
 
In summary as stated in the previous sections of this chapter, while there is only a limited 
literature available on the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour at the long-term, some 
conclusions can be drawn from the review of the literature about the possible effects on 
voting behaviour in the short-term. After an extensive review of the principal studies 
regarding political consequences of CCTs in Latin-America it seems that CCTs have led to an 
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increase in political participation among CCT’s beneficiaries not only by increasing turnout 
rates at both local and federal elections but by positively affecting the vote-share of the party 
in power. A second aspect is the possible effect that CCTs can have on changing the outcome 
of an election. Some scholars argue that CCTs have been or could have been a key element 
to predict the course of the election. With regards to the Mexican case Diaz-Cayeros et. al. 
(2008) and Ana de la O (2011) have argued that at local level CCTs may have a strong effect 
however more research on the long-term effect is needed. This study seeks to contribute to 
the literature in this respect as at least 3 presidential elections were analysed.  
After the review of the different studies presented on this chapter, it is important to mention 
that a variety of methods were used to analyse the effects of the CCTs on voting behaviour. 
In the case of CCTs that were randomly assigned (i.e. Oportunidades), scholars have used 
difference-in-differences, regression discontinuity and panel data techniques to evidence 
the effects of such programmes on the vote decisions of recipients by comparing them with 
the non-recipients. As for the CCTs that were not randomly assigned (i.e. Bolsa Família), 
scholars such as Cesar Zucco (2013) used non-parametric matching techniques to compare 
different treated – untreated populations. This point is relevant as a diversity of studies using 
different techniques have not arrived at common results regarding the effects on political 
behaviour. As we will see in the next chapter, this study will try to obtain comparable results 
by using the same techniques while analysing both CCTs.  
After an extensive review of the literature, it is important to notice that the literature did not 
look for long-term effects on voting behaviour. Two studies (Zucco, 2013; Manacorda et al., 
2009) tried to show long-term effect; however, such studies were not convincing. As for the 
case of Uruguayan PANES (Macorda, et al., 2009) it was a temporary poverty relief 
programme and some of its beneficiaries were still receiving the benefits while analysed. The 
latter emphasises the need to provide more clear answers regarding what could be the 
effects of the programme after a longer period of exposure. This work seeks to contribute to 
the literature by examining such long-term effects. It is important to notice that many of the 
studies that have studied the long-term effects of CCTs have focussed on the socioeconomic 
rather than the political effects.  
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In addition, there is a gap in the available studies regarding CCTs and its effect on electoral 
behaviour that this work will try to fulfil which is the lack of cross-country comparisons. This 
study will contribute to the literature by making a comparison of the effects of CCTs on voting 
behaviour, both short- and long-term, between Mexico and Brazil. This study will bring 
together the two strands of literature by looking at the beneficiaries’ voting behaviour in 
both in the short and long run while observing how a diversity of independent variables have 
been effective in increasing support for the incumbent and how they may have had an impact 
on their electoral choices through time. 
While this study will not focus on the effects of CCTs on socioeconomic outcomes, the 
present literature review has served to observe that the effects of conditional cash transfer 
programmes on socioeconomic outcomes are significant. In programmes such as 
Oportunidades and Bolsa Família, similar results have been observed in terms of health, 
education, and nutrition, demonstrating a consensus on the socioeconomic effects of CCTs 
which does not exist regarding their effects of CCTs on voting behaviour. 
Regarding health, the literature shows positive results in most of the programmes in the 
region, highlighting improvements for children up to the age of three years and indicating 
that the more time they are exposed to the programme the greater their levels of nutrition 
and height in comparison to those who were not part of the programme. However, there are 
some exceptions regarding nutrition, for example in Brazil where it appears that the effect 
of the programme has not been as positive as in other countries. Results about education 
attendance and enrolment are positive too, as a curious fact which many of the scholars have 
noticed is that high rates of enrolment do not necessarily lead to better performance at 
school. 
Conditional Cash Transfer programmes were created with the main objective to reduce 
poverty and to eradicate its intergenerational persistence. As a result, various approaches 
were used to design and to implement CCTs across the region. Two main models took place 
one in Mexico and the other in Brazil both share the same goals but the way to tackle their 
objectives is different. While the Mexican model sought to eradicate poverty through human 
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capital accumulation, primarily by increasing education of beneficiaries by boosting better 
educational skills that could lead to better work positions (clearly a long-term effect model) 
the Brazilian model sought to eradicate poverty in the short term by transferring money to 
the poorest households of the country thereby seeking to increase income and therefore 
consumption, also by increasing school attendance and decrease drop-out rates. As 
Oportunidades it sought to have a positive impact on adult labour force participation of 
women. While the results in both cases have shown positive outcomes in reducing poverty 
rates, in both countries high rates of poverty persist even if CCTs have being in operation for 
more than two decades (World Bank, 2018).  
These findings are relevant for the purposes of this study. As mentioned briefly in the section 
3.3. of the chapter clientelism is considered to be about political support in exchange of 
goods. In this sense, some scholars (Soares et al, 2010; Ferreira et al, 2013; Nichter, 2018;) 
have considered that CCTs along with the vulnerability due to the concentration of poverty 
could imply some margin of manoeuvre for political gain of such programmes even if are 
programmatic in nature.  Despite having clear rules, they are not available for all of the 
population, they have selectivity criteria including the targeted population being the less 
well-off who are more prone to political mobilisation.  
In summary, for this research perspective, clientelism is the exchange of citizens´ political 
support through the delivery of goods with selectivity criteria oriented by political interests. 
Having this in mind, even if CCTs are programmatic policies, the way the benefits are 
allocated could be oriented by the incumbent party in order to have higher turnout rates 







The aim of this chapter is to present the research methods used to find whether Conditional 
Cash Transfer Programs (CCTs) have been successful as a political weapon in terms of its 
effectiveness to increase voting support towards the incumbent party among CCT 
beneficiaries. As presented in Chapter 3, the existing literature on the effects of CCTs is 
extensive with regards to their effects on health, nutrition, and school attendance (Lindert 
et al. 2006).  However, studies looking into its effects on political behaviour among CCTs 
beneficiaries are fewer. Such studies focus predominantly on the short-term effects of these 
programmes. Crucially, there is still considerable debate in the literature on the subject as 
some studies have argued that CCTs have benefited the incumbent party electorally, while 
others have found no evidence of such effects. (Green, 2008; Bohn, 2011). 
The importance of looking into the possible political and electoral impacts of these 
programmes with regards to the targeted population relies on the fact that CCTs have been 
implemented in most Latin American countries as a tool to diminish poverty. As explained in 
the previous chapters, targeted beneficiaries of such programmes are those at the bottom 
of the income distribution and as a result are more susceptible to political manipulation. 
Hence the significance of this study, as it seeks to test whether CCTs lead to a larger electoral 
support for the incumbent party in two stages (long and short term) by examining whether 
the introduction of those programmes increases on one hand the likelihood of beneficiaries 
to vote for the incumbent party and to the other by conducting a long-term study to observe 
if loyalty towards the incumbent remains after a longer exposure to the programme. 
The three research questions of this study were drawn using rational retrospective and 
prospective theories elements and the sociological theory:  
a) Are CCT beneficiaries more likely to vote for the incumbent following their self-
interest?  
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b) Does time influence the effect of CCTs on voting behaviour?  
c) Do CCTs increase incumbent support in both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries?  
If CCT beneficiaries follow their self-interest, the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party 
would increase after the introduction of CCTs. These changes in political patterns could be 
attributed to many factors such as higher income, better education, region or to a margin 
for clientelism produced by the programme. This should be studied further.  
To provide a better understanding about the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour, this 
chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides the research design including the 
hypothesis and the expected results, section 4.3. provides the rationale behind the selection 
of Oportunidades from Mexico and Bolsa Família from Brazil. This is followed by section 4.4, 
describing the different datasets used for analyses. Then, section 4.5 presents the variables 
used for each of the models with the operationalisation of each of them. Following this, 
section 4.6 describes the statistical methods used in this study at a municipal and individual 
levels. For Mexico panel data analyses were performed at individual level and cross-sectional 
analyses were performed at municipal level, while for Brazil cross-sectional analyses were 
performed at individual level while panel data analyses were performed at municipal level. 
Finally, section 4.7 presents a summary of the key aspects that were discussed in the chapter.   
4.2.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
As discussed previously in chapter 3, the implementation and organization of poverty 
reduction programmes involves a series of complex relationships between individuals, social 
organizations (communities) and governments. With regards to CCTs, these relationships 
exist within communities with a dense population of beneficiaries and communities where 
their presence is minimal. This leads on the one hand to non-beneficiaries feeling displaced 
from a certain public policy and to the other hand to political operators looking to gain 
electoral advantage because of their implementation (or expansion). In that sense, 
beneficiaries of the CCTs may feel compelled to vote for the incumbent while non-
beneficiaries could act in two different ways; first by voting for the incumbent with the 
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purpose of obtaining the benefits to which they do not have access to at the time and second, 
non-beneficiaries could vote against them as a form of punishment for not having access to 
the programme.  
Having this in mind, this research follows one hypothesis:  
a) The more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support for the 
party that governs at national level.  
This study assumes that beneficiaries are rational, and follow their self-interests, meaning 
that their electoral choices correspond to their material concerns (immediate benefit).  
By assuming that voters act differently depending on time elapsed this study relies on two 
periods of observation; in the short-term this work assumes that voters consider the recent 
governmental performance or in our case, the introduction or expansion of a safety net via 
the CCT, and tend to reward the incumbent because of the introduction of such policy. In the 
long-term voters will contemplate the incumbent´s past performance to make projections 
about its future performance (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988). If voting were motivated by 
judgements of past events, we could conclude that changes of voting behaviour of the 
beneficiaries could be a result of discontent with the incumbent’s performance. 
To test the hypothesis this study follows a quantitative approach using secondary data and a 
qualitative approach when comparing results from both countries as a pooled dataset was 
not possible. Constrains were found along the construction of the datasets from each 
country, those limitations along with the different electoral systems did not allow to pool the 
data and formally compare differences between countries. However, by analysing each 
country at the municipal and individual levels inferences on the effect of the implementation 
and the political regimes were possible. As is described later in the chapter, for each of the 
countries there are descriptive statistics, logistic regressions at municipal and individual level 
and panel data analyses. The next section focuses on the rationale and justification of the 
case selection of Mexico and Brazil. 
 105 
4.3. CASE SELECTION 
 
The effects of Oportunidades from Mexico and Bolsa Família from Brazil because they are 
the two largest and oldest CCTs in operation in Latin America. However, comparative 
research requires certain similar characteristics between cases. Following Halperin, et. al. 
(2012: 203) this chapter understands that “comparative politics is frequently based on 
comparing differences (or similarities) between countries. But it can also be used to compare 
differences between units within countries, such as regions, organizations, political parties, 
pressure groups, or whatever”. In that sense, there are several similarities between Mexico 
and Brazil, from a comparative perspective, the justification of this study is twofold. First, 
both countries are highly affected by poverty; however, at the macroeconomic level, 
according to the World Bank ranking in terms of real gross domestic product (GDP) these 
two countries are located in the fourteenth and seventh rank respectively. Both countries 
are upper-middle-income (World Bank, 2018) but still with a large population living in 
poverty (in 2016 Mexico had a poverty rate of 34.50% while in Brazil the rate was 20.7%). 
CCTs appeared to have played a key role in reducing poverty. The literature suggests that 
Brazil has been more effective in this respect, but Mexico has been more successful in 
reducing inequality. Both countries have CCTs in operation and since the early 2000’s such 
policies have experienced a large expansion in terms of the number of beneficiaries and in 
terms of the governmental expenditure as a percentage of GDP.  
Mexico and Brazil share similarities in terms of population growth rates, both nations have 
been independent for about 200 years, in terms of income they are two of the biggest upper-
middle-income developing countries in Latin America (OECD, 2019) and finally both countries 
are considered as new democracies after long periods of dictatorship with some democratic 
interludes in the case of Brazil and a single ruling party in the case of Mexico. In terms of 
their political background, as described in Chapter 2, both countries have had a long and 
difficult path towards democracy, mainly due to the struggle and demands of their citizens. 
Similarly, both nations share comparable growth experiences, but we must remember that 
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Brazil used to suffer hyperinflation rates in contrast with Mexico’s price stability (Maddison, 
1992). 
Comparing the results from these countries it is possible to disentangle the determinants of 
voting behaviour following the introduction and institutionalization of CCTs. To date, apart 
from Maddison (1992), there is no evidence in the literature of a long-term comparative 
study between Mexico and Brazil. The existing evidence does not provide a good explanation 
regarding the possible outcomes in terms of political behaviour related to the 
implementation of the CCTs. Some scholars have partially explained their effects as a natural 
effect of distributive policies. Scholars such as Cesar Zucco (2008; 2011: 2013) suggest that 
the introduction of CCTs has been effective to generate support towards not only the 
incumbent party in most regions of Brazil, but also the presidential candidate of the 
incumbent party. 
There are, however, several differences on the implementation of the CCTs between Mexico 
and Brazil. While Oportunidades was created as a means-tested programme, and it started 
as a randomized16 trial with a limited number of beneficiaries in rural areas of the poorest 
states of Mexico (Levy, 1991); Bolsa Família was implemented also as a means-tested 
transfer but with a less rigid process of selection when compared to Mexico. In contrast to 
Mexico’s Oportunidades programme, Bolsa Família did not start as a randomized 
experiment; the programme was implemented throughout the country, not gradually as in 
Mexico. These differences in implementation could affect the way that CCTs influence voting 
behaviour.  
Another crucial difference between countries that could affect the effect of CCTs on voting 
preferences are their political regimes. On one hand, during the Mexican revolution the 
“caudillos” decided to integrate a unique and strong political force, that could gather in one 
institution the diversity of political leaderships in the country, so the National Revolutionary 
 
16 Randomization means that experimental units were randomly allocated across the treatment groups. In 
experimental design, randomization is very important since it helps to reduce cofounders by equalising any 
possible omitted variables. 
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Party (now PRI) was created in 1929. The so-called Mexican “soft dictatorship” led the PRI to 
hold power until year 2000.  
The PRI was very effective in retaining power mainly because of its clientelistic practices and 
the massive state electoral machinery (Fox, 1994), the state set the rules, prepared, counted 
and then provided the validity of the election. It was until year 2000 when Mexico turned to 
democracy. On the other hand, Brazil’s political background included the military 
dictatorship from 1920 to 1945, a period of democracy from 1945 to 1964 when a coup led 
by Humberto Castelo Branco put the military back in power. The military ruled again from 
1964 to 1985. Democracy returned in 1985 with José Sarney, followed by Fernando Collor 
de Mello in 1989 (Fausto, 2014; Braga & Acuña, 2015). These remarkable differences could 
also help to answer if incumbency support, because of the implementation of the CCTs, is 
higher in countries with less democratic history rather than in more democratic ones. In that 
sense, it may be more likely to find stronger effects of incumbency support in Brazil when 
compared to Mexico.  
Even if the creation of a pooled dataset including data from both countries was not possible, 
by comparing qualitatively results from the two countries this work analyses data at different 
levels of aggregation (individual and aggregate data) and combined different domestic 
aspects that are relevant to explain CCTs’ outcomes in political behaviour. Despite the 
methodological constraints where the same panel data analyses at individual and municipal 
levels from both countries were not possible, comparisons of the effects of CCTs between 
Mexico and Brazil at the individual level (behavioural attitudes) and at the aggregate level 
(context) were made with the available information from each country. The latter sought to 
explain how common socio-economic variables could affect the behavioural process of the 
beneficiaries while casting a ballot. In the next section, a more detailed discussion on how 
the datasets used for analyses in each of the countries were constructed is presented.  This 
is followed by the statistical methods used to analyse the available data.   
4.4.  DATA  
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This section provides information about the creation of the datasets as well as the 
operationalisation of the variables for each country. Datasets from both countries were 
created using secondary data provided by different public institutions. With such data two 
independent datasets were constructed for each country (four datasets in total), in order to 
compare the allocation of CCTs and the effects of these on voting behaviour at two different 
levels of observation (municipal and individual).  
The first Mexican dataset was constructed using two different sources: The Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) which is a survey carried out every two years since 
1992 by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), and the electoral data 
reported by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). This dataset was used to analyse the 
aggregated data at a municipal level. The second dataset (individual-level data) used to 
analyse the effects at an individual level was the Mexico Panel Study (MPS), which is a large 
longitudinal study that allowed us to identify which voters changed their electoral 
preferences during the campaign (Lawson, et. al, 2001).  
The third dataset was created for Brazil using three different sources of data: The National 
Household Sample Survey (PNAD17), a Brazilian cross-sectional survey carried out by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), a survey from the Unified Registry of 
Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and electoral data from the Supreme Electoral 
Court (TSE) at the municipal level. The fourth dataset created at the individual level was done 
by merging data from the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) and the Brazilian Institute of 
Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE), which provide data at the individual level. 
The use of these surveys allowed testing for nearly identical control variables over different 
time periods in the two countries. To provide a tailored measure of the indicators subject of 
the thesis, I constructed data sets which were both valid and reliable. In that sense validity 
was provided by the confirmation of my theoretical expectations, in other words how good 
the set of variables mapped what was intended to be measured. Following Bryman (2012) 
validity is obtained when a set of indicators can represent accurately or measure the subject 
 
17 In Portuguese: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios.  
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of the study. Regarding reliability all the set of questions to measure the concept were 
selected to be consistent. However, the problem with reliability is that even if the measure 
is precise it may not be valid. Therefore, following that criterion, the study included measures 
used in previous research using different data sources to explore the relationship between 
receiving CCTs and voting behaviour.  
Because of the secrecy of ballot, voting behaviour was not directly observable at the 
municipal level using the secondary data available from both electoral authorities in Mexico 
and Brazil. Hence, individual data collection was analysed to provide a baseline which could 
describe best not only the socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals prior to 
implementation of the CCTs but their voting preferences. To determine the effects on voting 
behaviour this study used two strategies. First, at the aggregate (municipal) level, data from 
Mexican Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) of the 2000 - 2012 presidential elections and data 
from the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) of the 2002 – 2014 presidential elections 
were used to construct measures of electoral vote shares at the municipal level following a 
similar strategy as Green (2006). With such data municipal trends of voting preferences were 
possible to identify by looking into the proportion of households covered by the CCTs’ in each 
municipality and look into the associations of these to vote for the incumbent.18 By doing 
this, it was able to identify any increases on vote share for the incumbent after the 
implementation of the CCTs. A second strategy was to use public opinion surveys such as 
MPS, IBOPE and BEPS as such surveys focus on randomly selected individuals throughout the 
municipalities of the country and include questions about demographic and income 
characteristics, self-reported vote and partisanship over time, government performance, 
political ideology, CCT coverage and political participation. The surveys include only adults in 
voting age. Given that this study aims to demonstrate the effect of CCTs on voting behaviour 
at the municipal and the individual level, a group of datasets that could reflect the evolution 
of the socioeconomic characteristics and political attitudes of both municipalities and 
 
18 Section level voting data is public and available at www.ife.org.mx and www.tse.jus.br/ 
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individuals was necessary. A detailed discussion about the construction of the dataset for 
each level of analysis of each country is provided in the next subsections. 
 MEXICO 
 
In order to identify the effects of Oportunidades on voting behaviour a set of different 
datasets were used to provide robust evidence of such effects at two different levels of 
observation. 
4.4.1.1. MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
For the first level of observation, data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(ENIGH), a survey carried out every two years since 1992 by the Mexican Statistics Office was 
used. This survey follows a stratified multiphase sampling design using basic geostatistical 
areas (AGEB), stratified according to 5 geographic areas and socio-economic criteria. 
Localities were selected following four criteria: urban, urban with high population density, 
urban with low population density and rural. The ENIGH dataset was deployed with a sample 
of 10,000 households in every round of the survey and it includes household’s socioeconomic 
information from a representative sample of all the municipalities in Mexico. For the 
purposes of this study, only 3 waves of the survey (2000, 2006 and 2012) were used 
corresponding to each of the three electoral periods analysed. A set of variables were 
created to reflect the effects of the programme on socioeconomic characteristics. However, 
in order to test the likelihood of the beneficiaries to vote for the incumbent party a second 
dataset was necessary to analyse such effects on voting patterns in Mexico. Therefore, both 
ENIGH and IFE datasets were merged into a new dataset reflecting municipal data that could 
allow the analysis of these characteristics in each of the three elections analysed.  
Merging both datasets was challenging for several reasons; however, the most challenging 
was to correctively match INEGI and IFE identifiers of the municipalities. Given the 
autonomous nature of both INEGI and IFE they use different identifiers for municipalities, 
localities, and regions. For this study purposes to find a rightfulness correspondence was 
demanding and in most of the cases, to avoid wrongly matching, a manual correspondence 
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was necessary as many of the municipalities in Mexico share the same name. Once the 
information was merged a set of variables were created, they are useful to make inferences 
about the effects of CCTs on the impoverished households and the correlation with the 
average voting preferences within each municipality and to analyse the effect of the 
proportion of beneficiaries on the proportion of votes for the incumbent cross-sectionally 
(short-term).  
4.4.1.2. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
As stated previously in the chapter, a second level of observation was required. At the 
individual-level analyses, a longitudinal survey with data regarding voting attitudes of the 
Mexican electorate was used. The Mexico Panel Study is a large longitudinal study on voting 
behaviour that allows assessing the political attitudes of the Mexican electorate. The survey 
consists of three rounds (2000, 2006 and 2012) with three waves each year. The survey 
documents which types of voters changed their electoral preferences during the campaign 
(Lawson, et. al, 2001). With this survey, it was possible to identifying CCTs beneficiaries’ 
political preferences and if there was any change in their political ideology when voting. With 
this dataset, it was able to calculate the effect of having the programme and voting intentions 
as well as voting behaviour.  
 BRAZIL 
 
A similar strategy was followed for Brazil in order to identify the impact of the 
implementation of Bolsa Escola (for the 2002 election) and Bolsa Família (for the following 
elections) on its beneficiaries. Two different types of data were used to complete the analysis 
at both levels, and data from three surveys were included (see Table 4.1)  
Table 4.1 Waves used for the logistic regressions at individual level models from MPS, BEPS and IBOPE 
SURVEY 2000 2002 2006 2010 2012 2014 
MPS X  X  X  
BEPS    X  X 
IBOPE  X X    
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4.4.2.1. MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
In order to establish the proportion of Bolsa Família´s beneficiaries per municipality, data 
from the household survey from the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and the National 
Household Survey (PNAD) carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) were analysed. The PNAD survey is conducted by means of a sample of individuals 
from 211,344 permanent households distributed among 3,500 municipalities in Brazil. It 
focuses mainly on overall population characteristics, education, labour, income and housing 
as well as characteristics about migration, fertility, civil status, health, food security among 
others. These statistics are mainly collected to identify the socioeconomic development and 
improvement of life conditions in Brazil (IBGE, 2014).  
Using these two surveys it was possible to include the proportion of households receiving 
the programme as well as general socioeconomic characteristics of the households at 
municipal level regarding income, age, gender and years of schooling. Transformations to 
these individual level data were applied with the intention of having an aggregated level of 
analysis (municipal).  
To identify results regarding vote share per candidate, party and demographic group this 
study used municipal level data available from the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE). This data 
set includes electoral and voting results from past Brazilian elections. To determine the 
effects of Bolsa Família on voting behaviour this study uses a similar strategy to one 
previously used by Green (2006). She used aggregated data from the 1998 through the 2014 
Mexican presidential elections as a set of measurements of electoral vote share of the 
beneficiaries and coverage of the programme across targeted localities. Following the latter 
similar measurements were created to identify how Brazilian municipalities with higher 
proportion of CCT beneficiaries voted in different electoral periods. 
4.4.2.2. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
In an effort to build a comprehensive dataset, data from two surveys carried out by the 
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Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) and the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and 
Statistics (IBOPE) was merged into one dataset. These surveys randomly select individuals 
throughout the municipalities of the country and included questions about demographic and 
income characteristics, self-reported vote and partisanship over time, government 
performance, political ideology, CCT coverage and political participation. The surveys include 
only adults aged 16 years of age or older.  
The first survey used to create the dataset was the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and 
Statistics (IBOPE) survey, carried out in 2002 and 2006. While the first wave of this survey 
does not include questions on CCT benefits, the survey aims to measure self-reported vote 
for the presidential election with a sample size of 2778 respondents (1,419 females and 
1,369 males). The second wave of the survey in October 2006 includes a sample size of 2002 
(953 males and 1049 females) respondents in 199 municipalities. This second wave of the 
survey includes data on CCT benefits as well as on self-reported vote.  
The second survey used to create the dataset was the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS) 
carried out in 2010 and 2014. This survey was designed to capture the voter’s perception of 
politicians at individual level during the observed electoral periods of 2010 and 2014 and to 
identify which factors might affect the final voting decision. As regards the 2010 edition BEPS 
is composed of three waves: the first wave 6 months before the election, second wave during 
the campaigning and the third wave just after the second round. The panel aimed to define 
baseline measures of self-reported vote and policy preferences (BEPS, 2010). This survey has 
a sample of 2269 respondents, but for this work’s purposes and following a strategy used by 
Zucco (2013), only respondents involved in all three waves were used, decreasing the sample 
size to 1221. As for the second edition of the survey in 2014, it was replicated in seven waves 
from May to November. This enables the capturing of movements in voting, evaluation of 
government and policy preferences.  
The sample is representative of the Brazilian population and it covers 22 of the 27 states and 
118 municipalities in all regions of the country with a total number of 4303 respondents. For 
the purposes of this analysis only one wave was used; wave 6 taken in October 2014 to reflect 
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actual voting. It is to be noted that this data has some additional limitations that were not 
mentioned before. Pooled surveys provide an insight into voting preferences not the actual 
voting, which is important as social desirability bias could push an individual to answer 
differently (Bryman, 2012). This problem was reported by Zucco’s study in 2013 and he tried 
to minimise this effect by using surveys taken close to the election (IBOPE, Vox Populi and 
BEPS).  
4.4.2.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN DATA  
 
Conditional Cash Transfers programmes in Brazil were introduced in the late 1990s a decade 
characterised by its opacity in terms of accountability as a result of the legacy of the military 
regime and the persisting patron-client power relationships at state and municipal level. As 
a result of this opacity, the Brazilian CCT did not incorporate impact evaluations in the initial 
design making it harder to assess its effects among beneficiaries (Fiszbein and Shady, 2009) 
contrary to the similar Oportunidades programme in Mexico.  
• Limitations of the Municipal data 
 
As stated in the previous paragraph the absence of impact evaluations on the design of the 
programme makes it hard to analyse its effect among the targeted population. This is 
because of the universal introduction of the programme at the same time and in all regions. 
Another limitation is that TSE data cannot be used to perform individual analysis given the 
secrecy of the ballot. This limitation was solved by using pooled surveys.  
• Limitations on Individual data 
 
At the individual level, it was necessary to rely on two different surveys carried on by the 
IBOPE and BEPS. The main problem with such surveys was that they were constructed 
differently from each other. Hence, it was necessary to use similar questions between 
surveys in order the reflect the proportion of families with Bolsa Família and their vote 
preferences.  
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4.5.  VARIABLES 
 
This section describes the rationale behind the inclusion of each of the variables in the 
models and highlights their operationalisation. As this study seeks to disentangle the effects 
of the implementation on CCTs on voting behaviour in both the short and long term. To 
different levels of observation was followed. Because voting behaviour could be a 
multifactorial process, this study includes for each of the models at the different levels of 
observation, demographic characteristics of both the municipalities and the individuals and 
socioeconomic attributes. Since the construction of the different sources of data is different 
within each country some models (panel data) include different variables and thus are 
explained within the analyses for each country.  
 
 OUTCOME VARIABLES 
 
4.5.1.1. VOTE FOR THE LARGER PARTIES AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
In order to analyse voting behaviour, at the municipal level in every model three outcome 
variables were used in the case of Mexico (vote for PRI, PAN and PRD) and two in the case of 
Brazil (vote for PT and vote for PSDB) for each wave of observation. The dependent variables 
at municipal level were constructed as a dichotomous variable reflecting won the election at 
each municipality. Taking values of 0 if lost and 1 if won in order to find whether the increase 
in of coverage of CCTs had an effect on electoral wins of the incumbent party at municipal 
level. The variables were constructed using data from IFE in the case of Mexico and from TSE 
in the case of Brazil. Variations in voting behaviour among municipalities are good indicators 
when analysing the political effects of CCTs. 
 
4.5.1.2. VOTE FOR THE LARGER PARTIES AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
The dependent variable reflects the actual vote. It was created from one common question 
across surveys from both countries, where respondents were asked about their voting 
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preferences. “who did you vote for?” The possible answers took up to 5 values depending 
on the preferred candidate in the case of Mexico and up to 3 values in the case of Brazil; 
however, it was recoded as binary taking the value of 1 if the actual vote was for the 
incumbent candidate and 0 if the individual intended to vote for any other party.  
 
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
4.5.2.1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
For each of the countries analysed in this work, several demographics, socioeconomic and 
political variables were considered. The demographic, socioeconomic and political variables 
used for the analysis at the municipal level were: 
4.5.2.1.1. HOUSEHOLDS WITH CCT 
 
This variable was constructed in order to reflect households that receive benefiting from 
CCTs in each municipality. The rationale behind this variable is to help to identify and to 
reflect the proportion of households receiving any of both programmes and observe if a 
higher proportion of households within the municipality lead towards incumbent’s party 
support. Other studies have included this variable in order to identify a relationship between 
coverage and party support (Zucco, 2013). 
4.5.2.1.2. REGION 
 
Region was coded as a categorical variable as the programme targets the less-well off in all 
the different regions: centre, north, west, east and south. Poverty is not uniformly distributed 
in Mexico and Brazil hence it was useful to use such a variable to identify if the less well off 
from each of the regions differed with regards to the impact of the programmes.  
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4.5.2.1.3. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (ACHIEVEMENTS) 
 
This variable was created in order to show any possible correlation between education and 
voting preferences. Educational level was coded as a continuous variable. This variable 
reflects the total number of years of schooling per head of the household in each 
municipality. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapters, scholars have shown an 
association between lower educational achievement with a higher propensity to vote for 
clientelistic parties. In addition, higher educational achievement conditioned by the CCTs 
could have affected voting turnout as higher levels of education are related to higher 
participation (Putnam 2000). The variable was recoded into four categories reflecting a high 
(13 years or more), medium high (7 - 12 years), medium low (1-6 years) and low (0 years) 
levels of education for each of the countries of focus.  
4.5.2.1.4. RURAL MUNICIPALITY 
 
Rural or urban municipality was constructed as a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 
if the municipality was considered rural or 0 if it was urban. This variable helped analyse the 
effect of how rural municipalities voted over the past elections and if this changed when 
CCTs were implemented or expanded in this area when compared to urban areas. For the 
case of Mexico, this variable was very important as Oportunidades was firstly introduced in 
rural municipalities and later expanded to urban areas. Apart from this, it is widely known 
that the most impoverished and less educated municipalities are situated in rural areas in 
both Mexico and Brazil, hence it was relevant to observe if such areas were willing to change 
their allegiance to the party that first introduced the programme in the subsequent elections. 
4.5.2.1.5.  MUNICIPAL INCOME 
 
Income was constructed as a categorical variable divided in tertials with the first tertial being 
the lowest income category. The inclusion of this variable aimed to address if the voting 
patterns between higher or lower income municipalities differed. Most studies have found a 
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correlation between higher income and stronger support for the incumbent party (Green, 
2006; Bohn, 2011; De la O, 2013; Zucco, 2013).  
4.5.2.1.6. GOVERNOR FROM THE INCUMBENT PARTY AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
 
The analyses included whether the municipality had governor from the incumbent party at 
federal level. The variable was constructed as dummy to reflect the possible effect of having 
a governor from the incumbent party on votes for the incumbent party candidate for the 
presidency. This variable is relevant as respondents could associate the benefit with the 
governor rather than with the president and thus could be more likely to vote for the 
incumbent governor regardless of the president’s party. This is particularly pertinent for the 
case of Brazil as the implementation of the program is decentralised from the national level 
to the state and municipal levels. Because of this, recipients would vote for the governor’s 
party associating the program to the governor. The rationale behind this variable is that 
having a governor from the incumbent national party could influence the voting preferences 
of the electorate in two separate ways; first, towards the incumbent national party (it takes 
value of 1) and second, towards governors’ parties (it takes values of 0). This variable became 
important in the 2012 election in Mexico when PRI ruled in the majority of states even 
though the party was in the opposition at federal level. The variable additionally helps to 
show if there is a possible effect of the CCTs depending on the region. By doing this, it is 
possible to infer to a certain extent the degree of political influence by the local incumbent 
on the presidential election. Further research can be done on this matter by using data from 
the local electoral institutes. 
In the following subsection the operationalisation of the independent variables at the 
individual level is described. 
4.5.2.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
  
Most of the variables that were included in the municipal level were also introduced at the 
individual level analyses. However, using the exit polls surveys, other variables were included 
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for the individual analysis. Such variables were particularly important for explaining voting 
behaviour at the individual level such as gender, age, or ethnicity (skin colour). Each of the 
independent variables will be described in this section.  
4.5.2.2.1. CCT BENEFICIARY 
A constant question in almost every survey (see table 4.1) used to construct the dataset at 
individual level, with the exception of the 2002 IBOPE, was about Conditional Cash Transfers; 
the question asked if “during the last 3 years the respondent or anyone living in the household 
has been a beneficiary of a CCT programme”. This variable was also coded as a dichotomous 
variable taking values of 1 for being a CCT beneficiary and 0 otherwise.  
4.5.2.2.2. GENDER 
 
Gender was included in order to observe female electoral behaviour as both Oportunidades 
and Bolsa Família as women are the main recipients of the CCTs.  This could impact voting 
behaviour of women. The dichotomous variable gender was coded with values of 1 if female 
and 0 if male. This variable was also relevant as previous research shows a “traditional gender 
gap” in political preferences, meaning that women tend to be more conservative than men 
(Box-Steffensmeier et. al., 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Many scholars have also argued 
that by empowering women through CCTs, they could its economic benefits to increase the 




Age was included to observe voting behaviour at different age strata. The variable was coded 
as a categorical variable (6 categories). The rationale behind these categories for the Mexican 
case was that it is assumed that the youngest led Vicente Fox to the presidency in year 2000 
while those aged 51 to 70 were more prone to support Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in 
2006.  As for the case of Brazil, previous studies (Bonn 2011; Zucco 2013) show that older 
adults were reluctant to vote for Lula in 2002 but by 2006, after the increasing benefits 
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provided to the elderly during Lula’s tenure, their voting preferences changed radically 
favouring the PT in the next electoral period. This means that different age groups supported 
different candidates and with the increasing proportion of older adults, their vote could shift 
the results. 
4.5.2.2.4. SKIN COLOUR (ETHNICITY) 
 
A self-reported variable on Ethnicity was coded as a categorical variable. Three different 
categories were created white, light brown and dark brown. This variable is useful to identify 
if respondents who categorised themselves as white were more educated and received a 
higher income. The latter is a result of the general assumption that income inequalities in 
countries like Mexico and Brazil are because of racial disparities in opportunities. 
4.5.2.2.5. MARITAL STATUS 
 
Marital Status was also included as some scholars recognise that married individuals tend to 
vote more conservative than single individuals (Weisberg 1987). The variable was 
constructed as categorical that takes values of 1 when single, 2 when in partnership and 3 
when separated, widowed or divorced. 
4.5.2.2.6. RELIGION 
 
Religion was constructed as a categorical variable. It takes values of 1 if Catholic, 2 if Christian 
or non-Catholic and 3 for other religions. Some scholars (Zucco, 2013) argued that religion 
influences voting behaviour particularly in the most impoverished regions.  
4.5.2.2.7. YEARS OF STUDY 
 
Similar to the independent variables at a municipal level, self-reported years of education 
was created as a categorical variable in order to show any possible correlation between 
education and voting preferences. This variable ranges from having zero years of education 
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to college and it reflects on average the total years of education of respondents. Such 
categories reflect the different school achievements of the respondents (none, non-formal 
education, primary, secondary, high school and university). This variable was included 
because school attendance is linked with the conditionalities of the CCTs.  
4.5.2.2.8. EMPLOYMENT 
 
Employment status was included as unemployed respondents are expected to vote for the 
party which provides more benefits, and perhaps hoping to receive the programme. It was 
constructed as a dichotomous variable that takes values of 1 if employed and 0 if otherwise. 
Survey respondents were asked if they had been in paid work during the past week and were 
classified as paid workers if they were “employed” or “non employed”.  
4.5.2.2.9. TYPE OF LOCALITY 
 
Similar to the type of municipality, type of locality was designed as a categorical variable 
taking values of rural, urban and mixed. The reason behind these categories is to observe if 
individuals living in rural communities were more prone to support the incumbent party in 
the following election after the introduction of the programmes (De la O, 2007). 
4.5.2.2.10. REGION 
 
As with the municipal independent variables, Region was also included for the individual 
analyses. Because poverty is not uniformly distributed in Mexico or Brazil it was useful to use 
such variable to identify if the poorest regions in the country were more inclined to vote for 
the incumbent party because of having access to CCTs. Region was coded as a categorical 
variable with up to 4 regions in Mexico and 5 regions in Brazil. This study hypothesised that 
regions with higher proportion of individuals living in poverty would be more likely to vote 





4.5.2.2.10. IDEOLOGICAL PLACEMENT 
 
Ideological placement was constructed as a categorical variable, and its values ranged from 
strong left to strong right. Respondents were asked to place themselves in one of the 
different categories. The variable is important for this study purposes as it is possible to 
observe respondent’s political ideology.  
4.5.2.2.11. EX-PRESIDENT APPROVAL 
 
The effect of the approval for the previous president was also included in these models, this 
in order to find whether respondents casted a punishment vote if they did not like the 
previous administration. This variable was coded in a likert scale ranging from approved a lot 
and disapprove a lot.  
4.5.2.2.12. PERSONAL ECONOMY PERCEPTION (IMPROVED DURING THE PAST 
ADMINISTRATION) 
 
As explained previously in this chapter, macroeconomics and microeconomics play an 
important part when casting a ballot. A better perceived economic situation may encourage 
individuals to vote for the incumbent to maintain the same economy. Whereas a much worse 
perceived situation may lead the voter to seek for change. This variable was coded in a Likert 
scale from better to worse. In the following section the statistical approach will be discussed. 
4.6.  STATISTICAL APPROACH 
The first step for the statistical analyses is to describe the waves of each of the surveys. This 
was followed by logistic regressions highlighting differences between municipalities with a 
higher proportion of recipients of CCTs at the municipal level, and differences at the 
individual level between those receiving the CCT and non-recipients. While for Mexico a 
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longitudinal panel was performed at the municipal level, for Brazil the panel was constructed 
at the individual level because of the different availability of data in each of the countries.    
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In both, the chapter focusing in results from Mexico, and the chapter focusing on results 
from Brazil, the first sections of results at municipal and individual levels present results from 
descriptive statistics. These sections provide an overview of the general context including 
the socioeconomic conditions of the target population (like income levels, education, gender 
and access to health services) before and after the introduction of the programmes. This is 
significant because as a result of the political background of both countries, a strong 
clientelistic bond between the less well-off and the incumbent are expected. 
 LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
Similar to previous studies, logistic regressions were used to investigate the cross-sectional 
effect of having a CCT or not in each of the countries of focus. In addition, these regressions 
serve to examine if the associations of CCTs and voting behaviour were a result of other 
characteristics aside from the programme.  As explained in the section focusing on the 
operationalisation of the variables, for the municipal analyses, logistic regressions using the 
dichotomous variable of the party was performed.  At the individual analyses, the dependent 
variables were intention to vote and votes for the incumbent at each electoral period. 
 PANEL DATA ANALYSES 
 
Even if randomized experiments are the best weapon to identify trustworthy estimates of 
the effect of a programme, further differences of respondents can be attributed as an effect 
of the programme when using panel data analyses (Allison, 2009). Due to the lack of 
resources, this study could not perform a randomized experiment and it relied on the 
second-best option, namely quasi-experimental methods. To have an effective quasi-
experimental approach it was necessary to have randomly assigned people to treatment (the 
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CCT) and control groups (without CCT). The randomisation was done in the surveys where 
they randomly selected individuals for the case of Mexico and municipalities for Brazil. A 
second but fundamental step is to collect baseline data, and subsequently follow-up data 
must be collected for both groups. A third step consists in estimating the programme’s 
impact in terms of the mean outcome for both the treatment and the control group and 
comparing the difference.  
By using panel data, I was able to analyse the effect of the programme longitudinally. Panel 
data are observations at multiple times including individuals (𝑖) and time (𝑡) as subscripts on 
each of its variables. This is important as one of my hypotheses is that time plays an 
important role on the effect of the CCT on voting behaviour. Mainly that after the 
institutionalisation of the programme the effects on voting behaviour could be lost or 
change. Unfortunately, I was not able to perform a panel data analysis at the municipal level 
in Mexico, as the municipalities included for the survey are randomised and change at each 
election period. However, for the case of Brazil I was able to perform a fixed effects model 
at this level. For the individual level, I was able to perform this type of analysis for the case 
of Mexico but not in Brazil, as the dataset I constructed did not use the same respondents. 
One of the benefits of panel data is that it includes the sum of unobservable effects (𝑢𝑖𝑡 =
𝜇𝑖 + 𝑉𝑖𝑡)  where 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the unobservable individual effect which is constant over time and 
𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the remaining disturbance or error term (Baltagi 2005). This is the basic equation for a 
panel data regression:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋´𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The advantages of panel data analyses include accounting for the combination of inter 
municipal (for the case of Brazil) or inter individual (for the case of Mexico) differences. This 
is similar to a cross-sectional analysis, but the analysis also accounts for intra municipal (for 
the case of Brazil) and  intra individual (for the case of Mexico) changes of support for the 
incumbent across the different electoral periods (Baltagi 2005). The two most common 
statistical methods for panel data include fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models 
(Baltagi 2005; Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones 2019; Bell and Jones 2015; Dieleman and Templin 
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2014; Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013). FE models are able to explore the 
relationship between having a higher proportion of recipients  and wins for the incumbent 
in Brazil in each municipality by looking into the change of wins within the municipality 
(within-effects) removing the effect of omitted variables unique to each municipality (Baltagi 
2005; Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones 2019). In the panel data analysis from Mexico, FE are able 
to look into the effect of a change of status (becoming a recipient) on votes for the 
incumbent. By looking at change, FE models provide a more robust causal inference because 
the heterogeneity bias is controlled for (Boyce and Wood 2011; Menon et al. 2018).  As FE 
look into the effect of change, several variables could not be included such as gender or 
education. However, as the main objectives of the thesis look into the effect of a change in 
the recipient status and the Hausman test was significant, I chose FE over RE for these 
analyses. (Baltagi 2005; Bell and Jones 2015)  
4.7. SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explain the rationale behind choosing Oportunidades and 
Bolsa Família as case studies. Also to provide a description behind the construction of the 
datasets highlighting the difficulties and differences in each of the countries. The research 
strategy and research methods were also described, while at the same time explaining why 
the adopted methodology was appropriate for answering the questions subject of this 
research. By using linear models and panel data analyses this work contributes to the existent 
literature as it provides results regarding the effects of CCTs at two levels of aggregation 
municipal and individual in two different countries. It also provides a general overview of the 
voting preferences of beneficiaries across time, to be specific across the last four electoral 
periods in both countries even if the panel in Brazil is at the municipal level and in Mexico at 
the individual. By combining these different approaches to analyse the diversity of outcomes 
that CCTs may or may not have on voting behaviour.  
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5. THE EFFECT OF OPORTUNIDADES ON VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR  
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the effect of Oportunidades on the voting behaviour of its recipients. 
Drawing on the retrospective economic voting theory, this chapter aims to demonstrate that 
recipients of CCTs are following their material self-interests (pocketbook voting) rather than 
party identification. Following both the retrospective and pocketbook voting theories, this 
work expects that CCT recipients base their voting on two strands, first by expectations about 
their future benefits and second by evaluating incumbent’s past policies and rewarding the 
incumbent party (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1985). In addition, this works theorises about 
voters’ behaviour in the long run; it is expected that initially, recipients are more responsive to 
real policy outcomes but after those polices have been in operation for a long period of time, 
voters are more likely to switch their political preferences (Key, 1966) towards a different party 
as they feel that the continuation of the programmes is guaranteed (De la O, 2013). Anthony 
Downs (1957) suggested that voters base their voting behaviour by comparing their expected 
utility of voting for the incumbent with the expected utility of voting for the opposition party. 
The utility differential would determine their voting when casting a ballot. In other words, 
recipients might change their voting based on their expectations of future policies on electoral 
promises (Downs, 1957). Thus, the research questions of this study were drawn using rational 
(prospective and retrospective) and sociological theories elements: are CCT beneficiaries 
voting following their self-interest? How does time influence their voting behaviour? And 
finally, do CCTs increase incumbent support in both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries? 
To answer these questions, this study relies on three statistical models using data from the 
Mexican Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI), the Electoral Federal Institute (IFE) and 
from the Mexico Panel Study (MPS). By means of retrospective evaluations, this study aims to 
demonstrate that CCTs changed their party voting preferences towards the incumbent party. 
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In order to understand the effects of CCTs better, effects of the programme were analysed at 
a municipal level and at the individual level.  Within these two sections, a brief summary of the 
descriptive findings is provided, followed by results from bivariate correlations. Then a series 
of logistic regressions are presented and finally, for the individual level analyses results from a 
fixed effects panel data analysis are discussed. Finally, the chapter presents a conclusion.  
5.2. THE EFFECT OF OPORTUNIDADES AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL  
5.2.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
In order to find the effects of CCTs on vote share, the first descriptive statistics describe the 
overall voter turnout and support for each of the parties. First, Table 5.1 presents the pattern 
of electoral participation in Mexico over the past four elections. Results show that the 1994 
election was the election with the highest participation when comparing it to the other three 
electoral periods.  
 








Voting Age  
1994 78.50% 35,545,831 45,279,053 53,944,640 
2000 63.96% 37,603,923 58,789,209 62,684,899 
2006 58.55% 41,791,322 71,374,373 66,061,738 
2012 63.14% 49,087,446 77,738,494 76,008,240 
Calculations using data from INE (2015)  
 
With regards for vote share for the incumbent Table 5.2., shows that the proportion of vote 
share for the incumbent decreased in each electoral period. Even if this is not analysed by CCT 
status, it is interesting as it could be a result of a punishment vote because of the persistent 
socioeconomic problems.  
Table 5.2.  Vote share for the incumbent per municipality 2000-2012. 
Votes for the incumbent 
2000 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PRI 379 0.21 0.82 0.41 0.12 
2006 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PAN 
526 0.02 0.71 0.33 0.15 
2012 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PAN 377 0.03 0.59 0.26 0.11 
Calculations using data from ENIGH-INEGI (2002, 2006, 2012). 
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In order to look into differences between recipients of the programme and non-beneficiaries 
within municipalities, a descriptive analysis of households with and without the programme 
over the different electoral periods is presented. Prior to the implementation of the 
programme, the average total years of schooling was only 5 years. After the introduction of 
the programme, as presented in Table 5.3., the average years of schooling increased in both, 
the population with and without Oportunidades.  Overall, in 2000 households had a mean of 5 
years of schooling while in 2012 they reached an average of 7 years. When comparing 
households with and without the programme, in 2006, households with Oportunidades´ 
beneficiaries had a mean of 5 years of education, while non-beneficiaries had almost 6.  When 
looking into the minimum years schooling, Oportunidades beneficiaries had 0 years while non 
beneficiaries had 3 years as minimum.  These findings are in line with Oportunidades targeting 
rules. The programme seemed to have increased years of schooling across the population. 
However, these descriptive statistics are only illustrative and do not prove whether the 
programme was effective in increasing years of schooling. A more detailed statistical analysis 
is needed to be conclusive in this regard. 
Table 5.3.  Years of schooling per household 2000-2012. 
Years of schooling 
2000 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
years of study  379 0 14 5.31 2.478 
years of study 
(oportunidades) 0 0 0 0 0 
years of study  
(other social programme) 
98 0 12 3.24 2.510 
N 379     
2006 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Years of study  
526 1 14 7.01 2.345 
years of study 
(oportunidades) 245 0 16 4.88 2.818 
years of study  
(other programme) 
432 0 14 5.61 2.079 
N 526     
2012 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Years of study  377 3 16 7.61 2.100 
years of study 
(oportunidades) 143 0 16 5.33 2.527 
years of study  
(other social programme) 
373 2.3 16 7.07 1.863 
N 377     
Calculations with data from ENIGH-INEGI (2000, 2006, 2012). 
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Normality tests were applied to continuous variables such as vote share, average number of 
households with the programme, years of schooling, income etc., in order to decide whether 
to use parametric or non-parametric tests when looking into differences between groups. As 
the data was not distributed normally, non-parametric tests were used.  The next tables 
present a summary of the characteristics of the municipality in each electoral period.  
When looking into income (table 5.4) we can observe that the average income of the general 
population is larger when compared to households benefited by Oportunidades or by any other 
social assistance programme. As the std. deviation shows, income in the Oportunidades group 
is more dispersed from the average when compared to the population in general.  
Table 5.4.  Income per household per municipality (2000 - 
2014). 
Income* 
 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev 

















87,230.7 23,080.5 11,935.9 
N 1659     
 Calculations using data from ENIGH-INEGI (2000, 2006, 2012, 2014).  
* Currency in actual Mexican Peso.  
 
Due to the not normal distribution of income, a logarithmic conversion was done, nevertheless 
it still was non-Gaussian, so Friedman test was applied showing that income was significantly 
different between groups p<0.001.  
Household composition did not differ between those with Oportunidades and those without 
(table 5.5). Approximately all households included a mean of five individuals. However, 
differences when looking into the maximum number of members per household. Those with 
the programme reached twelve and the std. deviation among the households with 
Oportunidades showed that the difference within this group was when comparing it to the 
general population.  
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Table 5.5.  Household composition (General, with 
Oportunidades and households with any other social 
programme). 
People per household 
 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
avg. number of people 
per household 
1691 2 9 4.83 .9712 
avg. number of people 
per household with 
Oportunidades 
388 1 12 4.74 1.808 
avg. number of people 
per household with any 
programme 
903 1 12 4.94 1.358 
      




5.2.2. MUNICIPAL BIVARIATE ANALYSIS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES AND VOTE SHARE FOR THE INCUMBENT 
Table 5.6. shows correlations between the independent variables and the vote share for the 
incumbent parties from 1994 to 2012 electoral periods. These correlations are illustrative and 
do not imply any causality. 
      Table 5.6. Correlation Incumbent Parties. Presidential Elections 1994-2012. 
 (1994) (2000) (2006) (2012) 
 PRI PRI PAN PAN 
Rural 0.391*** 0.386*** -0.164*** -0.062 
Household total 
income  





0.0449 0.168*** 0.443*** 0.105* 
Years of school - - - -0.421*** 0.274*** 0.058 
Proportion of families 
with  
Oportunidades   
- - - 0.221*** -0.150*** -0.068 
Proportion of affiliates 
to Seguro Popular   
- - - - - - 0.199*** 0.177 
N 409 379 526 377 
Calculations using data from INE (2015) INEGI (2000, 2006, 2012, 2014).  
  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Results of table 5.6 show that when looking into the effects of having a CCT on the electoral 
decision of its beneficiaries, municipalities with a higher proportion of families with 
Oportunidades were significantly more likely to have a higher vote share for the incumbent PRI 
in 2000 while it was significantly less likely to have a higher vote share for the incumbent PAN 
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in 2006 despite the fact that this party had expanded the programme nationally to both rural 
and urban areas.  
An additional control variable was included in these correlations; the proportion of affiliates to 
Seguro Popular. The rationale behind the introduction of this variable was that the Seguro 
Popular was introduced during President Fox’s tenure and was a component of the 
Oportunidades CCT scheme of conditions, requiring that beneficiaries of Oportunidades need 
to attend regular meetings at the health centre. These health centres were mostly operated 
by the newly established health system. Municipalities with a higher proportion of households 
affiliated to the Seguro Popular had significantly higher vote share for the incumbent PAN in 
2006. Surprisingly in the electoral period of 2012, this did not seem to influence vote share for 
the PAN. Being affiliated to this programme did not significantly influence in the next electoral 
period. This is important because the operation of the Seguro Popular was decentralised at 
state level so it may be that individuals rewarded not the party in power at presidential level 
but to the party in power at state level.  
The results from table 5.6 also show that rural municipalities were significantly more likely to 
vote for the incumbent PRI in both 1994 and 2000. However, in 2006 rural municipalities were 
significantly less likely to vote for the incumbent PAN despite the fact that it was under the 
PAN´s administration that the expansion of Oportunidades and the introduction of the Seguro 
Popular took place. In 2012 the difference between rural and urban municipalities was no 
longer significant. The fact that rural municipalities were more likely than urban municipalities 
to vote for the incumbent in 1994 and 2000, but less likely to do this in 2006 suggests that 
perhaps incumbency as such was irrelevant, though the PRI may have been rewarded initially 
for introducing CCTs.  
When looking into income, higher household income was correlated with lower support for 
the incumbent PRI in 1994 and 2000 and higher support for the incumbent PAN in 2006 and 
2012. Across the electoral periods of 2000-2012, having a governor from the same party as the 
nationally incumbent meant higher support for the incumbent. In terms of education, higher 
years in education was correlated with lower support for PRI in 2000 and higher support for 
the PAN only in 2006. It seems then, that the less-well off households and households with 
lower educational achievements were more likely to vote for PRI in 1994 and 2000 while better 
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off households with more educated individuals were more prone to support PAN in 2006 and 
2012.   
A set of correlations were run for the non-incumbent parties. Results from these correlations 
are illustrative of a new shaping of the electorate after the implementation of the CCTs.  It 
appears that CCTs managed to create a sense of partisanship towards PRI; as we can observe 
in table 9.9 in the appendix, the PRI showed a higher likelihood of winning in municipalities 
with a higher proportion of households with Oportunidades in the electoral periods of 2006 
and 2012 when the PAN was incumbent. In the same way, municipalities belonging to rural 
areas, those with a higher proportion of less well of households and those with households 
with lower educational achievements were significantly willing to support the PRI more than 
the incumbent PAN.  
5.2.3. THE EFFECT OF OPORTUNIDADES ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR AT 
THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
This section shows results from logistic regression analyses at the municipal level. By using this 
type of analyses, the inclusion of categorical variables and the operationalisation of other 
otherwise continuous characteristics into categorical variables was possible. As briefly 
explained in the methodology section, instead of using the share of votes for the incumbent 
party as the dependent variable, for these analyses a dummy variable capturing whether the 
incumbent won within the municipality was constructed.  This was done to take account of the 
many political parties and different alliances between them at the municipal level and to 
establish whether the introduction or expansion of the programme increased the likelihood of 
winning for the party in power.  
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Table 5.7. The effect of Oportunidades on voting behaviour at the municipal level in the 2000-2012 electoral periods: Logistic regression 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
(Inc) 







Proportion of households with CCTS 
 
 6.32* -4.78 -10.83 0.63 -0.44 -0.30 24.7** -35.65 -19.8* 
Standard error 4.99 5.33 12.16 0.26 0.26 0.29 9.24 25.77 9.36 
Region 
Centre ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
North -0.28 0.44 -0.74 -0.20 0.07 -0.09 -0.23 0.24 0.20 
Standard error 0.32 0.31 0.69 0.54 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.44 0.32 
West 0.89 -0.85 -6.27 2.45* 1.32* -2.79*** 0.23 1.64* -3.12** 
Standard error 0.635 0.630 29.986 1.072 0.571 0.711 0.596 0.801 1.139 
East 1.645 -1.794* -5.302 1.114 1.559 -1.944* 3.113** -2.545 -2.751* 
Standard error 0.914 0.905 25.729 1.578 0.808 0.833 0.993 1.512 1.102 
South 1.253 -2.209 3.705 1.642 -1.374 0.639 -0.334 -1.959 0.871 
Standard error 1.208 1.195 2.696 2.061 1.045 1.040 1.110 1.692 1.180 
Educational achievements  
0 years 0.812 -0.863 0.267 2.185* 0.100* -2.005*** 0.107 1.766** -1.046 
Standard error 0.467 0.467 1.026 0.933 0.490 0.505 0.490 0.718 0.557 
1 – 6 years 0.715 -0.710 0.199 1.478 1.375*** -1.720*** 0.243 0.584 -0.655 
Standard error 0.412 0.406 1.006 0.907 0.431 0.438 0.366 0.520 0.409 
7 -12 years -0.074 -0.108 0.846 0.306 0.359 -0.340 0.265 -0.330 -0.214 
Standard error 0.376 0.360 0.858 0.812 0.327 0.334 0.335 0.497 0.366 







Table 5.7. Continued 
 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
(Inc) 









0.268 -0.359 0.397 -0.182 -0.702** 0.712** 0.310 -0.185 -0.327 
0.294 0.295 0.578 0.350 0.243 0.243 0.304 0.474 0.334 
NO ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Municipal Income 
1st tertile 1.239** -1.331*** 0.493 1.094 -1.401*** 0.924 0.887* -2.127*** 0.078 
Standard error 0.404 0.400 0.872 0.793 0.431 0.438 0.386 0.635 0.426 
2nd tertile 0.550 -0.647 0.571 0.732 -1.424*** 1.189*** 0.479 -1.024* 0.027 
Standard error 0.331 0.319 0.743 0.737 0.349 0.349 0.293 0.429 0.327 
3rd tertile ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Governor from same party as incumbent 
Yes 0.363 -0.254 -0.363 -0.713 1.901*** -1.650*** -0.637* 0.672 0.386 
Standard error 0.292 0.289 0.630 0.468 0.269 0.275 0.283 0.410 0.295 
No ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
N  379 379 379 526 526 526 377 377 377 
Pseudo R2  0.168 0.184 0.121 0.258 0.219 0.194 0.156 0.208 0.186 
  * p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
  Calculations using data from INE (2015) and ENIGH (2000.2006,2012). Figures in the cells show logistic regression coefficients. 
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Results from table 5.7 show that in the year 2000 in municipalities with a higher proportion of 
households receiving what was then called Progresa, the PRI (the incumbent party at the time) 
was more likely to win. However, this was not true when PAN was incumbent nationally in 
2006. PRI was significantly more likely to win in municipalities with a high proportion of 
households receiving Progresa or Oportunidades in 2012 when PAN was still incumbent 
nationally. 
When looking into the other control variables, the PAN was more likely to win in 2006 and 
2012 in municipalities from the western states, while the PRI was more likely to win in 
municipalities from the east in 2012.  Municipalities from the eastern Mexico are poorer when 
compared to those in the west.   
Also, the PRI was more likely to win in 2000 in municipalities with households with lower 
average of years of education, while in 2012 this was true for the PAN. When looking into rural 
and urban areas, the PRD was more likely to win in municipalities in the rural areas in the 
election of 2006, while the PAN was significantly less likely to win in these municipalities.  
When looking into the municipality income, the PRI was significantly more likely to win among 
municipalities with higher number of households in the lower tercile of income during the 
elections of 2000 and 2012.  By contrast, the PAN was significantly less likely to win in these 
municipalities.  
In municipalities with a governor from the incumbent party, the PAN had a higher likelihood of 
winning in the year 2000. However, this variable was only significant for that year. Surprisingly, 
that same year, in municipalities with a governor from the PRD there was a significantly lower 
likelihood for the PRD winning.  
In summary, descriptive statistics showed that the PRI had a significantly higher vote share in 
municipalities with a higher proportion of families with Progresa in 2000. However, this was 
not true when the PAN was incumbent in 2006 or 2012; this party had significantly less vote 
share in 2006. The municipal level logistic regressions showed different results.  During the 
years 2000 (incumbent PRI) and 2012 (incumbent PAN) the PRI was more likely to win in 
municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving a CCT, but this did not happen 
in 2006 (incumbent PAN). The other control variables do not show consistent results. It appears 
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that in municipalities with higher income, the PAN was less likely to win across the three 
electoral periods. The results also suggest that municipalities with low average education were 
more likely to vote for the incumbent PAN in 2006 and 2012.   
5.3. THE EFFECT OF OPORTUNIDADES ON INDIVIDUAL VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR 
5.3.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
This section provides results from the descriptive statistics of the baseline data for each wave 
of the Mexico Panel Study (MPS). It includes comparisons of data from the first wave with the 
3 different editions of the Panel (MPS, 2000-2012). The population in each one of the samples 
was 2400 individuals aged 18 and over. Respondents’ baseline characteristics are summarised 
in Table 5.8 All proportions were taken from the weighted data of the samples while the 
population (N) size was taken from the unweighted data. The survey included don’t know or 
refuse as possible answers however as this possibility was not consistent across all waves, they 
were coded as missing values. Nevertheless, analyses were carried out considering these 
possible answers with no changes in the results. 
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Table 5.8. Cross sectional descriptive statistics of the baseline samples of MEPS 2000, MEPS 2006, and MEPS 2012. 






Type of Municipality Urban 70 70 73 
Rural 22 20 26 
Mixed 7 10 1 
Gender Male 47 49 48 
Female 53 51 52 
Age  Mean 38yrs 40yrs 40yrs 
18-30 36 33 34 
31-40 23 23 24 
41-50 18 19 18 
51-60 11 12 11 
61-70 6 8 7 
70+ 4 5 6 
Marital Status Single 24 24 24 
Married or in a partnership 71 71 70 
Divorced, separated or widowed 5 5 6 
Ethnicity White 18 19 19 
Light Brown 46 50 50 
Dark Brown 35 31 31 
Other (Black/Asian) 1 --- --- 
CCT Beneficiary* Yes 13 23 20 
No 85 77 80 
Religion Catholic 90 83 81 
Christian – Non-Catholic 5 8 8 
Other 1 2 4 












Employed Yes 43 87 87 
No 56 12 12 
Income 
(in MX pesos) 
0 – 2000 52 28 28 
2001 to 6000 33 50 50 
6001 to 16000 13 22 22 
More than 16000 2 -- -- 
Years of education 
 
Mean  2.9yrs 3.2yrs 3.2yrs 
No education 10 5 4 
Primary 39 33 28 
Secondary 22 23 31 
High School 17 19 20 
College 11 20 16 
Ideological Placement Strong left 9 7 7 
Somewhat Left 4 18 13 
Centre-Left 7 7 7 
Centre 22 25 24 
Centre-Right 15 7 7 
Somewhat Right 15 13 12 
Strong Right 28 8 8 


















Self-reported vote PRI 46 29 39 
PAN 36 27 24 
PRD 15 36 27 
Others 1 6 8 
None 2 2 2 
Region Centre 44 42 41 
North 22 20 24 
South 22 24 21 
Western 12 14 14 
* N was taken from the unweighted sample, but proportions and significance tests were obtained using the weighted samples. Significance: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 




As Table 5.8 shows, the proportion of individuals living in urban localities ranged from 70% in 
2000 to 73% in 2012 while the proportion of rural localities ranged from 22% to 26%, the 
remainder living in mixed localities. The variation in the percentage of individuals that are 
beneficiaries of a CCT ranged from 13% in 2000 to 20% in the 2012. 
Income distribution ranged from having no income to more than 16,000 pesos (USD $810) per 
month. Between 2000 and 2012, the proportion of people living with less than 2000 pesos 
(USD $101) per month decreased from 52% to 28%. These findings support the hypothesis that 
the introduction of CCTs have led to an overall increase of income across the beneficiary 
families, thereby reducing the gap between poor and extreme poor. With regards to the 
individuals being employed a higher proportion of individuals in 2012 reported working for pay 
than in 2000, the proportion of employed individuals rising from 43% to 87%. These results 
seem consistent with current statistics from INEGI (2014) regarding the active labour force in 
Mexico. In addition, the latter results could be also the reason of why income seemed to have 
increased over the period in which CCTs were in operation.  
Given the design of the survey, it was possible to identify ideological placement of the 
respondents, based on a question asking the respondents to place themselves in one of a set 
of categories ranging from strong left to strong right.  As can be seen in table 5.8., most 
respondents were centre oriented (25% in 2006 and 24% in 2012) rather than left or right wing 
except for year 2000 where 28% of respondents placed themselves as strong right wing. 
Self-reported vote, by contrast, is more illustrative of the true political choices than party 
orientation and ideological placement. As the results show, the proportion of individuals that 
stated an intention to vote for the PRI ranged from 46% in 2000 to 39% in 2012, 2006 being 
PRI’s worst year in terms of self-reported vote (29%). These results are in line with the final 
electoral results that place PRI as the third political force in 2006. As regards the individual’s 
intention to vote for PAN it is possible to observe from table 5.8 that it’s political force in terms 
of declared self-reported vote has fallen since the 2000 election ranging from 36% to 24%. As 
with the previous results this is also in line with the electoral results published by IFE placing 
PAN as the third political force in 2012. It is to be noted that PRD’s self-reported vote increased 
from 2000 to 2006 but did not increase for 2012.  
 141 
As regards the socioeconomic characteristics of the population, individuals from wave one had 
the lowest average years of education (2.9) compared to the second (3.2) and the third (3.2) 
waves. As explained previously, education categories were created from having zero years of 
education to college. The introduction of education policies and reforms to the education 
system made Mexico overcome a 40% illiteracy rate during 1960 to a 5% illiteracy rate by 2010 
(Olvera, 2013). However, despite having as a Constitutional right (art.3) the access to a basic 
free and public education and having a literacy rate of 95%, the average years of schooling was 
only 8.8 throughout the period of study (years 2000 to 2012). Meaning that the large share of 
the population had access only to basic education but not to secondary education, high school 
or university. It is to be noted that after the introduction of CCTs in the 90’s and the 
introduction of a policy aimed to provide universal coverage to every child in the country under 
PAN’s administrations it is possible to observe an incremental improvement in the mean years 
of study. This effect is also visible when looking at years of education categories in table 5.8, 
the proportion of individuals with zero years of education passed from 10% to 4% in 12 years. 
Finally, when describing the demographic characteristics, the mean age reported by 
respondents was 48. The variation in the proportions within each age category is very small 
between waves. In all the waves the proportion of individuals reported being married is on 
average 70%, while the proportion of respondents being divorced, separated or widowed is 
5% and the proportion of individuals that were never married was almost on average 24%. As 
it regards to ethnicity in all the waves, around the 49% of the respondents were self-
categorised as light brown, 19% white and the rest as dark brown (32%). As regards to religion 
84% of the respondents across the three waves identified themselves as Catholics whereas the 
rest of the respondents reported other religion preferences.   
5.3.2 INDIVIDUAL BIVARIATE ANALYSIS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES AND VOTES FOR THE INCUMBENT 
 
In order to find which individual characteristics were significantly associated with the vote for 
the incumbent, bivariate analyses between self-reported vote and other independent variables 














Did not vote 




Did not vote 




Did not vote 




Yes  53 47 55.071 
0.000 *** 
20 80 11.363 
0.003 ** 
21 79 0.135 
0.935 No   30 70 21 79 22 78 
Age 
category 









31-40 37 63 38 62 24 76 
41-50 36 64 35 65 21 79 
51-60 40 60 31 69 19 81 
61-70 35 65 33 67 19 81 
70+ 35 65 29 71 19 81 
Gender 






20 80 1.401 
0.236 
 
Female  39 61 22 78 23 77 
Ethnicity 











37 63 21 79 17 83 
Dark 
Brown 
36 64 17 83 19 81 
Marital 
status 









Married  39 61 21 79 23 77 
Divorced  53 47 19 81 18 82 
Religion 
Catholic 40 60 31.184 
0.000 *** 
23 77 14.880 
0.005 ** 
23 77 7.377 
0.117 Christian 50 50 17 83 22 78 
Other 42 58 11 89 10 90 




Table 5.9 Continued… 
Characteristics 
2000 2006 2012 














Did not vote 













Primary 42 58 20 80 16 84 
Secondary 37 63 20 80 25 75 
H. School 29 81 20 80 23 77 
College 25 75 28 72 24 76 
Employed 
Yes 37 63 5.364 
0.068 
21 79 0.797 
0.673 
26 74 13.928 
0.001 * No 41 59 23 77 16 84 
Type of 
Locality 









Rural 45 55 20 80 15 85 
Mixed 41 59 17 83 23 77 
Region 









North 41 59 29 71 25 75 
South 39 61 15 85 14 86 














Some Left 24 76 17 82 15 85 
Center 
Left 
25 75 20 80 12 88 
Center 27 73 22 78 25 75 
Center 
right 
38 62 29 71 29 71 
Some 
Right 
42 58 23 77 31 69 
Strong 
Right 
45 55 29 71 37 63 
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Table 5.9 Continued… 
Characteristics 































PAN 10 90 42 58 48 52 
PRD 6 94 4 96 5 95 
Other 18 82 0 100 19 81 
Didn´t vote 29 71 20 80 20 80 
Ex-President 
Approval 











38 62 25 75 26 74 
Neither 31 69 13 86 11 89 
Disapprove 
somewhat 
28 72 8 92 11 89 
Disapprove a 
lot 















47 53 34 66 33 67 
Same 41 59 18 82 23 77 
Somewhat 
Worse  
30 70 11 89 17 83 
Worse 22 78 5 95 9 91 
Significance *p<.05; **p<.001; *** p<.001. Calculations using MPS (2000, 2006 and 2012). 
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As the table 5.9. shows, individuals with Progresa significantly had higher self-reported vote 
towards the incumbent party PRI in 2000 and individuals with Oportunidades did not show 
higher self-reported vote towards the incumbent PAN in 2006 and 2012. When analysing the 
demographic variables age did not seem significantly related towards votes for the incumbent. 
There were significant differences in self-reported vote by gender only in 2000 where more 
men intended to vote for the incumbent. When analysing ethnicity (which in Mexico is 
assessed as skin colour), a significantly lower proportion of darker skinned respondents 
intended to vote for the incumbent only in 2006. A higher proportion of respondents without 
religion or non-Catholics or Christians intended did not vote significantly more for the 
incumbent. While in the year of 2000 a higher proportion of individuals with college education 
voted for other party than the incumbent and a higher proportion of individuals without 
education voted for the incumbent. This differed in the posterior elections of 2006 and 2012 
where individuals with college education and secondary education significantly intended to 
vote for the incumbent.  
A significantly higher per cent of individuals without an employment voted for the incumbent 
only in 2012. Individuals from mixed localities were significantly more likely to vote for the 
incumbent in 2000 while in 2006 a significantly higher proportion of individuals in a rural 
environment were more likely to vote for the incumbent.  
There was a significantly higher proportion of individuals from the north with self-reported 
vote for the incumbent across the three electoral periods. Also, across the three periods, a 
higher percentage of individuals with a right ideological placement were significantly more 
likely to intend to vote for the incumbent. Whereas in 2000 a higher proportion of individuals 
that had previously voted for PRI intended to vote for the incumbent, in 2006 and 2012 a higher 
proportion of respondents that had previously voted for PAN intended to vote for the 
incumbent. Individuals with the highest approval for the previous administration were 
significantly more likely to vote for the incumbent. Finally, individuals with the worse financial 
situation were more likely to vote for the incumbent in 2000, while in 2006 and 2012 




5.3.3 INDIVIDUAL LOGISTIC MODEL  
 
While logistic regression models from section 5.1.3 showed results at a municipal level using 
aggregated data, this section used a national poll targeting individuals.  As briefly explained in 
the methods chapter, the Mexico Panel Study is a cross sectional random stratified sample of 
Mexican eligible voters and has been going on since the year 2000. This survey includes several 
variables valuable for the study of the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour. Logistic regression 
analyses were performed, having the self-reported vote for the incumbent party in every 
election from 2000 to 2012 as a dependent variable, whereby the vote for the incumbent was 
coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.  
Results on table 5.10 show that when including all the variables in the model, respondents with 
Oportunidades did not vote significantly more for the incumbent in any of the electoral periods 
when compared to those without the programme. Results also show that during the year 2000, 
those belonging to a rural or mixed community were more likely to vote the incumbent than 
those in urban communities. Respondents with the centre left and centre right ideological 
placements were more likely to vote for the incumbent than those identifying with the strong 
right. Individuals reporting their personal economy as worse, somewhat worse or the same 
were less likely to vote for the PRI when compared to those reporting a better economy. 
Similarly, respondents disapproving the ex-president performance or approving somewhat the 
president performance were less likely to vote for the PRI compared to those approving the 
past administration.   
Table 5.10 also shows that in the year 2006 respondents with primary, and secondary 
education were significantly more likely to vote for the incumbent PAN when compared to 
those with university degree. Individuals that approved somewhat, disapprove somewhat and 
disapproved a lot the ex-president’s administration were less likely to vote for the PAN when 
compared to those approving the administration a lot.  
Finally, the table also shows that for the elections of 2012, when the PAN was incumbent, only 
individuals approving somewhat and disapproving a lot the ex-presidents administration were 








Table 5.10 The effects of Progresa - Oportunidades on voting behaviour at the individual level: Results from logistic regressions.  
Election Year 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
Incumb 








Yes 0.005 -0.006 -0.014 0.047 0.024 -0.098*** -0.072 -0.066 0.159 
Standard error 0.010 0.051 0.080 0.047 0.055 0.060 0.049 0.062 0.043 
NO ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Gender 
Female 0.359 -0.050 -0.659*** 0.218 0.028 -0.276 -0.004 0.193 -0.230 
Standard error 0.192 0.035 0.035 0.049 0.011 0.043 0.021 0.041 0.043 
Age category 
(in years) 
18-30 -0.106 -0.076 0.069 -0.161** 0.012 -0.034 0.021 -0.132 -0.087 
Standard error 0.011 0.052 0.078 0.015 0.046 0.050 0.023 0.057 0.029 
31-40 -0.101 -0.068 0.059 -0.167 0.013 -0.033 0.022 -0.137 -0.085 
Standard error 0.025 0.048 0.075 0.057 0.033 0.024 0.022 0.051 0.062 
41-50 -0.094 -0.066 0.057 -0.159 0.014 -0.037 0.020 -0.128 -0.073 
Standard error 0.064 0.068 0.065 0.079 0.053 0.065 0.056 0.083 0.050 
51-60 ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
61-70 -0.107 -0.067 0.084 -0.162 0.012 -0.038 0.018 -0.126 -0.082 
Standard error 0.030 0.057 0.071 0.077 0.076 0.053 0.066 0.010 0.097 
70+ -0.110 -0.075 0.070 -0.162* 0.012 -0.033 0.023 -0.148 -0.089 
Standard error 0.029 0.047 0.053 0.064 0.064 0.076 0.049 0.035 0.052 
Skin Colour 
Light brown 0.025 -0.158 -0.110 0.006 -0.169 0.119 0.144 -0.052 -0.075 
Standard error 0.031 0.072 0.061 0.072 0.057 0.039 0.029 0.021 0.053 
Dark brown 0.028 -0.156 -0.111 0.009 -0.193 0.124 0.181 -0.072 -0.077 
Standard error 0.057 0.060 0.082 0.068 0.031 0.092 0.031 0.033 0.014 
White ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
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Table 5.10. Continued 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
Incumb 








Married or in a 
partnership 
0.159 -0.180 -0.169 -0.039 0.033 0.016 0.042 0.031 -0.038 




0.168 -0.114 -0.168 -0.051 0.038 0.013 0.048 0.033 -0.025 
Standard error 0.035 0.082 0.033 0.025 0.043 0.052 0.056 0.045 0.077 
single ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Christian, not 
catholic 
-0.119 0.003 0.087 -0.122 -0.027 0.020 -0.181 -0.160 0.134 
Standard error 0.018 0.044 0.056 0.028 0.064 0.033 0.068 0.050 0.022 
Other -0.127 0.003 0.091 -0.114 -0.026 0.025 -0.200 -0.196 0.135 
Standard error 0.021 0.030 0.090 0.066 0.033 0.017 0.012 0.040 0.040 
Years of Study 
None -0.225 0.225 -0.185 -0.304*** 0.250 0.052 -0.156 0.177 -0.030 
Standard error 0.021 0.059 0.060 0.024 0.009 0.064 0.046 0.086 0.030 
Non-formal 
education 
-0.213 0.242*** -0.165 -0.425 0.159 0.054 -0.167 0.172 -0.034 
Standard error 0.050 0.093 0.062 0.045 0.038 0.067 0.069 0.063 0.037 
Primary -0.239*** 0.127 -0.182 -0.411 0.229* 0.051 -0.177 0.252 -0.032 
Standard error 0.061 0.010 0.050 0.036 0.029 0.021 0.014 0.045 0.030 
Secondary -0.187** 0.187* -0.169 -0.534* 0.189* 0.055 -0.149 0.207 -0.031 
Standard error 0.046 0.051 0.046 0.075 0.043 0.054 0.064 0.032 0.056 
High school -0.192 0.190* -0.185 -0.409 0.200 0.046 -0.169 0.209 -0.031 
Standard error 0.043 0.070 0.046 0.049 0.030 0.094 0.039 0.042 0.036 







Table 5.10. Continued 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
Incumb 








Yes 0.076 0.033 -0.304 0.025 0.021 -0.098 -0.021 0.159 -0.388 
Standard error 0.070 0.035 0.046 0.040 0.064 0.050 0.068 0.076 0.061 
NO ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Type of Locality 
rural 0.359* -0.332 -0.304 -0.170 0.127 0.050 -0.153 0.022 0.169 
Standard error 0.052 0.020 0.056 0.019 0.039 0.060 0.065 0.064 0.039 
mixed 0.408*** -0.291 -0.295 -0.172 0.101 0.049 -0.149 0.021 0.165 
Standard error 0.029 0.039 0.053 0.062 0.048 0.092 0.100 0.068 0.061 
urban ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Region 
North 0.153 -0.058 -0.050 0.343** -0.022 -0.295* -0.153 0.128 0.012 
Standard error 0.015 0.061 0.070 0.068 0.065 0.042 0.062 0.058 0.068 
South 0.150 -0.067 -0.043 0.274* -0.039 -0.251 -0.108 0.157 0.014 
Standard error 0.071 0.027 0.016 0.044 0.011 0.053 0.063 0.014 0.039 
Center ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Western 0.135 -0.064 -0.051 0.278 -0.029 -0.321 -0.154 0.160 0.013 
Standard error 0.090 0.072 0.032 0.063 0.033 0.023 0.069 0.052 0.060 
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Table 5.10. Continued 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
Incumb 









Somewhat left 0.189 -0.045 -0.153*** 0.023 0.051 -0.117* 0.049 0.036 -0.282 
Standard error 0.087 0.060 0.052 0.036 0.060 0.029 0.075 0.057 0.042 
Center-left 0.208** -0.041 -0.231 0.025 0.052 -0.093 0.040 0.048 -0.197 
Standard error 0.078 0.076 0.040 0.026 0.068 0.035 0.059 0.083 0.052 
Center-center 0.209 -0.046 -0.215 0.029 0.053 -0.123 0.044 0.036 -0.224* 
Standard error 0.084 0.031 0.036 0.029 0.033 0.063 0.063 0.071 0.046 
Center-right 0.208* -0.052 -0.207* 0.023 0.044 -0.138** 0.046 0.051 -0.233 
Standard error 0.042 0.040 0.010 0.076 0.060 0.074 0.032 0.063 0.025 
Somewhat right 0.208 -0.040 -0.228** 0.025 0.052 -0.117 0.046 0.043 -0.239*** 
Standard error 0.024 0.031 0.069 0.054 0.080 0.050 0.030 0.041 0.064 




Approve a lot ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Approve 
somewhat 
-0.209* 0.107 0.034 0.078 -0.586*** 0.129 0.111 -0.329*** 0.061 
Standard error 0.042 0.056 0.049 0.074 0.059 0.053 0.024 0.038 0.023 
Neither approve 
nor Disapprove 
-0.199 0.118 0.044 0.061 -0.671 0.097 0.114 -0.329 0.073 
Standard error 0.041 0.061 0.029 0.038 0.008 0.051 0.067 0.059 0.049 
Disapprove 
somewhat 
-0.221 0.091 0.041 0.072 -0.597* 0.088* 0.108 -0.301 0.047 
Standard error 0.040 0.050 0.044 0.041 0.024 0.099 0.054 0.056 0.025 
Disapprove a lot -0.208*** 0.099 0.044 0.069 -0.559** 0.107** 0.107 -0.413** 0.057 
Standard error 0.032 0.047 0.078 0.054 0.045 0.035 0.042 0.043 0.067 
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Table 5.10. Continued 
Variable Category 
2000 2006 2012 
PRI 
Incumb 










Better ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Somewhat better -0.216 0.004 0.056 0.136 -0.175 0.014 -0.049 -0.126 0.011 
Standard error 0.078 0.067 0.032 0.029 0.060 0.067 0.075 0.060 0.079 
The same -0.244* 0.004 0.071 0.119 -0.168 0.014 -0.053 -0.134 0.011 
Standard error 0.050 0.056 0.058 0.057 0.061 0.043 0.039 0.088 0.067 
Somewhat worse -0.258** 0.003 0.069 0.118 -0.144 0.015 -0.051 -0.152 0.009 
Standard error 0.050 0.057 0.064 0.082 0.086 0.064 0.029 0.048 0.026 
Worse -0.224* 0.003 0.069 0.119 -0.144 0.015 -0.051 -0.151 0.010 
Standard error 0.036 0.005 0.066 0.078 0.019 0.027 0.042 0.092 0.062 
N  2363 2363 2363 2337 2337 2337 910 910 910 
Pseudo R2  0.117 0.038 0.045 0.087 0.126 0.073 0.034 0.127 0.083 
F 0.906          
* p<0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p <0.001 




5.3.4 LONGITUDINAL EFFECTS OF OPORTUNIDADES ON VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR: PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
In order to find if the longitudinal exposure of a CCT such as Progresa - Oportunidades 
had an effect on voting behaviour, a panel data analysis was performed with the 
dependent variable being the vote for the incumbent. Results are shown in table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11. Longitudinal effects of Progresa - Oportunidades on voting behaviour (vote for 






Yes -.019 (0.608) 




31-40 0.039 (0.377) 
Std. Err. 0.044 
41-50 -0.018 (0.713) 
Std. Err. 0.049 
51-60  -0.115* (0.048) 
Std. Err. 0.058 
61-70 -0.040 (0.565) 
Std. Err. 0.070 
70+ 0.073 (0.368) 
Std. Err. 0.082 
Years of Study 
No education -0.095 (0.288) 
Std. Err. 0.089 
primary -0.135** (0.007) 
Std. Err. 0.050 
secondary -0.064 (0.192) 
Std. Err. 0.049 
High school  -0.043 (0.397) 
Std. Err. 0.051 
University REF 
Ideological Placement 
Somewhat left REF 
Strong left  -0.004 (0.949) 
Std. Err. 0.078 
Somewhat Left -0.055 (0.336) 
Std. Err. 0.058 
Center-Left 0.115 (0.058) 
Std. Err. 0.061 
Center-Right 0.085 (0.235) 
Std. Err. 0.071 
Somewhat Right 0.027 (0.607) 
Std. Err. 0.052 
Strong Right 0.110 (0.153) 




Past Vote  
Previous Election 
PAN -0.074 (0.208) 
Std. Err. 0.059 
PRD -0.161** (0.003) 
Std. Err. 0.054 
Other -0.014 (0.941) 
Std. Err. 0.182  
didn't vote -0.117* (0.039) 
Std. Err. 0.039 
Ex-President´s Approval 
Approve a lot REF 
Approves somewhat -0.031 (0.490) 
Std. Err. 0.045 
Neither -0.234*** (0.000) 
Std. Err. 0.064 
Disapproves somewhat -0.248*** (0.000) 
Std. Err. 0.056 
Disapproves a lot -0.229*** (0.000) 
Std. Err. 0.064 
Personal Economy Has improved 
Better REF 
Somewhat better 0.171* (0.040) 
Std. Err. 0.083 
The same 0.150*** (0.000) 
Std. Err. 0.042 
Somewhat worse -0.020 (0.690) 
Std. Err. 0.050 
Worse -0.092 (0.080) 
Std. Err. 0.052 
Constant 0.384*** (0.000) 
Observations (N) 2554 




It seems that having Progresa - Oportunidades did not significantly increase the number 
votes for the incumbent when compared to individuals without the programme. 
However, certain individual characteristics were significantly negatively associated with 
votes for the incumbent across the three electoral periods. Individuals from the 51-60 
age category were significantly less likely to vote for the incumbent than those in the 
reference category. Individuals belonging to the primary school group also were 
significantly less likely to vote for the incumbent than those in the reference category 
university. Respondents with past votes for the PRD and those who didn't vote showed 
significantly less likelihood of voting for the incumbent than those in the reference 
category (PRI). Those neither approving nor disapproving, and those somewhat 
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disapproving or disapproving lot the previous administration were also negatively 
associated towards votes for the incumbent than those in the reference category 
(approve a lot). A higher likelihood for voting for the incumbent was seen among those 
whose economy became somewhat better or remained the same when compared to 
those with a perception of a better economy.  
 
5.4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the relationship between Progresa -
Oportunidades and voting behaviour at a municipal and individual levels. This section 
presents a discussion of the results from the statistical analyzes contrasting them with 
the relevant literature.  
5.4.1 THE EFFECTS OF PROGRESA - OPORTUNIDADES ON VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
As a summary when looking into the effects of Progresa - Oportunidades on voting 
behaviour, results from the correlations presented in table 5.6., suggest that the 
incumbent PRI was more likely to win in municipalities with higher proportion (coverage) 
of households with Progresa in the year 2000. These results are in line with results 
presented by Ana de O (2017).  They are also able to answer the hypothesis of this work 
“The more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support for the 
party that governs at national level” as it was in 1997 where Progresa was put in place. 
So it seems that, despite not changing the election as Vicente Fox from PAN won that 
year, the programme produced favorable results for the PRI in municipalities with the 
highest coverage in the year 2000.  Results from the correlations for all parties in the 
following elections (table 9.9 appendix) suggest that among municipalities with higher 
proportion of households with Progresa, the PRI was more likely to win when compared 
to the incumbent party. This relationship could be the result of the association between 
delivery of goods in exchange for political support, or as suggested by De la O (2013), the 
programme may have had the effect of increasing the vote for the party introducing it in 
the short term and sustaining itself in the long term. These results are in line with the 
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findings regarding the Seguro Popular introduced in 2003. Individuals with this insurance 
were more likely to vote for the PAN (incumbent) in 2006. However, the effect stopped 
being significant by 2012. This shift supports the hypothesis of this research by showing 
that the effect of programmes on support for the incumbent party at national level 
weakens over time. As de la O (2013) argued, it seems that the effect of Progresa (later 
Oportunidades) in the long term diminished. 
In contrast to these results, correlations from table 9.9 in the appendix, the proportion 
of municipalities with Seguro Popular was positive for the PRI in 2012. These results could 
be due to the way in which Seguro Popular was operated and implemented, which was 
administered by the governors of the states. This could, in some way, have influenced 
the positive effect for the PRI in 2012. However, this is not the scope of this research as 
Seguro Popular is not a CCT. The proportion of those affiliated to the Seguro Popular was 
not considered in the logistic models since this variable is non-existent in Brazil. However, 
without a doubt, it opens space for future research. 
When looking into the other characteristics associated with votes for the incumbent, 
correlations from table 5.6, show that rural municipalities were significantly more likely 
to vote for the PRI when it was the incumbent in 1994 and 2000 elections, but also when 
it was in the opposition in 2006 and 2012 (table 9.9 of the appendix). This reflects the 
power of the PRI in the rural and most marginalized communities of the country. It is an 
interesting finding as Progresa - Oportunidades started and was expanded in rural 
municipalities, and in these areas Seguro Popular was introduced first.  In rural 
municipalities the PAN was less likely to win in 2006 and in 2012. 
The effect of the PRI in rural municipalities could be explained in terms of patronage, 
since, as Hilgers (2008) argues, the central element of patronage is the long-term 
relationship in which there is an unequal situation of power where generally there is a 
political alliance. The result contrasts with what was indicated by Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez 
and Magaloni (2007; 2008) in the sense that interventions such as CCT were aimed at the 
poorest municipalities because they are the most likely to respond electorally (in the form 
of votes or alliances) to income transfers. However, in this case it seems that the tie to 
the PRI was so strong, that the widening of the programme did not work for the PAN. 
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When observing the effect of income, results from the bivariate analysis show that it 
seems that beneficiaries from Progresa - Oportunidades vote following their economic 
self-interest. As results from table 5.6, show, for municipalities where households 
reported a higher income, the vote share for PRI in the years 1994 and 2000 was lower, 
while for 2006 and 2012 vote share was higher for PAN. This is in accordance with what 
was stated in the review of the literature in chapter three in which both Diaz-Cayeros, et. 
al (2007) and de la O’s (2013) suggest that voters are much more likely to vote utility 
driven, as expected by the retrospective and prospective voting theory. Even if authors 
such as Menocal (2001), Marques et al. (2009) and Abensur et., Al. (2007) and Canêdo-
Pinheiro (2015) argue that the greater the coverage of the programme, the greater the 
number of votes received favoring the incumbent, it seems, from the results obtained in 
this study that this is not true in the case of Progresa. The relationship between the 
proportion of households with the programme and wins for the incumbent was only 
positive in 2000 for the PRI and was never positive for the PAN. These results partly 
confirm the hypothesis of this study: it seems that Progresa had a short-term effect at 
this level of observation.  
After controlling for all other independent variables, logistic regression models at the 
municipal level show that the PRI was more likely to win in municipalities with a higher 
proportion of households receiving the programme during the 2000 elections (see table 
5.7), similar to results from the bivariate analyses. This is also in line with results obtained 
by Ana de la O (2013).  Despite the positive effect of Progresa in 2000 for the PRI, it was 
not decisive and the PAN won the elections. Perhaps this was because the proportion of 
households with the programme was small.  
The lack of a significant effect of the programme at the individual level in 2000 could be 
a result of the strict regulations and programmatic implementation of Progresa not 
having an effect of creating clients and that, despite improving the quality of life of the 
municipalities, there was no effect on the elections at the municipal level during the 
subsequent presidential elections for the PAN. These results agree with previous studies 
by Díaz Cayeros et al (2012) and Nichter (2018) arguing that despite the persistence of 
clientelism in Mexico, this phenomenon has decreased over the years.  These scholars 
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also reflect that the design of Progresa - Oportunidades was successful of being if not 
completely, at least partly isolated from political interference.  
Aside from this, results also show that the PAN was more likely to win across the three 
electoral periods in municipalities with higher income and in 2006 and 2012 in 
municipalities with higher average years of education. 
5.4.2 THE EFFECTS OF OPORTUNIDADES ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
  
Owing to the secrecy of the vote, it is practically impossible to know with certainty who 
someone is voting for. That is why this study considered the need to use two sources of 
information, one at the municipal level with data from the aggregate vote and 
socioeconomic characteristics by municipality, and another at the individual level with 
data on voting intention obtained through a nationally representative survey. 
According to the bivariate analysis (table 5.9.) beneficiaries of Progresa/Oportunidades 
were more prone to vote for the incumbent party PRI in 2000 and individuals with 
Oportunidades reported a higher self-reported vote towards the incumbent PAN in 2006, 
but not in 2012. In the same way as in the results at the municipal level, these results 
seem to verify the first two hypotheses of this study. On the one hand the positive effect 
of Progresa/Oportunidades for the incumbent in the short term, and on the other hand 
that this effect decreases with time. However, as this relationship could be a result of 
other characteristics, logistic regressions and panel data analyses were performed at the 
individual level.  
Results from the cross-sectional logistic regression analyses show that once controlling 
for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, individuals receiving Oportunidades 
did not vote significantly more for the incumbent than those without Oportunidades. 
Results also show that during the year 2000, the variables associated with higher votes 
for the incumbent were belonging to a rural or mixed community and having centre left 
or centre right ideological placements. In addition, years on formal education were only 
relevant for the incumbent in 2006. 
158 
 
Results on the longitudinal effect of the programme using panel data fixed effects (table 
5.11.) show that Oportunidades did not significantly increase the number of self-reported 
vote for the incumbent when compared to individuals without the programme. 
Individuals aged 51-60 were significantly less likely to vote for the incumbent. Individuals 
belonging to the primary school groups also were significantly less likely to vote for the 
incumbent longitudinally. The only characteristic positively associated with a higher 
likelihood for voting for the incumbent was seen among those whose economy became 
somewhat better or remained the same when compared to those with a perception of a 
better economy. Further analyses were carried out using datasets from the comparative 
study of electoral systems (CSES). Results from this panel analyses, also did not show a 
significant association between having Oportunidades and votes for the incumbent (See 
Appendix 9.1.).  
These results are consistent with the study by Green (2006), in which an effect of 
Oportunidades on voting behaviour was not found.  The importance of this null result 
could be explained in two strands: the first is derived from the relatively lower proportion 
of beneficiaries when compared to other countries (24% of the population) (Cecchini and 
Atuesta, 2017), which has not been enough to determine political support in the long 
term.  The second, that the implementation of programmatic policies as well as the 
establishment of solid electoral institutions (see chapter 3) has resulted in the erosion of 
clientelism. 
The foregoing is consistent with the relevant literature since, as Nichter (2018) argues, 
the design of Progresa/Oportunidades has allowed to contain any type of political 
manipulation previously exercised by brokers in non-programmatic policies. Nichter also 
points out that having institutions guaranteeing the secrecy of the vote has challenged 
greatly the survival of clientelistic practices. During the administrations of the PAN (2000-
2012) an immense effort to curtail brokers was made, this was accompanied by and effort 
to limit and prohibit any transfers from the central government towards the less well-off. 
By doing so, CCTs were isolated from any political maneuver to secure votes from this 
population. In terms of Vommaro and Combes (2019) a vital part of the clientelistic 
relationship was removed. Unlike non-programmatic policies, Oportunidades was 
designed in a way that there was no requirement for the government to have delegates 
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(brokers) at a local level. However, this design led to decentralization in the operation of 
some of the components of the programme. Meaning that the components operating at 
the local level could have an effect of political manipulation. Results from this study are 
not significant in this regard. However, future research could explore the effect of 
Oportunidades in the election of governors. 
In summary, while it seems that cross-sectionally there was an effect of 
Progresa/Oportunidades for the PRI at a municipal level in 2000, individually and 
longitudinally beneficiaries of Oportunidades did not seem to vote more for the 
incumbent.  This could suggest that the incorporation of Oportunidades to the Mexican 
political scene resulted in a decrease in clientelism. Although the hypothesis of this thesis 
arguing that the more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on 
support for the party that governs at national level is not verified at the individual level, 
at the municipal level it is confirmed as the PRI had a significantly higher vote share in 
municipalities with a higher proportion of families with Progresa-Oportunidades. This 
discrepancy leaves room for further reflections on the use of polls and not on the real 
information on the direction of the vote at the individual level, despite being is impossible 




6. THE EFFECT OF BOLSA FAMILIA ON VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR.  
6.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Similar to chapter 5 where the effect of Oportunidades on voting behaviour was 
examined, this chapter focuses on the effect of Bolsa Escola (2001-2003) and Bolsa 
Família (2003-to date) on Brazilian voters. The models of this study allow for testing both 
retrospective and prospective theories. These theories posit that electors follow their 
personal economic situation when casting a ballot (Lewis-Beck, 1985). Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) suggested that since people preferred to avoid losses rather than obtain 
additional gains, so voters will prefer to vote for the incumbent party in order to maintain 
their current gains. In the same line scholars (Scott, 1969; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; 
Kitschelt, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013; Nichter, 2018) have found evidence from low-income 
countries that risk averse citizens show preferences for parties providing them with 
immediate benefits. 
Thus, this chapter examines voting behaviour among recipients of Bolsa Escola and Bolsa 
Família within two strands. First, retrospectively (Fiorina, 1981), meaning that 
beneficiaries vote based on how this policy has increased their income by means of the 
monthly stipend transfers. Secondly, following the prospective theory (Downs, 1957), 
some scholars (Bohn, 2011; De la O, 2013; Zucco, 2011) have suggested that not only 
Bolsa Família beneficiaries but non-Bolsa Família beneficiaries could respond electorally, 
based on their future expectations of the performance and expansion of the CCT 
programmes. Using this type of analyses, the aim of this study was to identify if there the 
effect of Bolsa Família on voting behaviour by assessing the effects of the programme 
longitudinally on the incumbent-supporting constituency over the past four presidential 
elections. As explained in the introduction, it is assumed that beneficiaries are rational 
and income oriented in this sense, incumbent's vote share is a function of both time and 
the expenditure destined for CCT Programs. 
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On this basis, this work contributes by providing insights to the rationale behind voters’ 
choices. Although this work’s hypotheses have been explained in more depth in the 
previous chapters (3 and 4), it is useful to restate them briefly: the research strategy holds 
that, the more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support for 
the party that governs at national level. The latter is also explained by the pocketbook 
theory (Lewis-Beck, 1985) in which higher dependence on programme resources is 
associated with a greater vote share for the incumbent. However, results from this work 
on Mexico suggest that the CCTs did not have a significant influence for the incumbent 
to win at the municipal level, or for voters to cast a ballot for the incumbent if receiving 
the benefit. Thus, it seems that institutionalisation of these programmatic programmes 
may decrease their effect on voting behaviour in the long term.  
This chapter is structured similar to the chapter focusing on the effects of Oportunidades 
on voting behaviour. The statistical analyses were performed with data from different 
sources such as the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and the National Household 
Survey which are carried out to measure the population’s participation in the labour 
market and both demographic and educational characteristics. Data from the Brazilian 
Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE) and the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study 
(BEPS) and data from the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) was also incorporated.  
Results are presented first showing the influence of Bolsa Família at the municipal level, 
providing descriptive statistics, cross-sectional bivariate analyses and results from logistic 
regressions. In contrast to Mexico, for the case of Brazil, it was possible to build a panel 
data analyses at a municipal level. This is followed by the individual level analyses 
including a section on descriptive statistics and followed by results from logistic 
regressions. Finally, a section discussing the results and contrasting them with available 





6.2. THE EFFECT OF BOLSA-ESCOLA/BOLSA FAMILIA AT THE 
MUNICIPAL LEVEL  
 
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
This section, similar to the Chapter focusing on the effect of Oportunidades, presents first 
results from descriptive statistics. They focus on electoral participation and on presenting 
municipal characteristics. Table 6.1 presents the pattern of electoral participation in 
Brazil over the past four elections. 







2002 79.53% 91,664,001 115,254,113 
2006 81.01% 101,997,079 125,913,479 
2010 78.5% 106,563,671 135,753,295 
2014 78.9% 112,683,879 142,822,046 
Source IFES (2017). 
 
Despite voting being compulsory in Brazil, the highest vote turnout of the studied periods 
was in 2006.  When looking towards vote share for the incumbent (see Table 6.2.), results 
show that it differed in every electoral period being highest in 2006. 
 
Table 6.2.  Vote share for the incumbent per municipality 2002-2014. 
Votes for the incumbent 
2002 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PSDB 5567 0 0.740 0.497 0.425 
2006 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PT 
5567 0.149 0.933 0.691 0.453 
2010 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PT 5570 0.196 0.965 0.594 0.153 
2014 Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
PT 5573 0 0.958 0.576 0.185 




Even if this was not analysed by Bolsa Escola/ Bolsa Família status, it is interesting as it 
could be a result of a reward vote to the incumbent in 2006 but this effect declined over 
the next two periods perhaps because of the presidential corruption scandals. 
Descriptive statistics at the municipal level (see table 6.3) also show that vote share for 
the incumbent was not higher than 50% in the first round but support for the incumbent 
grew in the second round.  It also shows that a higher proportion of municipalities belong 
to the incumbent party and that the proportion of households with the programme, 
similar to the Mexican case is less than a third of all households. 
Table 6.3. Characteristics of the municipalities in years 2002-2014 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Incumbent Vote Share 22278 0.493 0.426 0 42.046 
Incumbent Vote Share 2nd 
Round 
22278 0.590 0.581 0 63.933 
Proportion of Households with 
CCTs 
1. Bolsa Escola, 2001-2003 
2. Bolsa Família, 2003-to date 
22292 0.261 0.177 0 0.729 
CCT Governmental  
Expenditure  
22265 0.893 0.811 0 5.902 
Household total income 27778 10.913 1.509 7.445 20.162 
% impoverished households 27831 31.669 21.853 0.129 86.595 
% extremely impoverished 
households 
27463 19.824 586.603 0.014 227.680 
Years of Education  27840 9.117 1.579 2.853 23.396 
Governor from the incumbent 
party at the federal level 
27865 0.518 0.410 0 1 
Region 5572 3.564 1.228 1 5 
Source: Own elaboration using secondary data collected from TSE, IPEADATA and PNAD, IBGE 
(2014). 
 
Table 6.3 also shows that years of schooling were higher in Brazil. While in Mexico many 
households reported 0 years of schooling, in the surveys from Brazil, the minimum 
number of years was 2.8.  Data from Brazil provides the proportion of impoverished 
households and extremely impoverished households. By adding these two numbers, 
results show that more than half of the households are impoverished. Disparities in 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics between the municipalities are evident 
as municipalities display large variation. These disparities could confirm, as suggested by 
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Marques et al. (2009) and Abensur et al. (2007), that the higher number of beneficiaries, 
the higher the proportion of votes for the PT (see table 6.4).  
 
 MUNICIPAL BIVARIATE ANALYSIS BETWEEN 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND VOTE SHARE FOR THE 
INCUMBENT 
 
Table 6.4. shows correlations between the independent variables and the vote share for 
the incumbent parties from 2002 to 2014 electoral periods. These correlations are 




Table 6.4. Bivariate analyses between support for PSDB and PT and municipal characteristics for Presidential Elections in Brazil 1994-2012 
Variables 2002 2006 2010 2014 
PSDB 
(inc) 






Household total income 0.210*** 0.263*** 0.322*** 0.220*** 0.308*** -0.402** 0.232*** -0.418*** 
Governor from the incumbent party  
at the federal level 
-0.036** -0.038** 0.059*** -0.009 -0.339*** 0.358*** 0.033* 0.043** 
Years of School -0.011 0.065*** 0.182** -0.055*** 0.347*** -0.351** 0.015 0.002 
CCT Governmental  
Expenditure  
0.042** -0.095*** -0.255*** 0.049*** -0.710*** 0.747*** -0.786*** 0.768*** 
Proportion of Households with CCTs 
1. Bolsa Escola 2001-2003 
2. Bolsa Família 2003-to date 
-0.013* -0.070*** -0.253*** 0.039** -0.702*** 0.735*** -0.809*** 0.781*** 
% Impoverished households -0.019 -0.091*** -0.259*** 0.049*** -0.676*** 0.719** -0.758** 0.753*** 
% Extremely impoverished households -0.001 -0.083*** -0.233*** 0.046*** -0.637*** 0.692*** -0.646*** 0.658*** 
Region -0.028** 0.039** 0.074** -0.009 0.189*** -0.258** 0.322* -0.304*** 
N 5564 
Calculations using data from TSE, IPEADATA and PNAD, IBGE (2014). 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Results from table 6.4., also show that the expenditure on CCTs is related to higher 
electoral wins for the nationally incumbent party: in 2002, PSDB; in 2006-2014, PT. As 
expected, this influence was positive and statistically significant for all the electoral 
periods. As will be addressed in the discussion and conclusions section, these results are 
in line with previous research suggesting that the expansion and higher expenditure on 
the programme tend to favour the incumbent.   
 
 THE EFFECT OF BOLSA FAMILIA ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR 
AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL: RESULTS FROM LOGISTIC 
REGRESSIONS 
 
Logistic Regression analysis was used to analyse the electoral performance of the 
incumbent following the implementation of Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Família in Brazil. Results 
from table 6.5 show that, during the first electoral period (2002) the proportion of 
families with Bolsa Escola was positively associated (but not significant) with electoral 
support for the PSDB. However, in the following elections of 2006, 2010 and 2014 the 
proportion of households with Bolsa Familia seemed to be positively associated with 
electoral wins for the nationally incumbent party (PT) at municipal level. This is in line 
with previous research focusing on the effect of CCTs on voting behaviour suggesting that 
the effect of the introduction of a programme is positive towards the incumbent at the 
short term.  These results continue to be in line with the rational theory as in the last two 
electoral periods, municipalities with a higher proportion of households with Bolsa 
Família were more likely to support PT (the incumbent at the time). This could 
demonstrate a significant effect when the programme expanded. These results are in line 




Table 6.5. The effects of Bolsa Escola - Família on voting behaviour at the municipal level: Logistic regression of the 2nd Round of electoral periods 2002-2014 
 Variable Category 













Proportion of households  
with CCT 
1. Bolsa Escola 2001-2003 
2. Bolsa Família 2003-to date 
  -0.275*** 0.268 0.694 -0.702 0.046*** -0.054 0.015*** -0.016 
 Standard error 0.090 0.009 0.039 0.009 0.079 0.0002 0.010 0.010 
Region 
South East ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
North 0.089 -0.094 0.123 -0.130 0.246 -0.254* 0.196 -0.200* 
 Standard error 0.008 0.010 0.045 0.008 0.085 0.006 0.111 0.007 
North East 0.057 -0.064 0.108 -0.114 0.214 -0.223 0.165 -0.174 
Standard error  0.045 0.010 0.046 0.009 0.100 0.010 0.096 0.009 
Centre 0.076 -0.084 0.061 -0.067 0.189 -0.191 0.188 -0.188 
Standard error  0.067 0.010 0.036 0.010 0.101 0.008 0.104 0.008 
South 0.075** -0.080 0.017 -0.026 0.178 -0.187 0.202 -0.209 
Standard error  0.101 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.078 0.015 0.116 0.008 
Years of formal education 
0 years 0.446 -0.448 0.253 -0.261 -0.138 0.138 0.254 -0.262 
 Standard error 0.087 0.009 0.051 0.008 0.108 0.111 0.141 0.009 
1-6 years 0.422 -0.426 0.204 -0.206** -0.102 0.097 0.216 -0.225* 
 Standard error 0.108 0.216 0.055 0.008 0.052 0.090 0.120 0.010 
7-12 years 0.398 -0.403 0.106 -0.114 -0.084 0.080 0.239 -0.240 
Standard error  0.114 0.009 0.044 0.007 0.045 0.089 0.131 0.009 
≥ 13 years ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Rural 
Yes -2.620*** 2.615 -0.448*** 0.444 -0.005** -0.002 0.082 -0.088 
Standard error  0.081 0.010 0.065 0.225 0.029 0.026 0.050 0.010 
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Table 6.5. Continued. 
 Variable Category 













Municipal Income          
1st tertile -- --  -0.579 0.574 2.524 -2.530 1.688 -1.689 
Standard error  --  -- -0.630 0.556 2.377 -3.711 -1.707 -1.709 
2nd tertile --  -- -0.412 0.404 2.019 -2.024 1.516 -1.518 
 Standard error -- --  -0.436 0.387 1.847 -1.540 0.534 -1.540 
3rd tertile ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Governor from the incumbent party  
at the federal level 
Yes -0.324 0.315 -0.464 0.457 0.188 -0.195 0.649 -0.649 
 Standard error 0.110 0.009 0.033 0.007 0.099 0.124 0.011 0.010 
N   5564 5564 5564 5564 
Pseudo R2   0.052 0.283 0.372 0.437 




When looking into the effect of years of formal education, municipalities with lower 
number of years on formal education were less likely to vote for the PSDB during 2006 
and 2014. This variable produces few significant effects, possibly be due to the PT’s classic 
constituency consisting of not only workers but also intellectuals and more educated 
people. The effects of proportions of households with CCTs become statistically significant 
in the first round in year 2010 and in the second round in 2014. In this model having a 
governor from the incumbent party at federal level when analysing for the PT status is not 
significant. Although this may seem like a contradictory finding this could be caused by 
the small number of governors the PT had in those years (see table 6.6).   
Table 6.6. Number of states governed by 
party 
Party Name 
Year of Election 
2002 2006 2010 2014 
PP 2  1  
PDT 1 1 2  
PT 3 3 5 5 
PMDB 6 5 7 5 
PSL  1   
PPS  2 2  
DEM 6 4 1 2 
PMN    1 
PSB 2 4 3 6 
PSDB 7 7 6 7 
PSD    1 
Total 27 27 27 27 
Source: Own creation using data from TSE 
 
 LONGITUDINAL EFFECTS OF BOLSA FAMILIA ON VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL: PANEL DATA ANALYSES 
 
The data from Mexico at a municipal level was not suitable to perform panel data 
analyses; however, as briefly explained in the methodology chapter, data from Brazil 
allowed these types of analyses. Because of this and in order to find if there was a 
significant effect of a higher proportion of households with Bolsa Família and wins for the 
incumbent at the municipal level, panel data analyses were performed, with the 
assumption that municipalities with a higher proportion of households with CCTs should 
have an increased likelihood for a win from the incumbent party. As discussed in chapter 
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4, panel data contain repeated observations at different periods of time for each of the 
observed units.  
This kind of data allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at unit level. In other 
words, by adopting a fixed effects model we can control for stable characteristics 
whether they are measured or not. The rationale behind this is that any possible effects 
those time-invariant variables can have at any specific period of time will have the same 
effects in the following periods of time because the values of the variables do not change 
over time (Allison, 2009). 
Panel Data was constructed using longitudinal data from the TSE and the IBGE. This 
subset of the data has observations for the 5564 municipalities in Brazil over 4 periods of 
time 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. In order to test the null hypothesis (a strong relationship 
between electoral incumbent support and Bolsa Escola - Família) this work performed a 
set of regression analyses using longitudinal data. Following De la O (2009) the 
percentage of vote share for the incumbent was considered as the dependent variable.  
In addition to the incumbent vote share model, two other models were performed to 
reflect the effects on voting behaviour, having as dependent variable vote share for PSDB 
and vote share for PT respectively. By doing this it is possible to observe how the 
independent variables affects the outcome variable depending on the party. These two 
additional models were performed per each party and are included as tables 9.10 and 
9.11 from the appendix.  
For the incumbent party models (table 6.7), FE and RE models were performed.  
However, because of its robustness and results from the Housman Test, only results from 
the FE model are presented. The others can be found in appendix table 9.12. It is 
important to note that results from the two different approaches showed that a higher 
proportion of families with CCTs seem to influence favourably vote support for the 
incumbent.   
As explained briefly in the methods chapter, the model was specified using vote share for 
the incumbent party as the dependent variable. Vote share was calculated as the number 
of ballots cast for the incumbent divided by the total number of votes. The same logic 
was followed when calculating vote share for each party.   
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Results from the FE models in table 6.7 show that the incumbent was more likely to have 
a higher vote share in municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving 
CCTs. This could be a result of the increasing expansion of the programme during Lula’s 
tenure but also of the larger grants provided by Dilma Rousseff. However, having a 
governor from the incumbent party at the federal level seemed to be negatively 
correlated with vote support for the incumbent, suggesting that CCT’s decentralisation 
could create stronger ties between voters with the local authorities rather than to the 
federal government. These results can be subject of following analysis given the 
importance of the governors at local level. 
 
 
Interestingly higher CCT expenditure appeared to be negatively related with vote support 
for the incumbent and as stated previously, for individual parties this may imply that it is 
not the amount of money spent of on the programme per family, but the actual number 
of families enrolled on the programme what dictates higher ballots for the incumbent. As 
Table 6.7. Panel data analysis: The longitudinal effect of the proportion of households with 
CCTs on vote share for the incumbent party at municipal level (2002-2014). 
VARIABLES  Fixed Effects 
   
Proportion of Families with CCTs per Municipality  0.646*** 
SE (0.119) 




Household Municipal Income  0.036** 
SE (0.011) 
% of poor  0.002* 
SE (0.001) 
Years of Formal Education Municipal Level  0.006* 
SE (0.002) 
Governor from the incumbent party  
at the federal level (Dummy) 
 -0.047* 
SE (0.022) 
Incumbent Vote Share  
- PSDB (2002) 
- PT (2006-2014) 
 0.350*** 
SE (0.021) 
Constant  -0.231 
SE (0.149) 
Observations  22,207 
R-squared  0.190 
Number of regions  5 
Region FE  YES 
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the model confirms, as expected, that Brazilian recipients of CCTs who are living in 
poverty and receive 1 year of education (overall at household level) are more likely to 
vote for the incumbent party.  
In order to provide robustness to the study and following Zucco’s approach (2013; 2015) 
a new set of variables were introduced to the model (GDP growth, religion as the 
proportion of Pentecostals and the proportion of non-white population). Such variables 
follow Zucco’s (2009; p.37) arguments that Lula and the PT should have performed better 
amongst communities with a larger concentration of Brazil’s poor population (such as 
non-whites and Pentecostal). These models were also ran for each party (tables 9.8 and 
9.9 of the appendix) confirming that Lula da Silva had a higher vote share in municipalities 
with a higher share of non-white population, while the PSDB had a significantly lower 
vote share. Municipalities with higher proportion of Pentecostals were significantly 
associated with vote support for PSDB and negatively to PT. 
Table 6.8. The longitudinal effect of the proportion of households with CCTs on vote share for 
the incumbent party including religion and ethnicity (2002-2014) 
VARIABLES Fixed Effects 
Proportion of Families with CCTs per Municipality  0.642*** 
SE (0.112) 
Governmental expenditure in CCTs per Municipality  -0.045* 
SE (0.017) 
Household Municipal Income  0.039** 
SE (0.011) 
% of poor  0.002* 
SE (0.001) 
Years of Formal Education Municipal Level  0.007*** 
SE (0.002) 
Governor from the incumbent party1  
at the federal level (Dummy) 
 -0.047* 
SE (0.022) 
GDP Growth  -0.048*** 
SE (0.009) 
Proportion on non-white population  0.000** 
SE (0.000) 
Proportion of Pentecostals   -0.003*** 
SE (0.001) 








Observations  22,140 
R-squared  0.191 
Number of Region  5 
Region FE  YES 
Region RE   
1 PSDB (2002) / PT (2006-2014) 
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, OLS and RE models were also performed on 
the vote share for the PSDB and PT (appendix tables 9.9 and 9.10). For the PSDB, a higher 
share of extreme poverty seemed to favour a higher vote share, while higher government 
expenditure on CCTs and proportion of families with Bolsa Família had a negative 
influence vote share for this party. For the PT, municipalities with a higher proportion of 
families with Bolsa Família and years of schooling had a positive effect on vote share for 
this party. These results are in line with this work’s hypothesis. Results from the models 
by party in Appendix tables 9.9 and 9.10 show that as the number of beneficiaries 
increases the more the support for the incumbent PT while there is a negative significant 
relationship between PSDB and the percentage of families with Bolsa Família. 
Interestingly the governmental expenditure on CCTs is negatively related with PT in the 
3 models. 
In summary, at a municipal level both, the logistic regressions and the panel data fixed 
effects analyses show that municipalities with a higher proportion of recipients of CCT´s 
were more likely to vote for the incumbent party. Results from the cross-sectional logistic 
regressions provide a positive association favouring the PSDB in 2002, logistic regressions 
across all the other electoral periods suggest that municipalities with higher proportion 
of recipients were more likely to vote for the PT in 2006, 2012 and 2014. In parallel, 
results from the panel data analyses show that longitudinally it seems that there is a 
positive association between a higher proportion of households receiving the programme 




6.3. THE EFFECT OF BOLSA FAMILIA ON INDIVIDUAL VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter and the introduction, similar to the analyses 
from Mexico, this chapter includes two different levels of data with the intention of 
identifying the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour not only at an aggregated (municipal) 
level, covered in the previous section, but also at an individual level. Such individual-level 
analysis is limited by the confidentiality of vote and the non-randomised introduction of 
the programme.  However, in order to overcome these limitations and compare the 
effect on voting behaviour on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries this part of the study 
relies on exit poll surveys which include self-reported vote as a proxy for the actual voting 
behaviour of the beneficiaries.  
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In order to understand the population interviewed, this section present a brief 
description focusing on their reported vote for the incumbent or other, and their 
beneficiary status. It also provides a summary of the main demographic characteristics of 
the population.   
Table 6.9. Cross sectional descriptive statistics of the baseline samples of IBOPE 2002-2006 
and BEPS 2010-2014. 










Urban 78 -- 87 89 
Rural 22 -- 13 11 
Gender 
Male 49 49 46 48 
Female 51 51 54 52 
Age 
     16 – 24  25 21 17 18 
     25 – 34 25 24 22 29 
     35 – 44  30 20 21 18 
     45 – 59  11 23 25 23 
        60+ 9 13 15 15 
Marital 
Status 
Single 26 35 31 29 
Married or in a 
partnership 








White 38 43 36 41 
Light Brown 45 42 47 44 
Dark Brown 7 9 10 12 
Other (Black/Asian) 10 6 7  
CCT 
Beneficiary* 
Yes -- 22 32 35 
No -- 78 68 65 
Religion 
Catholic 69 65 63 61 
Christian – Non-
Catholic 
18 21 28 26 
Other 5 4 3 5 
None 8 10 6 8 
Employed 
Yes 71 68 64 61 
No 29 32 36 39 
Income 
(in BR reals) 
0 - 1039 44 19 24 51 
1040 – 5200 30 58 63 35 
5201 – 10399 16 15 13 7 
≥ 10400 9 8 -- 6 
Years of 
education 
     00-00 6 19 5 2 
     00-04 12 34 19 6 
     04-08 30 24 26 39 
     08-12 21 31 49 43 
     12-16 22 11 1 9 
     16+ 10 -- -- 1 
Ideological 
Placement 
Strong left 13 15 11 15 
Somewhat Left 9 9 8 5 
Centre-Left 13 7 21 6 
Centre 24 26 15 9 
Centre-Right 27 15 19 37 
Somewhat Right 4 7 7 6 
Strong Right 1 11 9 8 
None 9 10 10 14 
Self-reported 
vote 
PSDB 54 48 49 68 
PT 46 52 51 32 
Region 
North-Centre 13 14 31 38 
North East 27 27 24 19 
South 15 15 20 11 
South East 45 44 27 31 
Source: IBOPE 2002 and 2006; BEPS 2010 and 2014. 
Variables are shown as the reference categories used in the regressions. 
 
As observed on table 6.9., the proportion of votes for the incumbent varied from 54% in 
2002 (PSDB) to 32% in 2010 (PT). Also, the proportion of beneficiaries interviewed 
increased over each electoral period. There was a higher proportion of individuals 
earning less than $5200 reals and most of the individuals reported less than 12 years of 
schooling. Finally, the sample population was balanced across waves when looking into 
to gender.  
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 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL  
 
While results from logistic regressions and panel data analyses at the municipal level 
supported a relationship of the incumbent winning or having a higher vote share among 
municipalities with higher proportions of beneficiaries of Bolsa Família, this section is set 
to disentangle whether there is an individual level effect of the programme. Similar to 
the chapter focusing on Mexico, this part of the study relies on logistic regression analysis 
because the dependent variable was coded as dichotomous: whether the respondents 
vote for the incumbent or not. With this type of models, we can estimate the likelihood 
of belonging to a given category given the values of the explanatory variables (Field, 
2005). Using this technique, this work sought to predict whether a respondent has voted 
for the incumbent candidate based on a set of individual characteristics (CCT beneficiary, 
age, gender, income, education and region).  
Different to the aggregated data, as table 6.10 illustrates, being a beneficiary of a CCT 
increased the likelihood of voting for the incumbent party only in 2006. Women were 
significantly more likely to vote for the PT in 2006, but over the next two periods it seems 
that women were less likely to vote for the incumbent PT than men. This follows the 
“traditional gender gap”, in which women tend to vote for more conservative parties than 
men. The only significant differences within the age categories, were seen in the 
likelihood to vote for PT in 2006, where individuals aged 31-40 were more likely to vote 
for this party when compared to the reference age category 51-60. There was no 
significant difference between marital status or religion across the three electoral 
periods. Similarly, no differences were seen between education, and employment 
categories across all electoral periods. Surprisingly, most rural communities were less 
likely to vote for PT across all electoral periods when compared to urban communities.  
When looking into the different regions in Brazil, across all electoral periods only the 
South was less likely to vote for the PT when compared to the South East. Results on self-
reported vote show that having a somewhat left ideological placement was significantly 
associated for votes for the PT in 2006 and 2014, while negatively associated with votes 
for the PSDB across all electoral periods when compared to having a strong right 
ideological placement. No significant differences of self-reported vote were found with 
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regards to the different categories of ex-president approval or of perceived economic 
improvement during the past administration. 
In summary, while municipal data did show a higher likelihood of winning and on vote 
share for the incumbent in municipalities with a higher proportion of Bolsa Família 
recipients, the individual analyses only showed this significant association during the 




Table 6.10. Logistic Regression at the Individual Level Brazil (2. Round) 
Election Year 
Variable Category 
2006 2010 2014 
PT PSDB PT PSDB PT PSDB 
CCT Beneficiary 
Yes 2.315*** -2.317 2.327 -2.328 2.334 -2.335 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
No ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Gender 
Female 0.841** -0.843 0.830 -0.832 0.833 -0.835 
Standard error 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Male ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Age category 
18-30 0.705 -0.707 0.717 -0.719 0.722 -0.724 
Standard error 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
31-40 0.700* -0.702 0.706 -0.708 0.708 -0.710 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
41-50 0.985 -0.987 0.990 -0.992 0.986 -0.988 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
51-60 ref ref ref ref ref ref 
61-70 0.713 -0.715 0.753 -0.755 0.787 -0.789 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
70+ 0.568 -0.570 0.651 -0.652 0.704 -0.706 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Skin Colour 
Light brown -0.158 0.157 -0.136 0.134 -0.039 0.037 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Dark brown 0.065 -0.067 0.094 -0.096 0.184 -0.186 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
179 
 
White ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Marital Status 
Married or in a partnership 0.056 -0.058 0.055 -0.057 0.056 -0.058 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Divorced, separated or widowed 0.049 -0.050 0.049 -0.051 0.050 -0.052 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 
Single ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Christian, not catholic -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 -0.022 0.020 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Other -0.006 0.004 -0.016 0.015 -0.007 0.005 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Years of Study 
None 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.007 0.005 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Non-formal education -0.005 0.003 -0.015 0.013 -0.006 0.004 
Standard error 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Primary -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Secondary -0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.006 0.017 -0.019 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 -0.009 0.009 
High school -0.004 0.003 -0.016 0.015 -0.008 0.007 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
University ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Employed 
Yes 1.084 -1.086 1.077 -1.079 1.078 -1.080 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Type of Locality Rural -0.611*** 0.609 -0.617*** 0.615 -0.612*** 0.610 
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Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
Mixed 0.165 -0.167 0.154 -0.156 0.146 -0.148 
Standard error 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 
Urban ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Region 
North -0.224 0.001 -0.217 0.215 -0.228 0.226 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
North-East -0.225 0.223 -0.233 0.232 -0.233 0.232 
Standard error 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Center -0.185 0.183 -0.176 0.174 -0.166 0.164 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 
South -0.101** 0.099 -0.109** 0.107 -0.119** 0.117 
Standard error 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
South East ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Ideological Placement 
Somewhat left 0.055** -0.056** 0.058 -0.059 0.067** -0.068** 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Center-left 0.042 -0.044 0.030 -0.032 0.026 -0.028 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Center-center 0.035 -0.037 0.043 -0.045 0.040 -0.042 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Center-right 0.022 -0.024 0.015 -0.017 0.006 -0.008 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Somewhat right 0.019 -0.020 0.023 -0.024 0.026 -0.027 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Strong right ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Ex-President Administration Approval Approve a lot ref ref ref ref ref ref 
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Approve somewhat -0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.011 -0.012 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 
Neither approve nor Disapprove -0.006 0.004 -0.008 0.006 0.003 -0.002 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 
Disapprove somewhat -0.006 0.004 -0.006 0.004 0.007 -0.009 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Disapprove a lot -0.005 0.004 -0.014 0.012 -0.026 0.024 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Personal Economy Improved Past Administration 
Better ref ref ref ref ref ref 
Somewhat better -0.0004 -0.005 -0.016 0.012 -0.022 0.022 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
The same -0.0004 -0.005 -0.004 0.0020 0.004 -0.008 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Somewhat worse -0.0003 -0.003 -0.009 0.008 -0.016 0.012 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Worse -0.0003 -0.003 0.010 -0.012 0.017 -0.016 
Standard error 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
N  1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 1214 
Pseudo R2  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Calculations using data from IBOPE 2002 and 2006; BEPS 2010 and 2014. Figures in the cells show logistic regression coefficients 
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6.4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the effects of Bolsa Escola (2003) and Bolsa Família 
(2003-to date) on electoral behaviour at the municipal and individual level. This section 
presents a discussion between the literature and the results obtained from the statistical 
analyses presented in the previous sections. 
 THE EFFECTS OF BOLSA ESCOLA AND BOLSA FAMILIA ON 
VOTING BEHAVIOUR AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 
When looking into bivariate statistics at the municipal level (table 6.4), results suggest that 
municipalities with households with higher average number of years of formal education were 
significantly more likely to vote for PT in 2002 but significantly less likely in 2006 and 2010. 
They were also significantly more likely to vote for the PSDB in 2006 and 2010. Results also 
show that municipalities with a higher percentage of poor and extremely poor households 
were more likely to vote for the PT in the electoral periods from 2006, 2010 and 2014 (see 
table 6.4), but not in 2002. Bivariate analyses in table 6.4, surprisingly show that the 
municipalities with a higher proportion of households with Bolsa Escola in 2002 were less likely 
to vote for the PSDB. These variables were important to include in the logistic regressions and 
models as they portray the main characteristics of municipalities where the PT was more likely 
to win i.e. those with households with lower years of formal schooling and those with a higher 
proportion of households receiving the programme.   
Logistic regressions were used to analyse the municipal electoral success of the incumbent 
party (PSDB 2002 and PT 2006-2014) after the implementation of Bolsa Escola and Bolsa 
Família. Results from table 6.5., show that for the year 2002 the PSDB was more likely (though 
not significantly) to win among municipalities with a higher proportion of families with a Bolsa 
Escola. Despite being non-significant, this higher likelihood could support the hypothesis of this 
work, proposing that the more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on 
support for the party that governs at national level. This effect was more evident in the results 
focusing on Oportunidades and go hand in hand to those suggested by Ana de la O (2013) on 
the 2000 elections from Mexico. Where a positive relationship was found between the 
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implementation of the programme and electoral support for incumbent at the municipal level. 
Similar to results from Oportunidades, these results seem to confirm the rational theory, as 
during the other two presidential elections (2010 and 2014), the PT obtained greater support 
from municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving Bolsa Família. 
Despite a higher win for the PSDB in the 2002 electoral periods among municipalities with Bolsa 
Escola, the PT won this electoral period. This could be a result of the lower proportion of 
households receiving the programme, as it was during Lula’s tenure when the programme 
expanded.  This is supported by previous scholars such as Hall (2006) and Power (2010) who 
suggest that the higher proportion of families living in poverty was the reason leading to the 
PT’s win. According to Zucco (2011) the relationship between Bolsa Família and the PT became 
stronger and led to a change in the electoral base of Lula da Silva through an alliance with this 
population through the continuous expansion of the programme consolidating his political 
strength. This is also agrees with the theoretical framework of this study as results from 
municipalities with a higher proportion of Bolsa Família seem to vote according to the 
retrospective and prospective theories, suggesting that they seek to maintain benefits in the 
long term.  
The proportion of households benefited by CCTs plays a key role in several of the studies 
discussed in Chapter 3. Findings from the literature review suggest that the electoral success 
of the PT in the elections following those from 2002 was a result of two main factors: coverage 
and expenditure (expenditure) in social programmes (Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008). 
These studies suggest that in municipalities where more households receive Bolsa Família 
(there is higher coverage), the proportion of votes received by the PT was higher compared to 
those municipalities where the proportion of households with the programme was lower. 
Canêdo-Pinheiro (2015) suggested that each 1 percent increase in the number of families with 
Bolsa Família led to an increase of 0.55 percent of votes favouring Lula da Silva. 
In contrast to previous studies (Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008, Canêdo-Pinheiro, 2015), 
this study found that despite the increasing coverage of the Bolsa Família, going from 8.84% 
in 2003 to 25.91% in 2006 (Senarc, 2016), the incumbent did not have a significantly higher 
vote share among municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving Bolsa 
Família during the 2002 and 2006 elections (table 6.11). 
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Table 6.11 Bolsa Família Coverage 2003 – 2014 
 Year Individuals % Population 
Beneficiary 
Families 
2003 16,124,195 8.84% 3,600,000 
2004 29,434,906 15.92% 6,571,842 
2005 38,968,779 20.81% 8,700,441 
2006 49,115,238 25.91% 10,965,810 
2007 49,461,308 25.79% 11,043,076 
2008 47,288,662 24.37% 10,557,996 
2009 54,494,728 27.78% 12,370,915 
2010 55,344,950 27.92% 12,778,220 
2011 56,884,187 28.41% 13,361,503 
2012 58,158,901 28.76% 13,902,155 
2013 57,888,228 28.36% 14,086,199 
2014 56,513,631 27.44% 14,003,441 
Source: Own elaboration using data SENARC (2016): Secretaria 
Nacional de Renda de Cidadania, Relatório de Gestão do Exercício 
2004-2016. Website:  http://mds.gov.br/acesso-a-
informacao/auditoria 
 
As shown in table 6.5, results from the logistic model at the municipal level suggest that during 
2002 and 2006 there was a non-significant positive relationship between the proportion of 
families with CCT´s and the vote share for the incumbent. This changed and in the following 
electoral periods this effect was significant, and the incumbent was more likely to win among 
municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving Bolsa Família. 
As reported in Chapter 2, 2006 was particularly successful in terms of vote share for the 
incumbent PT and its candidate Lula da Silva (table 6.2.) Where the proportion of votes it 
received was the highest of the four periods followed in the analyses. This confirms what Zucco 
(2008) pointed out, as a result of the favourable conditions in which the PT participated during 
the electoral period of 2006 such as: a good economy, high degrees of acceptability among the 
population and the high coverage of the programme, its electoral base was expanded among 
various sectors of the population. These results are also agreement to those presented by 
another work from Zucco (2011) and to a study by de la O (2013). As explain in an earlier 
paragraph they help answer the hypothesis of this work " the more recent a CCT programme 
is, the more positive its impact on support for the party that governs at national level" because 
during 2002 the PSDB had implemented Bolsa Escola and in 2003 the PT implemented Bolsa 
Família. However, contrary to what Zucco and de la O suggested, the relationship between the 
implementation of the programmes and vote share for incumbent was not as evident as in 
their studies. Results from this thesis show that the programmes produced a favourable effect 
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in the short term but not significant. This is evident in the 2006 election where, despite having 
a positive effect for the PT, the PT was not significantly more likely to win among municipalities 
with a higher household share of recipients. This finding is in line with results suggested by 
Bohn (2011). 
Contrary to what was expected, results from table 6.5 suggest that the PT was less likely to win 
in rural municipalities, but this was after controlling by proportion of households receiving 
Bolsa Família. So what this results suggest is that, according to Key's (1966) reward-
punishment theory, maybe the proportion of households living in rural municipalities and not 
receiving the programme were less likely to vote for the PT. This would be a punishment vote 
against the PT for not providing them with the same programme as those receiving Bolsa 
Família. Another possible explanation is that the influence of the programme was indistinct of 
whether it was received by a rural or urban municipality, increasing support from both 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. If this were true, it would be in line with one of the 
research questions of this work, as it seems that Bolsa Família increased support for the 
incumbent among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In accordance to the above, studies on 
clientelism in developing democracies suggest that individuals living in municipalities with a 
higher proportion of beneficiaries could behave as if the programme were social welfare, 
making the influence of the programme indistinct when voting. The latter agrees to the 
sociotropic voting theory, whereby beneficiaries vote according to the interest of the 
community and not by following their own narrow self-interest (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). 
The results of the logistic regression (see table 6.5) looking into the relationship between the 
vote share for the incumbent and the proportion of CCT beneficiaries could reject the 
hypothesis of this work, since, as observed, the effect was significantly positive in the last two 
periods. The hypothesis of the study stated that "the more recent a CCT programme is, the 
more positive its impact on support for the party that governs at national level". However, 
support among municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving the 
programme was significant for the PT and these results would help answer the question 
whether time influenced the relationship between CCTs and voting behaviour. Contrary to 
what happened in Mexico with Oportunidades, it seems that the effect of Bolsa Família was 
strengthened in the long term despite the institutionalization of the programme and contrary 
to what Ana de la O (2013) posits. Results from the 2010 and 2014 elections are consistent 
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with those presented by Zucco in 2013(2013), where Bolsa Família had a significant effect 
increasing the vote share of the incumbent at the municipal level in the long term (during the 
3 last presidential election). 
These results were verified with the more robust longitudinal analyses presented in tables 6.7 
and 6.8.  Results from the FE panel data analyses showed that municipalities with the highest 
proportion of households with CCTs were longitudinally more likely to vote for incumbent.  
In contrast to the results obtained in Mexico, where the effect of the programme seemed to 
fade in the long term, in Brazil results were opposite at the municipal level. This may be 
because of programme implementation differences. This is in line with what suggested by 
Piattoni (2007), Daieff (2015) and Nichter (2008). These authors explain that possible success 
of CCTs in electoral terms is a result of the exchange relationship between the beneficiary and 
the incumbent happened to be an inverted pyramid, despite the fact that CCTs were created 
as programmatic policies and the margin of maneuver for political use is minimal. In this sense, 
Nichter (2018) suggests that the beneficiaries acquire an active role in this exchange situation, 
being them, the ones deciding to maintain the relationship in order to receive gains. 
 THE EFFECTS OF BOLSA ESCOLA AND BOLSA FAMILIA ON 
VOTING BEHAVIOUR AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
Similar to the analyses from Mexico, due to the secrecy of the vote, the accurate determination 
of the direction of the vote of individuals is practically impossible. Therefore, data from a 
nationally representative individual survey were used. Given Brazil’s democratic history this 
study sought to demonstrate to what extent CCTs have influenced the electoral behaviour of 
their beneficiaries. Logistic regressions at the individual level provided evidence on the effect 
of Bolsa Família on the electoral behaviour of its recipients. The impact of Bolsa Escola - Família 
in the presidential electoral periods from 2002 to 2014 has been addressed by previous 
scholars as a key factor in PT’s electoral success. Results from this work agree and found that 
Bolsa Família (whether directly or indirectly) has brought electoral rewards to the incumbent 
at a municipal level. However, individual level analyses did not provide such evidence. Results 
presented in table 6.10 suggested that the vote for the incumbent party was significantly 
 187 
related to receiving CCT and being female only in the electoral period of 2006 and was non-
significant during the other electoral periods. These findings contrast with findings by Zucco 
(2013) where he suggested a significant effect of Bolsa Família with a higher vote share for the 
incumbent party during the last 3 electoral periods.  
Results could suggest that at the individual level, Bolsa Família is only related to more votes 
towards the incumbent in the short term, confirming the hypothesis of this study as 
beneficiaries were more receptive to vote for the incumbent that implemented the 
programme in the following electoral period. However, these results may be due to three 
reasons: first that differences are not seen at individual level but rather at municipalities with 
higher proportion of beneficiaries following the sociological theory, second these types of 
surveys contain selection bias as they are not randomised and nationally representative and 
finally, that according to De la O (2013) the institutionalization of the programme leads to a 
fading of the support for the incumbent in the long term. These results would suggest that the 
effect of Bolsa Família on voting behaviour was stronger in the short-term rather than the long-
term, coinciding with those from Progresa of Ana de la O (2013).  
However, it is important to note that the most robust models are those from the panel data FE 
models at the municipal level. As explained briefly in the previous paragraph, between the 
results obtained in both levels of observation may be explained by the sociological school, 
municipalities that have improved in socio-economic status may generate that non-
beneficiaries support the incumbent by voting according to the interests of the community, so 
municipalities with a higher proportion of individuals receiving the programme increase the 
vote share for the incumbent among non-beneficiaries (making individual results non-
significant in the long term, but vote share between municipalities significantly different 
depending on the proportion of recipients) (Kindergarten and Kiewiet, 1981). 
Although results at the individual level seem to be similar to those from Mexico, and it could 
be inferred that the design of Bolsa Família has been able to contain to some extent the 
political manipulation, as argued by Nichter (2018) and Daieff (2015), at the municipal the most 
robust evidence suggest a significantly higher vote share for the incumbent among 
municipalities with a higher proportion of households. This suggests that the design of the 
programme may still be subject to manipulation. 
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In summary, the different findings at municipal and individual level suggest that there was a 
significant individual effect of the programme at the short term. But the more robust municipal 
effects of the expansion of Bolsa Família showed that municipalities with a higher proportion 
of households with the programme were more likely to vote for the incumbent longitudinally. 
These findings could be explained in two strands: first that at the short term, accordingly to 
the rational theory, beneficiaries were more likely to vote for the incumbent, and second 
according to the sociological school, it seems that the incumbent had a higher vote share in 
municipalities with a higher proportion of households with Bolsa Família as the effect of the 
programme may have generated support for the incumbent by non-beneficiaries.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
7.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Conditional Cash transfer programs (CCTs) were created with the intention of solving the inter-
generational cycle of poverty through the adoption of various novel social policies with similar 
approaches. The novelty of these programmes, their rapid expansion through low- and middle-
income countries and their possible effects on the societal structure drew the attention of 
scholars. One of their main research interests was the possible effects of this type of 
redistributive policies on electoral behaviour. While some scholars believe that beneficiaries 
vote considering past performances of the incumbent to evaluate future welfare according to 
the retrospective theory (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck 1985; Duch and Stevenson, 2008), others 
such as Downs (1957), Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) and Stokes (2005) consider that beneficiaries 
vote thinking of their possible benefits in the future (prospective theory). Another theory of 
voting behaviour considered by authors such as Brady et. al, 1995 and Klesner, 2007 suggests 
that voters decide based on what is best for the community disregarding whether they are 
recipients of the programme or not (social theory).  Some authors have considered that 
because of the prospective theory, their use is linked to political manipulation and that they 
have served as effective tools to guarantee voter support during electoral processes (Fox, 
1994; Auyero, 1999; Hilgers, 2011; Nichter, 2018). 
Considering this, the objective of this study was to contribute to the existing literature by 
comparing the different effects on electoral behaviour of two of the largest CCTs in operation. 
This work aimed to identify the effects of Oportunidades and Bolsa Familia on the electorate 
from Mexico and Brazil respectively, in terms of both the time period (short and long term) 
after their implementation and the level of observation (municipal and individual).  
As addressed previously in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the relevance of this work 
relies on answering whether beneficiaries vote following their self-interests, if the time of 
exposure to the CCTs influences their voting behaviour and if the CCTs increase the political 
support for the presidential incumbent party. These are the central research questions of the 
thesis. Analyses aimed to shed some light not only on voting preferences in municipalities with 
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a higher proportion of households receiving CCTs, but also on the effects of the programmes 
individually upon their recipients. Notwithstanding similarities between Mexico and Brazil, 
findings from this work show differences in the effects in both countries: in both the short and 
long term and the two levels of observation. While results from Mexico at the municipal level 
showed a positive effect of the programme towards votes for the incumbent in the short term 
but not in the longer term, this was not the same for Brazil, where the programme did not 
seem to influence significantly recipients’ short-term voting behaviour (though the effects 
were positive in the longer term).  There were also differences between the two cases at the 
individual level. While in the case of Mexico no effects were seen, meaning that individuals 
with the program did not report a higher likelihood of voting for the incumbent, results from 
Brazil showed that respondents with the program reported a higher likelihood of voting for the 
incumbent party.  
This chapter provides a brief summary of the main findings from each of the countries at the 
municipal and individual levels and at the short and longer term, comparing them and 
describing briefly possible explanations for their differences.  The chapter then brings focus to 
the strengths and limitations of the study highlighting the scarce literature comparing the 
effect of CCTs between countries. It then brings light of the implications of findings and 
provides new ideas for future research. 
7.2. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Overall, results show that the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour depend on the country 
(implementation) and within each country they also depend on whether the analyses are made 
at the municipal or individual level. They also depend on the time frame analysed (short or long 
term). The next section presents results at each level of analysis comparing results from the 
two countries. 
 THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS AT 
AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL 
 




As explained in the previous chapters Mexico implemented its CCT programme addressing 
poverty in rural areas. Hence, the programme targeted municipalities characterised by high 
levels of marginalization with the aim of eradicating extreme poverty. Although Oportunidades 
has been widely recognised for its effectiveness in reducing poverty and inequalities (UNDP, 
2012). Despite that, as discussed in Chapter 5, the program has not been truly effective in 
terms of poverty reduction, the likelihood of the incumbent president’s party winning in 
municipalities with a higher proportion of households receiving the program was analysed 
(Villatoro, 2005).  
The correlations on the bivariate analysis presented in chapter 5 show that in the short term, 
three years after Progresa/Oportunidades was introduced, the PRI was much more likely to be 
voted for during the presidential election in 2000 in municipalities with a higher proportion of 
households with the program. Results are consistent with those presented by Ana de O (2013), 
and confirm that "the more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support 
for the party that governs at national level”, which is the hypothesis of this dissertation as this 
program was established in 1997 by the PRI. However, analyses provided other unexpected 
findings.  According to the correlations in the post-2000 electoral periods between votes for 
each political party and the proportion of households with the program, (table 9.9 appendix), 
the PRI was much more likely to get more votes than the incumbent party, PAN, in 
municipalities with the higher proportions of households receiving Oportunidades. This effect 
seems to indicate that, as suggested by De la O (2013), the programme had a positive effect 
on the proportion of votes for the party introducing the program (short term). These 
correlations showed that the effect remained positive for the PRI in the long-term meaning 
that municipalities with a higher proportion of beneficiaries were more likely to vote for the 
PRI in the other electoral periods despite this party not being the incumbent. These findings 
disagree to what was proposed by De la O (2013). 
Consequently, to demonstrate the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour, a series of statistical 
analyses were performed. Due to the data limitations that this study encountered at the 
municipal level and to verify the results obtained by the correlations described in the previous 
paragraph logistic regression analyses were performed. Similar to results presented by the 
correlations, the logistic regression showed a positive relationship between the proportion of 
households with Progresa and votes for the PRI for the year 2000. However, this effect did not 
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continue after that year.  Findings from these analyses did not show that municipalities with a 
higher proportion of households had higher vote share for the PAN in the following elections. 
Thus, PRI (the incumbent) was more likely to win among municipalities with a higher 
proportion of households with Progresa, suggesting that the programme had a positive effect 
in terms of voting for the incumbent only at the short-term at this level of observation. 
The relevance of these results is that they confirm this work hypothesis as the PRI had a 
significantly higher vote share in municipalities with a higher proportion of families with 
Oportunidades. In addition, they also confirmed the hypothesis as the capacity of the CCT to 
increase support for the party in power at national level weakens over time. Results highlight 
that for the following presidential elections (2006 and 2012) the newly incumbent PAN did not 
show a higher likelihood to win among municipalities with a higher proportion of households 
with the programme.   
Other information provided by results at this level of observation show that the only consistent 
variables related to votes for the incumbent were those municipalities with higher income 
where the PAN was more likely to win across the three electoral periods and average years of 
education, where municipalities with households with higher educational achievements were 
more likely to vote for the incumbent PAN in 2006 and 2012. 
7.2.1.2. MUNICIPAL LEVEL RESULTS FROM BRAZIL 
 
In Brazil, the literature review showed that the introduction of social policies and the expansion 
of them contributed significantly to the poverty reduction, to economic stability and decreased 
inflation rates, but also they also seemed to be related with PT’s electoral performance after 
2002. Scholars suggested that the increasing success of the PT during Lula’s second period in 
2006 remained after the following election period and Hunter and Power (2008) have 
sustained that the impressive support that Lula da Silva received among municipalities with a 
higher proportion of Bolsa Família's recipients was a result of the target population of the 
program. As discussed in the literature review, these municipalities are located in the most 
economically and educationally marginalised areas of Brazil, allowing Lula and the PT to 
generate an extensive electoral base helping him succeed during this second term.  
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Results on the correlations from the bivariate analyses showed that municipalities with a higher 
percentage of households receiving the program were more likely to vote for the PT in the 
electoral periods from 2006, 2010 and 2014 (table 6.4), but not in 2002. Surprisingly, analyses 
from 2002 show that with a higher proportion of households with Bolsa Escola were less likely 
to vote for the then incumbent PSDB. 
 
Similar to analyses from Mexico, in order to disentangle whether results from these bivariate 
analyses remained after controlling for other characteristics of the municipalities, logistic 
regression analyses were performed at the municipal level looking into the vote share for the 
incumbent after the implementation of Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família respectively. Results 
highlight that in 2002 the PSDB was more likely (though not significantly) to win among 
municipalities with a higher proportion of families with Bolsa Escola (table 6.5). Despite being 
non-significant, this higher likelihood could support (partially) the hypothesis of this work (the 
more recent the implementation of the program, the more positive the effect on electoral 
support for the nationally incumbent party). In contrast to Mexico, it seems that in Brazil the 
effect of the introduction of the programme was not evident in the short term. Logistic 
regression analysis also showed that in 2006, despite the fact that the proportion of 
households with CCTs increased significantly during Lula administration, contrasting to Hunter 
and Power (2007), Zucco (2008) and Canêdo-Pinheiro, (2015) the vote share for the PT was 
not significantly higher in such municipalities when compared to those with a lower proportion 
of households receiving the programme. While not necessarily due to the CCT scheme, it is to 
be noted that in 2006-2014 electoral periods, the PT won despite results not being significantly 
different between municipalities with higher and lower proportions of households receiving 
the programme. This phenomenon is in line with the results obtained by Cesar Zucco (2008) in 
which he points out that, probably the electoral success of the PT was mainly due to a series 
of favorable conditions such as a good economy, the popularity of the president as well as the 
CCTs. This could be related to the sociotropic voting theory introduced by Kinder and Kiewiet 
(1981) where individuals vote for the benefit of the community rather than for their own gain.  
Results from logistic regressions in the following electoral periods (2010 and 2014) did show 
that the PT was more likely to win among municipalities with a higher proportion of households 
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with the programme. These results could confirm the sociotropic theory, and could be related 
to the expansion of the programme made during Lula’s administration.  
Because of the characteristics from the data obtained from Brazil, I was able to deepen the 
analyses by performing longitudinal panel data analyses using fixed effects models. In 
summary, findings from these analyses suggest that in Brazil, municipalities with higher 
proportion of households receiving Bolsa Familia were more likely to vote for the incumbent 
even after controlling for other variables. Despite not being able to perform the same analyses 
in Mexico, when comparing the two countries, it seems that while in Mexico, the effect of the 
program at a municipal level faded in the long term, while in Brazil results showed that 
municipalities with a higher proportion of recipients were more likely to vote for the incumbent 
president’s party longitudinally. Results from Brazil oppose suggestions by the study by Ana de 
la O (2013). The effect of Bolsa Família does not disappear over time but seems to strengthen 
despite the institutionalization of the program. Logistic regression results and the longitudinal 
study presented in the previous chapter show that municipalities with a high proportion of 
families benefiting from Bolsa Família had a significant effect on voting for the incumbent PT, 
as pointed out by Zucco (2013). However, in Brazil there was no municipal effect in the short 
term (2002 for the PSDB) and this could be because the municipalities targeted by the 
programme at the beginning already had an allegiance for the PT (Zucco, 2013). 
These results serve to reject the hypothesis of this research work for the case of Brazil, “the 
more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support for the party that 
governs at national level”, as a significantly positive effect was observed in the logistic 
regressions using data from the 2010 and 2014 elections and the fixed effects models. 
 THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS AT 
THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 
In general, results from both countries looking to the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour at 
the individual level are not conclusive with respect to the hypothesis raised by this study. A 
limitation that should be considered is that results rely on self-reported vote. However, 
through the construction of a series of datasets taking into consideration national 
representative surveys (electoral panel studies) it was possible to obtain sufficient information 
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that allowed this work to analyse the effects of CCTS at individual level for both Mexico and 
Brazil. 
7.2.2.1. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL RESULTS FROM MEXICO 
 
At the individual level, results of the bivariate analyses from Mexico (table 5.9.) show that 
individuals with Progresa (year 2000) were more likely to report votes for the incumbent party 
PRI in 2000. In the following electoral periods (2006 and 2012), individuals with Oportunidades 
were not more likely to repot voting for the now incumbent PAN.  Results from the more robust 
cross-sectional regressions and the longitudinal panel data analyses suggests that individuals 
receiving either Progresa or Oportunidades were not significantly more likely to vote for the 
incumbent party when compared to those without the program.   
It is important to mention that results at the individual level are not in agreement with results 
at the municipal level showing a positive short-term effect of the program favouring the 
incumbent, thus confirming hypotheses one and two. The individual level results indicate that 
having Oportunidades does not make one more likely to vote for the incumbent. This could be 
due to the possibility that there is a lower proportion of beneficiaries compared to other 
countries with large scale CCTs and that the economic amount of the benefit is not as high as 
in other Latin American countries (Cecchini and Atuesta, 2017). The latter could be considered 
as a determining element in explaining the failure of Oportunidades to consolidate political 
support in the long term. Undoubtedly, and elaborating on Nichter (2018), the strict 
operationalization of the programme could have had an eroding effect on practices that 
conditioned the vote through this programme. 
7.2.2.2. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL RESULTS FROM BRAZIL 
 
Similar to the Mexican case, a nationally representative individual survey focusing on self-
reported vote was used to observe the effects of Bolsa Família on electoral behaviour. Scholars 
have argued that Bolsa Família was a determining factor in the electoral success of the PT in 
the three presidential elections from 2006 to 2014. However, the results obtained in this 
 196 
individual-level research work contradict those studies as they do not suggest such an 
association.  
Results show that individuals with the program reported a higher vote share in favour of the 
incumbent PT only for the 2006 election, controlling for the number of beneficiaries of Bolsa 
Família and gender. However, this effect was not significant for the other electoral periods. 
This result, unlike what happens at the same level of observation in Mexico, suggests that the 
more recent the implementation of the program, the greater the electoral support for the 
incumbent. These findings contrast with findings by Zucco (2013) where he suggested a 
significant effect of Bolsa Família with a higher self-reported vote for the incumbent party 
during the last three electoral periods at the individual level. 
These results suggest that at least at the individual level, the effect of Bolsa Família on electoral 
behaviour is only fulfilled in the short term. The results obtained, however, may have been this 
way because the effect is more evident at an aggregate level than at the individual level, 
according to sociological theory where individuals cast their ballot focusing on the benefit of 
the community rather than their own. Another element to consider is the selection bias of the 
survey. This study was unable, as is explained in the section on strengths and weaknesses, to 
use the same survey for all periods.  
These individual level analyses would confirm Ana De la O’s (2013) argument that the 
institutionalization of the program weakens the impact of the CCTs on electoral behaviour. This 
is because the beneficiaries are not afraid of their disappearance, thus verifying the hypothesis 
of the study “the more recent a CCT programme is, the more positive its impact on support for 
the party that governs at national level”. 
While there were no associations between being a recipient of the program and a self-reported 
vote for the president´s incumbent party in Mexico, the results from Brazil suggest that 
recipients of Bolsa Família were significantly more likely to vote for the incumbent when 
compared to non-recipients only in the short-term rather than the long-term. These results 
confirm the hypothesis of this work for the case of Brazil at the individual level as the 
programme showed a positive effect at the short term.  
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7.3. THE CONTRASTING RESULTS BETWEEN MEXICO AND BRAZIL 
 
It seems that the contrasting results between Mexico and Brazil are explained by differences 
in the implementation and operation of the program within each of the countries.  
a) Municipal Level 
As previously stated, in the case of Mexico at municipal level the effect was only visible at the 
short term while for Brazil at the municipal level a positive effect was found in all  regressions 
and longitudinal models for the incumbent PT. Contrary to what happened in Mexico with 
Oportunidades, it seems that the effect of Bolsa Família was strengthened in the long term 
despite the institutionalization of the program. This may be a result of the registration process 
that Brazil follows, where access to the program is done following a self-rated poverty index. 
This differs from Mexico where there is a means tested process, with mandatory conditions 
and rigorous operating rules. The less rigorous rules by Bolsa Familia and the expansion of the 
program associated with Lula’s tenure could have influenced follows less rigorous rules both 
in its implementation and in its evaluation. 
b) Individual Level 
Unlike results from the analyses at a municipal level, results for Mexico at the individual level 
show that individuals receiving the program were not more likely to report voting for the 
incumbent when compared to non-recipients. While individuals with Bolsa Familia from Brazil 
were more likely to report voting for the incumbent only in the short term, specifically for the 
2006 electoral period.  
However, the PT (the incumbent after 2006) won the elections in the following three terms, 
with increasing votes both among recipients and non-recipients. This suggest that voters from 
Brazil at the individual level, act according to the sociological theory by casting their vote with 
their communities in mind regardless of whether they are beneficiaries of the program or not. 
In this sense, non-recipients change their political patterns in favor of the incumbent as a 
response to their expected future utility, this effect is more evident and is only visible at the 
individual level and not at the aggregate level as results shown that Lula´s voting grew in both 
recipients and non-recipients.  
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Another important element that serves to explain the divergent results is the relationship 
between CCTs and political participation and civic culture. Brazil has a stronger civil society 
which was strengthened by Bolsa Familia, in Mexico participation and interest in public life is 
much lower (Russel, 2010; LAPOP, 2013, Ramírez, 2014). 
Aside from these characteristics, another difference between Oportunidades and Bolsa Família 
which could explain the different results is the number of individuals and families covered by 
the program, and the increase of coverage during the years in operation. The coverage of the 
program is linked with the evolution of poverty and with the ultimate goal of the CCTs, which 
is to eradicate the intergenerational cycle of poverty.  
In this sense, when comparing Mexico and Brazil, in terms of their success in alleviating 
poverty, it seems that Brazil has been more successful in decreasing the proportion of people 
living under the poverty line when compared to Mexico (IBGE, 2014) mainly due to the 
expansion of the programme and the benefits provided. Perhaps this effect has helped 
increase the effect of the program on voting behaviour at the long term in terms of support 
for incumbent, since according to World Bank Bolsa Família has been a key factor to reduce 
extreme poverty in Brazil from 9.7% to 4.3% of the population (World Bank, 2013) compared 
to Mexico Oportunidades show lower success in terms of extreme poverty reduction from 9.8% 
to 7.4% (CONEVAL, 2015) for the period observed. 
7.4. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 STRENGTHS OF THE STUDY 
 
The existing literature on the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour is scarce when compared to 
literature focusing on other outcomes such as health or socioeconomic conditions. Most of 
previous research focuses on single-country outcomes and, to this researcher’s knowledge no 
other study provides country comparisons on the potential effects of CCTs on voting behaviour. 
Accordingly, the first strength of this study is that it compares two countries with the longest 
and largest running CCTs. This is important as it has allowed us to test whether the assumptions 
made in other studies could be extrapolated to other countries or if differences in 
implementation could produce different results with regards to their effect on voting 
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behaviour. For example, it seems that while in Mexico the program is means tested, and has 
mandatory conditions, the lesser monetary aid provided and the lesser proportion of 
individuals covered could explain the effect in the short term and the lack of effect over the 
long term (despite it potentially being easier for governors to use the program for clientelistic 
purposes).  In Brazil, by contrast, where they use less institutionalised and less strict rules for 
enrolment with a self-rated poverty scale, the cadastro unico is associated with Lula da Silva’s 
government and the monetary aid as well as the proportion of individuals covered is larger, 
the effect of the program towards the incumbent party persists in the long term. It seems that 
we can conclude that what makes a beneficiary of a CCT vote for the incumbent is the strategy 
of implementation by the government rather than the program itself.  
Another strength of this study is that it follows two levels of observation and uses different 
statistical techniques in order to identify the effects of the program on voting behaviour of 
both communities and individuals. As discussed in the methodology chapter, these models 
were able to address the effect of CCTs on voting behaviour at municipal and individual levels 
cross sectionally and longitudinally. This study highlights that the effects of CCTs vary across 
the level of observation with the most effect seen at the municipal level. This could imply that 
perhaps the surveys in both countries are constructed differently, the time in relation to the 
electoral period could also differ and could cause desirability bias. Also, the methodology 
followed by the interviewers could be different and bias the results making differences 
between the two countries even more pronounced.   
Additionally, this dissertation follows a broader approach in terms of the literature reviewed 
focusing on the theoretical approach of voting behaviour trying to provide a possible answer 
to the way in which beneficiaries casted their ballot.  This takes relevance when discussing the 
results, as findings suggested that there is no one prevalent theory that could explain 
differences by country or by level of observation. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
There are some limitations to this study. First, in both countries due to the secrecy of the ballot, 
we cannot verify votes for a specific party, and even if in all democratic systems this limitation 
cannot be overcome, it is important to highlight a possible social desirability bias. Respondents 
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could think that interviewer was linked to the government and thus give a biased reply. 
However, because we analysed actual vote shares at the municipal level, we were able to 
compare results and thus partially overcome this problem.  Another way of overcoming this 
limitation only available for Brazil, was by using the surveys which followed the interviewees 
at three points in time (before, during and after) across each electoral period; as this is a 
longitudinal panel, results are more robust. In contrast, in Mexico, the sample from the INEGI 
was not longitudinal so I was not able to perform the same analyses. In order to deal with this 
problem cross sectional analyses were run by municipality. However, the municipality codes 
from the INEGI and the electoral institute are different and in order to overcome this issue I 
had to match and recode each municipality manually.  
Similar to the issues for municipal data from Mexico, for the case of Brazil, one of the main 
limitations was the access to the individual longitudinal datasets of the voting panel. This was 
solved by generating a dataset from the data used by Zucco (2013). However, this was not 
longitudinal data but rather cross-sectional data per electoral period, so analyses were 
performed cross sectionally at the individual level. In Mexico, there is a nationally 
representative panel dataset of vote and self-reported vote, in this country a panel data fixed 
effects model analysis was performed at the individual level.  
Regarding clientelism and as discussed in depth in Chapter 3 CCTs, have been considered 
effective instruments in reducing poverty but also in reducing old clientelist practices (Fox, 
2012; Nichter, 2018). However, a large strand of the literature argues that in developing 
democracies where the socioeconomic circumstances of voters are not ideal, they are more 
sensitive to the influence of goods provided by political parties. Following the latter, some 
scholars posit that programmatic policies such as CCTs are better to some extent at containing 
clientelism, however they do not eradicate it. This is because the role of the client (beneficiary) 
is no longer passive but the active ingredient of the clientelistic relationship as they are the 
ones looking for the benefits provided by such party (Piattoni, 2007; Hilgers, 2008; Daieff, 
2015; Nichter, 2018). To test such claims, this thesis gathered secondary data and analysed to 
what extent a relationship between having a CCTs was associated with votes for the 
incumbent, and whether these programmes were able to prevent clientelism by finding no 
such association. However, even if results shed some light to the fact that associations seemed 
more prevalent in Brazil where the program is less rigorously implemented, the data available 
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is not ideal. To overcome this, and as discussed in the implications of findings, surveys focusing 
on the effect of the programmes on voting behaviour or a study including qualitative fieldwork 
in the countries analysed would be necessary.  
7.5. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 
Findings from this study provide a window of opportunity for policy development in order to 
avoid the electoral use of the programmes, they also provide insight on voting behaviour 
theories.  This section summarises the implications of findings first, by looking into the design 
and implementation of CCTs, second regarding the transparency and accuracy on available 
data focusing on measuring the on the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour and third by 
presenting implications for voting behaviour theory.  
Results from this study highlight that the implementation of CCTs should be done by 
autonomous institutions in order to avoid the risk of influencing voting behaviour. This would 
allow the development of specific strategies to ensure that those responsible for the 
implementation avoid, or at least limit, any relationship with the incumbent government. The 
congress and political opponents should be vigilant of these relationships at a federal and 
municipal level in order to avoid clientelistic practices by the incumbent at any of those levels.  
CCTs, as results from this study suggest, should be designed and implemented as means tested 
policies with periodic evaluations. They should have budgetary locks in order to avoid the 
discretionary use of the funds, their discretionary expansion or delivery of goods to a specific 
section of the population. 
These independent institutions should also be in charge of data collection regarding to the 
social, political and electoral outcomes of the programmes. Data should be open access for the 
academic community in order to evaluate these effects not only in political matters but also in 
the socioeconomic and health effects on the targeted population. Preferably, with regards to 
the collection of reliable data, each of the programs should introduce a survey measuring 
aggregated and disaggregated levels of data as results from this study suggest that electoral 
results may be seen in either of or both levels of observation. Results also showed that that 
coverage matters in terms of electoral support for the incumbent, particularly in Brazil, where 
municipalities with a higher proportion of beneficiaries had higher vote shares for incumbent 
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in the long term. Scholars (Menocal, 2001; Marques et al., 2009; Abensur et., Al., 2007; 
Canêdo-Pinheiro, 2015) have argued that the greater the coverage of the program, the greater 
the number of votes in favor of the incumbent. While results from Mexico do not show this, it 
is important to remember the slower increase in the proportion of beneficiaries in this country 
when compared to Brazil. These surveys targeted to analyse these relationships could shed 
light on whether the positive effects of the programme expansion decrease if a more rigorous 
institution existed.    
Beyond the policy implications, this study also has theoretical implications with regards to 
voting behaviour. Prospective, retrospective and sociological theories are not mutually 
exclusive. It appears that in Mexico individuals’ voting behaviour is linked to both rational 
prospective-retrospective and sociological reasonings with one weighting more when casting 
their ballot as no pattern was found in the long term. While in Brazil differences between 
individual and municipal analyses could be related to a sociological theory being present 
among non-beneficiaries, voting for the incumbent party in municipalities with a higher 
prevalence of households receiving the program. These theoretical frameworks are almost 
impossible to test without an individual level panel data analysis in a national representative 
sample asking specifical questions focusing on the reasons behind the individuals voting 
choice.  
When an individual casts a ballot, he makes both retrospective, prospective, and sociological 
evaluations. However, the discussion around these theories is diffuse. It would be necessary to 
have instruments to be able to holistically evaluate the influence of the use of both the political 
discourse around the CCTs and the influence of the marketing that the incumbent can use to 
create a much more solid electoral base. 
7.6. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
All things considered, and as mentioned throughout the study there are several gaps that 
should be covered by future research. First, a more detailed study of information from local 
electoral institutes is needed in order to disentangle the relation between national and local 
and legislative representation and voting behaviour of CCT beneficiaries. Also, further research 
is needed on the effect of CCT programs in the “traditional gender gap” on voting behaviour. 
 203 
In addition, during 2018 both countries had elections, 21 years after the programs started. 
Studies could focus on finding if those who were born with their family receiving the program 
have any alliance to the incumbent when their families first received the aid. Such study could 
suggest whether the effect of CCTs is maintained over long periods of time and passed on 
between generations. Unfortunately, for the case of the Mexican Oportunidades this could not 
be followed up as the programme was eliminated by the Lopez Obrador government in 2019 
and with it an important source of studies on the effect of these programs on both the socio-
economic and political aspects was lost. 
Further studies are needed focusing on the effects of CCTs at the local and regional level. 
Hilgers (2008) points out that in regions of the Mexican state of Oaxaca social policies with 
both redistributive and clientelistic approaches have survived in those regions for two main 
reasons, one because of the adherence of citizens to local or regional political leaderships and 
to other side because partisan adherence was generated. That perspective focuses on 
analysing how, when and in what form a social policy can shape and define our political 
preferences. 
Following this and in relationship with the limitations of this study regarding clientelism, future 
research in terms of testing whether CCTs helped to erode or to contained clientelism is 
needed either by conducting field work or by creating a national level survey that could reflect 
this effect.  
Additionally, results from this thesis suggest that the higher proportion of coverage as well as 
diverse forms of operationalisation may have contrasting results. Future research could 
usefully focus on investigating the role of these variables in shaping the relationship between 
CCTs and voting behaviour. Also, a broader research focusing on the role of Governors and, 
where appropriate, Mayors in the operation of CCTs and their possible manipulation for 
political purposes at the local level. Such study would shed light on the relevant literature by 
studying at different levels of incumbency. 
7.7. FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
This work furthers the understanding on the effects of CCTs on voting behaviour. While in 
general these effects seem to depend on the design and implementation of the programme 
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within each country, results contrasts depending on the level of observation and time frame 
analysed. While in Mexico at the individual level, those receiving Oportunidades were not more 
likely to vote for the incumbent when compared to non-recipients in the short and long terms. 
However, at the municipal level, municipalities with a higher proportion of recipients had a 
higher vote share towards the incumbent at the short term. Contrastingly, results from Brazil 
suggest that individuals receiving the program were more likely to vote for the incumbent at 
the short term, but when looking into municipalities, those with a higher proportion of 
recipients had a higher vote share for the incumbent longitudinally. This could mean that the 
benefit seen by the community increases the votes towards the incumbent despite being a 
recipient or not.  
The future of CCTs in Latin America will continue to be central in the implementation of 
redistributive policies and the fight against poverty. However, and despite indications that the 
effect of CCTs on poverty reduction has been generally positive, these programs have not been 
able to reduce social inequality. Indeed, in the particular case of Mexico, Oportunidades was 
unable to significantly reduce social inequality and poverty has increased notably in recent 
years. This outcome is despite Mexico being a pioneer country in the implementation of CCTs 
and after having achieved good results on poverty reduction when it was initially implemented.  
As mentioned throughout this work, there are many innovations that would help CCTs work 
efficiently and reduce the risk of political manipulation. One of these relates to the way in 
which beneficiaries are identified and enrolled. By reducing inclusion errors and increasing 
coverage, discretionary and political use would be greatly reduced. Paradoxically, although 
Mexico has not been able to significantly reduce poverty with the use of Oportunidades, it 
seems from the results provided in this thesis that the programme was able (apparently) to 
break the inertia of the political use of social programmes. 
Perhaps the best guarantee of limiting political manipulation of CCTs is to foster the 
development of political participation amongst the beneficiaries. This with the aim to promote 
a more effective model of auditing and social control of public resources, seeking to end the 
old electoral malpractices by promoting greater political participation, civic culture, and a more 
educated society.  
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In general, this study has studied the effects of CCTs on electoral behaviour through an 
analytical lens in order to understand the motivations of citizens to vote for incumbent in the 
short and long term, starting from the premise that voters make decisions based on the 
benefits that could be obtained. However, from the results, it seems that citizens may, in some 
cases, have sociotropic rather than rational motivations when casting their vote. It is necessary 
to carry out a much broader study, which includes several countries with CCTs in operation 
and measure the electoral attitudes of their population in order to have elements to 
understand the logic and motivations of citizens when casting the vote. Unfortunately, in 
Mexico the CCTs were suppressed by the López Obrador government, seeking to return to the 
implementation of non-programmatic policies, thereby missing a valuable opportunity to 
investigate the effects of the institutionalization of social programs. At the same time, in Brazil 
Bolsonaro´s government announced in late 2020 that a new programme called Renda Cidada 
(citizen rent) will replace Bolsa Família in time to come. These two changes will undoubtedly 
result in the loss of valuable data regarding the effects of these CCTs that where in place for 
more than 20 years. Hopefully, the new programmes brought by these two governments will 
consider improving their implementations as well as data collection regarding their social, 
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9. APPENDIX  
 
This part of the study provides further estimations and extended results regarding the 
statistics  
9.1. APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL 
SYSTEMS (CSES) 
 
The CSES dataset is comprised of 5 waves, 2002, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014. This dataset 
comprises individual level data with demographics, perception of government and 
democracy, government and political sympathies. One downside is that the study does 
not follow the same population and the samples are of unequal size between studies. On 
the other hand, it gives a good idea of the political opinion, of the sample.  
 
For the years 2000 – 2014 the perception of the national economy, the separation 
between rural and urban populations and the ideological placement are important 
factors. Unfortunately, the studies do not cover CCT receivership, but education levels 
that can be used as a proxy. These factors take more significance in the 2010 and 2014 
elections where education, ideological placement in the left-right spectrum, the 
rural/urban population and the perception of the economy favour the incumbent party 
even though it was widely regarded as responsible for corruption scandals and the 
economic crisis. Which suggests a relationship between clientelistic policies and voting 
behaviour. 
 CSES MEXICO 
 
Table 9.1. Logistic Model Mexico’s 2000 Election  
 Variables Categories PRI PAN  PRD 
Sex 
Woman 0.1396 -0.0369 -0.1085 
 (-0.107 - 0.387) (-0.239 - 0.165) (-0.442 - 0.225) 
Age 
18-25 0.6349** -0.1647 0.3497 
 (0.239 - 1.031) (-0.457 - 0.128) (-0.168 - 0.867) 
25-34 0.5918** 0.0581 0.3174 
 (0.179 - 1.005) (-0.249 - 0.366) (-0.226 - 0.861) 
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35-44 0.6539** 0.124 0.4715 
 (0.192 - 1.115) (-0.234 - 0.482) (-0.129 - 1.072) 
45-54 0.8085** -0.1588 0.0539 
 (0.279 - 1.338) (-0.601 - 0.283) (-0.714 - 0.822) 
55-64 ref ref ref 
65+ 1.1486*** -0.2304 -0.3731 
 (0.57 - 1.727) (-0.746 - 0.286) (-1.285 - 0.539) 
Income 
1st quintile -0.4865* 0.2229 -0.1927 
 (-0.903 - -0.07) (-0.144 - 0.59) (-0.727 - 0.342) 
2nd quintile -0.4687* 0.4469* -0.421 
 (-0.891 - -0.047) (0.078 - 0.815) (-1.008 - 0.166) 
3rd quintile -0.2385 0.2236 -0.2363 
 (-0.657 - 0.18) (-0.147 - 0.594) (-0.8 - 0.327) 
4th quintile -0.5134* 0.4011 -0.6804 
 (-1.009 - -0.017) (-0.006 - 0.808) (-1.364 - 0.004) 
5th quintile ref ref ref 
Education 
None 
-0.3105 0.2839 -0.4494 
(-0.663 - 0.042) (-0.035 - 0.603) (-0.938 - 0.04) 
Elementary/lower 
secondary 
-0.3308 0.4093* -0.3741 
(-0.733 - 0.072) (0.059 - 0.76) (-0.928 - 0.179) 
Higher Secondary 
-0.3363 0.3369 -0.447 
(-0.769 - 0.096) (-0.035 - 0.709) (-1.048 - 0.154) 





LEFT -0.3524 0.1388 0.6847 
 (-1.708 - 1.004) (-0.756 - 1.033) (-0.294 - 1.664) 
2 -0.6407 -0.0193 0.6029 
 (-1.979 - 0.698) (-0.868 - 0.829) (-0.307 - 1.513) 
3 0.1986 0.5111 -0.5114 
 (-0.86 - 1.257) (-0.221 - 1.243) (-1.525 - 0.503) 
4 0.1271 0.8068* -1.0206 
 (-0.931 - 1.185) (0.04 - 1.574) (-2.312 - 0.271) 
5 0.4416 0.3342 -0.7373* 
 (-0.201 - 1.085) (-0.124 - 0.792) (-1.341 - -0.133) 
6 0.8674* 0.3646 -1.1933* 
 (0.087 - 1.648) (-0.251 - 0.98) (-2.177 - -0.21) 
7 -0.1551 0.8725** -2.0551** 
 (-1.016 - 0.705) (0.297 - 1.448) (-3.309 - -0.802) 
8 0.5157 0.6686* -1.1591** 
 (-0.195 - 1.226) (0.143 - 1.194) (-1.959 - -0.359) 
9 0.8642 0.0317 -0.4304 
 229 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001 
 
 
Table 9.2. Logistic Model Mexico’s 2006 Election  
Variables Categories PRI PAN PRD 
Sex Woman 
-0.1018 0.1603 -0.1267 
(-0.386 - 0.183) (-0.065 - 0.385) (-0.363 - 0.11) 
Age 
18-25 
0.281 0.3878* -0.4333* 
(-0.236 - 0.798) (0.033 - 0.743) (-0.804 - -0.063) 
25-34 
0.5965* 0.2253 -0.2089 
(0.094 - 1.099) (-0.136 - 0.586) (-0.574 - 0.156) 
35-44 
0.4786 0.283 -0.1702 
(-0.072 - 1.029) (-0.114 - 0.68) (-0.574 - 0.233) 
45-54 
0.9255** 0.1853 -0.3001 
(0.324 - 1.527) (-0.289 - 0.66) (-0.8 - 0.2) 
55-64 ref ref ref 
65+ 0.9563** -0.1989 -0.093 
 (-0.091 - 1.819) (-0.772 - 0.835) (-1.48 - 0.619) 
RIGHT ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref 
Protestant 0.4028 -1.1807** -0.2087 
 (-0.26 - 1.066) (-1.895 - -0.466) (-1.282 - 0.865) 
OtherChristian -0.3644 -0.2221 0.8395* 
 (-1.112 - 0.383) (-0.789 - 0.345) (0.098 - 1.581) 
Jewish -15.8329 -0.5472 2.1658 
 
(-6657.649 - 
6625.984) (-3.003 - 1.909) (-0.29 - 4.621) 
Buddhism 1.211 -13.304 2.3105 
 (-1.631 - 4.053) (-1198.168 - 1171.56) (-0.565 - 5.185) 
Non-believer -0.6925* -0.3225 -0.2998 
 (-1.32 - -0.065) (-0.72 - 0.075) (-0.978 - 0.379) 
Other -1.1032 -0.0447 0.6669 
 (-3.209 - 1.003) (-1.283 - 1.194) (-0.95 - 2.284) 
Don't know -12.1708 11.6409 -7.3374 
 
(-1419.189 - 
1394.847) (-539.64 - 562.922) (-253.716 - 239.041) 
Missing 0.7346 0.3877 -17.0978 
 (-0.735 - 2.204) (-1.048 - 1.823) (-11900 - 11900) 
Rural  
0.2736 -0.1655 -0.3341 
 (-0.082 - 0.629) (-0.479 - 0.148) (-0.806 - 0.138) 
Constant 
-1.5316*** -1.0943** -0.9754* 
(-2.349 - -0.714) (-1.729 - -0.46) (-1.909 - -0.042) 
N 1766 1766 1766 
R 0.01698 0.01026 0.0062 
 230 
(0.34 - 1.572) (-0.717 - 0.319) (-0.597 - 0.411) 
income 
1st quintile 
-0.1499 0.4137** -0.1089 
(-0.53 - 0.23) (0.119 - 0.709) (-0.423 - 0.206) 
2nd quintile 
-0.2899 0.2459 -0.2395 
(-0.853 - 0.273) (-0.163 - 0.655) (-0.671 - 0.192) 
3rd quintile 
-0.2328 0.5484 0.2051 
(-1.139 - 0.674) (-0.079 - 1.175) (-0.429 - 0.839) 
4th quintile 
-0.5768 0.4726 -0.1769 
(-1.485 - 0.332) (-0.089 - 1.035) (-0.738 - 0.384) 
5th quintile ref ref ref 
Education 
None 
-0.0967 0.1196 -0.0469 
(-0.459 - 0.265) (-0.162 - 0.402) (-0.353 - 0.259) 
Elementary/lower 
secondary 
-0.3567 -0.0074 0.0847 
(-0.831 - 0.118) (-0.349 - 0.334) (-0.265 - 0.435) 
Higher Secondary 
-0.6637 0.1531 -0.0138 
(-1.466 - 0.138) (-0.343 - 0.649) (-0.519 - 0.491) 






-20.2292 0.5757 -0.2332 
(-30900 - 30900) (-0.844 - 1.996) (-1.169 - 0.703) 
2 
1.2302* 0.1585 -0.4661 
(0.026 - 2.434) (-1.481 - 1.798) (-1.437 - 0.505) 
3 
0.6161 0.3742 -0.9438* 
(-0.628 - 1.861) (-1.038 - 1.787) (-1.829 - -0.059) 
4 
0.5833 -0.3012 -0.5853 
(-0.842 - 2.008) (-2.452 - 1.849) (-1.588 - 0.418) 
5 
0.3834 1.4328*** -1.578*** 
(-0.354 - 1.121) (0.63 - 2.236) (-2.099 - -1.057) 
6 
0.3032 1.8427*** -2.0232*** 
(-0.562 - 1.168) (0.971 - 2.715) (-2.712 - -1.334) 
7 
0.2582 2.1532*** -1.8652*** 
(-0.585 - 1.101) (1.316 - 2.991) (-2.501 - -1.23) 
8 
0.6484 2.0838*** -1.6966*** 
(-0.062 - 1.359) (1.302 - 2.866) (-2.215 - -1.178) 
9 
0.2033 2.4394*** -1.6497*** 
(-0.577 - 0.983) (1.634 - 3.244) (-2.212 - -1.087) 
RIGHT ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref 
Protestant 
0.3173 -0.7193** -0.0971 
(-0.231 - 0.866) (-1.26 - -0.178) (-0.607 - 0.413) 
Other Christian 
-0.2383 -0.2706 0.6698* 
(-1.127 - 0.651) (-0.931 - 0.389) (0.066 - 1.273) 
Non-believer 0.355 -0.5669* -0.1702 
 231 
(-0.225 - 0.935) (-1.053 - -0.081) (-0.654 - 0.313) 
Agnostic 
-9.3425 -12.0782 -9.3736 
(-435.825 - 
417.14) (-663.2 - 639.044) (-231.535 - 212.788) 
Rural   
-0.5162** -0.0953 0.3023* 
(-0.827 - -0.205) (-0.361 - 0.171) (0.01 - 0.595) 
Constant 
-1.8867*** -2.8752*** 0.74* 
(-2.692 - -1.081) (-3.707 - -2.043) (0.159 - 1.321) 
N 1591 1591 1591 
R 0.05485 0.0853 0.0716 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001 
 
 
Table 9.3. Logistic Model Mexico’s 2012 Election 
Variables Category PRI PAN PRD 
 
    
    
Sex 
Woman -0.0439 0.3751** -0.0636 
 
(-0.224 - 0.137) (0.145 - 0.605) (-0.288 - 0.161) 
Age 
18-25 0.1552 -0.0351 0.3429 
 
(-0.141 - 0.451) (-0.405 - 0.334) (-0.035 - 0.72) 
25-34 0.2759 0.2813 0.1566 
 
(-0.025 - 0.577) (-0.085 - 0.647) (-0.235 - 0.548) 
35-44 0.1962 0.0335 0.4203* 
 
(-0.113 - 0.505) (-0.353 - 0.42) (0.024 - 0.817) 
45-54 0.2174 0.2504 0.3577 
 
(-0.129 - 0.564) (-0.184 - 0.685) (-0.085 - 0.801) 
55-64 ref ref ref 
65+ -0.0929 0.1539 0.7703** 
 
(-0.467 - 0.281) (-0.315 - 0.623) (0.309 - 1.232) 
Income 
1st quintile 0.1372 0.1115 -0.1522 
 
(-0.171 - 0.445) (-0.303 - 0.526) (-0.544 - 0.24) 
2nd quintile 0.0564 0.0684 -0.0704 
 
(-0.246 - 0.358) (-0.337 - 0.474) (-0.449 - 0.308) 
3rd quintile 0.2004 0.1858 -0.0616 
 
(-0.15 - 0.551) (-0.263 - 0.634) (-0.516 - 0.392) 
4th quintile -0.039 0.2528 0.1159 
 
(-0.381 - 0.303) (-0.181 - 0.687) (-0.308 - 0.54) 
5th quintile ref ref ref 
Education 
None 0.022 0.3554 0.184 
 
(-0.263 - 0.307) (-0.037 - 0.748) (-0.181 - 0.549) 
Elementary/lower 
secondary -0.1634 0.5146* 0.4222 
 
(-0.533 - 0.206) (0.036 - 0.993) (-0.043 - 0.887) 
 232 
Higher Secondary -0.3707 0.6999** 0.0797 
 
(-0.779 - 0.038) (0.193 - 1.207) (-0.424 - 0.584) 





LEFT -0.4408 0.5572 0.0758 
 
(-1.652 - 0.77) (-0.693 - 1.807) (-0.649 - 0.801) 
2 -0.1611 -0.5018 0.3613 
 
(-1.321 - 0.998) (-2.06 - 1.057) (-0.397 - 1.12) 
3 0.8725 -0.9578 -0.245 
 
(-0.171 - 1.916) (-2.714 - 0.798) (-1.021 - 0.531) 
4 1.073* -0.1205 -0.2546 
 
(0.05 - 2.096) (-1.584 - 1.343) (-1.036 - 0.527) 
5 1.1981** 0.8115 -1.7727*** 
 
(0.366 - 2.03) (-0.256 - 1.879) (-2.367 - -1.178) 
6 1.8062*** 0.7253 -1.7787*** 
 
(0.956 - 2.656) (-0.38 - 1.831) (-2.422 - -1.135) 
7 1.8644*** 0.8012 -2.1188*** 
 
(1.019 - 2.71) (-0.292 - 1.894) (-2.773 - -1.464) 
8 2.0415*** 1.2749* -2.5369*** 
 
(1.211 - 2.872) (0.211 - 2.339) (-3.183 - -1.891) 
9 2.0527*** 1.2557* -2.7625*** 
 
(1.207 - 2.898) (0.178 - 2.333) (-3.479 - -2.046) 
RIGHT ref ref ref 
Religion 
Protestant -0.0763 -1.3982 -0.1112 
 
(-1.067 - 0.915) (-3.458 - 0.662) (-1.447 - 1.225) 
Other Christian -0.0525 -0.1956 0.0074 
 
(-0.481 - 0.376) (-0.729 - 0.338) (-0.547 - 0.561) 
Non-believer -0.6032** -0.083 -0.2095 
 
(-1.042 - -0.164) (-0.59 - 0.424) (-0.734 - 0.315) 
Other -0.4417 -0.9172 0.3452 
 
(-1.276 - 0.393) (-2.166 - 0.331) (-0.494 - 1.184) 
Missing -0.4604 0.0222 -0.1181 
 
(-1.224 - 0.303) (-0.836 - 0.88) (-1.044 - 0.808) 
Rural 
Yes -0.0994 -0.2292 0.0675 
 
(-0.418 - 0.219) (-0.671 - 0.212) (-0.347 - 0.482) 
Constant 
-2.1773*** -2.4088*** -0.2941 
(-3.109 - -1.246) (-3.604 - -1.214) (-1.112 - 0.524) 
N 2400 2400 2400 
R 0.0697 0.1081 0.1447 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001 
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 CSES BRAZIL 
 
Table 9.4. Logistic Model Brazil’s 2002 Election 
Variable Categories PT PSDB OTHER PT 2nd PSDB 2nd 
Sex Woman 
-0.1999* 0.2512* 0.0537 -0.197* 0.3012** 
(-0.372 - -0.028) (0.031 - 0.471) (-0.122 - 0.229) (-0.366 - -0.028) (0.102 - 0.5) 
Age 
18-25 
-0.00004209 0.3757* -0.2031 0.1143 0.1527 
(-0.247 - 0.247) (0.041 - 0.711) (-0.454 - 0.048) (-0.127 - 0.356) (-0.144 - 0.449) 
25-34 
0.1365 0.2534 -0.2901* 0.3844** 0.2648 
(-0.128 - 0.401) (-0.107 - 0.614) (-0.562 - -0.018) (0.123 - 0.646) (-0.046 - 0.576) 
35-44 
0.0862 0.4336* -0.3575* 0.2443 0.2826 
(-0.206 - 0.379) (0.056 - 0.811) (-0.661 - -0.054) (-0.043 - 0.532) (-0.056 - 0.621) 
45-54 
-0.0454 0.5573** -0.2946 0.176 0.5782** 
(-0.38 - 0.289) (0.14 - 0.975) (-0.636 - 0.047) (-0.149 - 0.501) (0.207 - 0.949) 
55-64 ref ref ref ref ref 
65+ 
-0.7472*** 0.5323* 0.3656* -0.6046** 0.3645 
(-1.111 - -0.383) (0.111 - 0.954) (0.027 - 0.704) (-0.946 - -0.263) (-0.02 - 0.749) 
Income 
1st quintile 
0.2152 0.1146 -0.2907* 0.1374 0.2285 
(-0.071 - 0.501) (-0.236 - 0.466) (-0.579 - -0.003) (-0.14 - 0.415) (-0.098 - 0.555) 
2nd quintile 
0.2638 -0.1466 -0.1845 0.1325 -0.1039 
(-0.025 - 0.553) (-0.521 - 0.228) (-0.475 - 0.106) (-0.149 - 0.414) (-0.45 - 0.243) 
3rd quintile 
0.2497 -0.055 -0.2267 0.0587 0.1982 
(-0.048 - 0.547) (-0.437 - 0.327) (-0.527 - 0.074) (-0.232 - 0.349) (-0.146 - 0.543) 
 234 
4th quintile 
-0.0094 0.5005* -0.3201 -0.3036 0.757*** 
(-0.34 - 0.321) (0.1 - 0.901) (-0.653 - 0.013) (-0.625 - 0.017) (0.392 - 1.122) 
5th quintile ref ref ref ref ref 
Education 
None 
-0.0772 -0.2477 0.2109 0.0212 0.0489 
(-0.328 - 0.173) (-0.594 - 0.099) (-0.04 - 0.462) (-0.223 - 0.265) (-0.247 - 0.345) 
Elementary/lower secondary 
0.1268 -0.053 -0.1016 0.1276 0.1708 
(-0.12 - 0.374) (-0.372 - 0.266) (-0.356 - 0.153) (-0.116 - 0.371) (-0.111 - 0.453) 
Higher Secondary 
0.1405 0.0123 -0.1933 0.4231* -0.1142 
(-0.25 - 0.531) (-0.453 - 0.478) (-0.605 - 0.218) (0.034 - 0.812) (-0.55 - 0.321) 
Universitary ref ref ref ref ref 
Ideological 
placement on the 
political spectrum 
LEFT 
-0.322 0.3539 0.1903 -0.2541 0.4888 
(-0.837 - 0.193) (-0.423 - 1.131) (-0.358 - 0.738) (-0.785 - 0.276) (-0.192 - 1.17) 
2 
-0.0205 -0.2396 0.1366 -0.0322 0.0201 
(-0.501 - 0.46) (-1.065 - 0.586) (-0.375 - 0.648) (-0.535 - 0.47) (-0.665 - 0.705) 
3 
-0.1551 0.5544 -0.0986 -0.1086 0.4499 
(-0.599 - 0.289) (-0.07 - 1.179) (-0.583 - 0.386) (-0.566 - 0.349) (-0.135 - 1.035) 
4 
-0.6067** 0.8239** 0.2247 -0.4451* 0.8725** 
(-1.046 - -0.167) (0.233 - 1.415) (-0.243 - 0.692) (-0.888 - -0.003) (0.331 - 1.413) 
5 
-0.7705*** 0.809** 0.411* -0.6649*** 0.8794*** 
(-1.094 - -0.447) (0.341 - 1.277) (0.074 - 0.748) (-0.991 - -0.339) (0.456 - 1.303) 
6 
-1.1763*** 1.3938*** 0.3351 -0.7954** 1.338*** 
(-1.678 - -0.675) (0.806 - 1.981) (-0.17 - 0.84) (-1.273 - -0.318) (0.784 - 1.892) 
7 
-0.7029** 0.7684* 0.376 -0.4974* 0.7678** 
(-1.167 - -0.239) (0.142 - 1.395) (-0.102 - 0.854) (-0.957 - -0.038) (0.197 - 1.339) 
8 -1.1851*** 1.1534*** 0.5548* -0.8286*** 1.2146*** 
 235 
(-1.624 - -0.746) (0.611 - 1.696) (0.123 - 0.987) (-1.247 - -0.411) (0.717 - 1.712) 
9 
-0.6285** 0.9745** 0.1248 -0.7231** 1.1264*** 
(-1.093 - -0.164) (0.381 - 1.568) (-0.37 - 0.619) (-1.185 - -0.261) (0.585 - 1.668) 
RIGHT ref ref ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref ref ref 
Protestant 
-1.0517*** -0.904** 1.4311*** -0.2243 -0.0408 
(-1.516 - -0.587) (-1.555 - -0.253) (1.009 - 1.853) (-0.629 - 0.18) (-0.507 - 0.426) 
Other Christian 
-0.9976*** -0.648** 1.2545*** -0.4946*** 0.1252 
(-1.265 - -0.73) (-1.015 - -0.281) (1.007 - 1.502) (-0.737 - -0.252) (-0.153 - 0.403) 
Jewish 
-1.0349 -28.7643 1.8049* -0.6982 -23.6353 
(-2.657 - 0.587) (-2380000 - 2380000) (0.201 - 3.409) (-2.138 - 0.742) (-148000 - 148000) 
Non-believer 
-25.712 1.2532 0.8612 -1.2416 0.8142 
(-400000 - 399000) (-0.733 - 3.24) (-1.115 - 2.837) (-3.521 - 1.038) (-1.176 - 2.804) 
Agnostic 
-0.4384** -0.4507* 0.6917*** -0.2298 -0.5529* 
(-0.75 - -0.126) (-0.9 - -0.002) (0.383 - 1) (-0.536 - 0.076) (-0.975 - -0.131) 
Other 
0.209 -0.0694 -0.1881 0.069 -0.2245 
(-0.196 - 0.614) (-0.562 - 0.423) (-0.631 - 0.254) (-0.338 - 0.476) (-0.696 - 0.247) 
Rural              
0.2287* -0.6048*** 0.2131 0.2202 -0.4387** 
(0.001 - 0.456) (-0.873 - -0.336) (-0.023 - 0.45) (-0.002 - 0.443) (-0.687 - -0.19) 
Constant 
0.3833 -2.0692*** -1.0282*** 0.6287** -2.204*** 
(-0.012 - 0.779) (-2.623 - -1.516) (-1.437 - -0.619) (0.235 - 1.022) (-2.709 - -1.699) 
N 2514 2514 2514 2514 2514 
R 0.0277 0.0669 0.0744 0.0462 0.0576 




Table 9.5. Logistic Model Brazil’s 2006 Election 
    PT PSDB OTHER PT 2nd PSDB 2nd 
Sex Woman 
-0.3482* 0.2364 0.1099 -0.3123* 0.4115* 
(-0.622 - -0.074) (-0.09 - 0.563) (-0.208 - 0.428) (-0.588 - -0.037) (0.09 - 0.733) 
Age 
18-25 
0.596** -0.2663 -0.649** 0.9102*** -0.224 
(0.202 - 0.99) (-0.888 - 0.355) (-1.096 - -0.202) (0.511 - 1.309) (-0.851 - 0.403) 
25-34 
0.8413*** -0.0944 -0.9291*** 0.9968*** -0.455 
(0.429 - 1.254) (-0.716 - 0.527) (-1.41 - -0.448) (0.584 - 1.409) (-1.104 - 0.194) 
35-44 
0.5026* -0.4685 -0.7148** 0.6125** -0.3363 
(0.043 - 0.962) (-1.101 - 0.164) (-1.244 - -0.186) (0.154 - 1.071) (-0.974 - 0.301) 
45-54 
0.2986 -0.3098 -0.9347** 0.6013* 0.0232 
(-0.232 - 0.83) (-0.968 - 0.349) (-1.579 - -0.29) (0.068 - 1.135) (-0.631 - 0.677) 
55-64 ref ref ref ref ref 
65+ 
-0.3583 -0.4088 0.1352 -0.072 0.0901 
(-0.945 - 0.228) (-1.178 - 0.361) (-0.49 - 0.761) (-0.657 - 0.513) (-0.652 - 0.832) 
Income 
1st quintile 
0.092 -0.1946 -0.5723 0.0962 -0.1232 
(-0.498 - 0.682) (-0.974 - 0.585) (-1.297 - 0.152) (-0.501 - 0.693) (-0.873 - 0.626) 
2nd quintile 
-0.2342 -0.2909 -0.0008 -0.3753 -0.5124 
(-0.84 - 0.372) (-1.089 - 0.507) (-0.7 - 0.698) (-0.986 - 0.236) (-1.323 - 0.298) 
3rd quintile 
-0.4502 0.383 0.1944 -0.4991 -0.0185 
(-1.092 - 0.191) (-0.329 - 1.095) (-0.538 - 0.926) (-1.147 - 0.148) (-0.741 - 0.704) 
4th quintile 
-0.2216 0.144 0.0461 -0.3993 0.4238 
(-0.692 - 0.249) (-0.573 - 0.861) (-0.485 - 0.578) (-0.876 - 0.077) (-0.261 - 1.108) 




-0.7306*** 0.0612 0.4492 -0.6258** -0.7264 
(-1.131 - -0.33) (-0.526 - 0.649) (-0.013 - 0.912) (-1.023 - -0.228) (-1.614 - 0.161) 
Elementary/lower secondary 
-0.802** -0.4866 -0.1148 -0.5391* -0.1873 
(-1.282 - -0.322) (-1.354 - 0.38) (-0.687 - 0.457) (-1.018 - -0.061) (-0.972 - 0.598) 
Higher Secondary 
-1.7224*** -0.4209 -0.009 -1.5692*** 0.3378 
(-2.533 - -0.912) (-1.197 - 0.356) (-0.978 - 0.96) (-2.369 - -0.77) (-0.461 - 1.137) 
Universitary ref ref ref ref ref 
Ideological 
placement on the 
political spectrum 
LEFT 2.0867 -0.0173 -0.6352 0.4368 0.0167 
  (-0.174 - 4.348) (-0.809 - 0.775) (-2.944 - 1.673) (-1.201 - 2.075) (-0.943 - 0.977) 
2 0.4758 0.2878 0.1347 0.2353 -0.137 
  (-0.812 - 1.764) (-0.654 - 1.23) (-1.318 - 1.587) (-1.08 - 1.551) (-1.698 - 1.424) 
3 -0.9188 0.4122 0.4775 -1.1943 0.4257 
  (-2.099 - 0.262) (-1.043 - 1.868) (-0.921 - 1.876) (-2.4 - 0.011) (-0.69 - 1.541) 
4 0.1709 -0.8337 0.4517 -0.4865 0.6089 
  (-0.999 - 1.341) (-2.394 - 0.727) (-0.872 - 1.776) (-1.647 - 0.674) (-0.432 - 1.649) 
5 -0.4528 0.7143 0.3205 -0.6289 -0.6111 
  (-1.25 - 0.344) (-0.341 - 1.77) (-0.658 - 1.299) (-1.46 - 0.203) (-1.877 - 0.655) 
6 -0.7275 0.3367 0.3646 -0.9565 -0.1767 
  (-1.701 - 0.246) (-0.717 - 1.39) (-0.822 - 1.551) (-1.962 - 0.049) (-0.797 - 0.443) 
7 -0.5386 0.0555 0.0378 -1.2003* -0.5965 
  (-1.533 - 0.456) (-0.572 - 0.683) (-1.199 - 1.275) (-2.225 - -0.176) (-1.626 - 0.432) 
8 -0.8051 0.0442 0.4221 -1.1943* 0.689 
  (-1.72 - 0.109) (-0.876 - 0.965) (-0.701 - 1.545) (-2.142 - -0.247) (-0.145 - 1.523) 
9 -0.1599 0.4929 0.3698 -0.604 0.527 
 238 
  (-1.15 - 0.831) (-0.364 - 1.35) (-0.801 - 1.54) (-1.617 - 0.41) (-0.224 - 1.278) 
RIGHT ref ref ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref ref ref 
Protestant -0.4187* -0.0491 0.4229* -0.4517* 0.2071 
  (-0.764 - -0.073) (-0.796 - 0.698) (0.031 - 0.815) (-0.801 - -0.102) (-0.195 - 0.609) 
Other Christian -0.0429 -0.1913 -0.3148 0.4075 -0.3381 
  (-1.021 - 0.936) (-1.458 - 1.075) (-1.598 - 0.969) (-0.631 - 1.446) (-1.632 - 0.956) 
5 8.5499 0.0734 -8.8606 8.9178 0.2782 
  (-248.909 - 266.009) (-0.346 - 0.493) (-309.485 - 291.763) (-263.353 - 281.189) (-5.65 - 6.207) 
Islam -19.2271 -0.8667 24.0315 -15.97 0.058 
  (-19600 - 19500) (-2.5 - 0.766) (-114000 - 114000) (-3787.143 - 3755.203) (-5.063 - 5.179) 
Buddhist -25.1579 0.2233 28.8245 -0.4887 0.1682 
  (-256000 - 256000) (-4.206 - 4.652) (-1070000 - 1070000) (-3.625 - 2.648) (-3.561 - 3.897) 
Ethnoreligion -0.3857 0.1494 0.7396 -0.25 -0.0596 
  (-1.262 - 0.49) (-4.248 - 4.547) (-0.211 - 1.69) (-1.128 - 0.628) (-1.089 - 0.97) 
12 -0.8259*** 0.3855 0.658** -0.7634** 0.4678 
  (-1.284 - -0.368) (-0.123 - 0.894) (0.173 - 1.143) (-1.222 - -0.305) (-0.036 - 0.972) 
Rural     
-0.1696 0.1204 -0.1206 -0.2564 0.0662 
(-0.557 - 0.217) (-0.358 - 0.599) (-0.563 - 0.322) (-0.646 - 0.134) (-0.403 - 0.535) 
Constant 
1.5714** -1.2322* -1.5048* 1.6565** -1.4115* 
(0.552 - 2.591) (-2.367 - -0.097) (-2.703 - -0.306) (0.611 - 2.702) (-2.549 - -0.274) 
N   1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
R   0.0857 0.0349 0.0771 0.0899 0.0553 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001 
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Table 9.6. Logistic Model Brazil’s 2010 Election 
    PT PSDB OTHER PT 2nd PSDB 2nd 
Sex Woman 
-0.1699 0.1452 0.07 -0.0491 0.1417 
(-0.36 - 0.021) (-0.065 - 0.356) (-0.143 - 0.284) (-0.237 - 0.139) (-0.056 - 0.339) 
Age 
18-25 
0.1449 -0.0718 -0.1101 0.1087 -0.0563 
(-0.152 - 0.441) (-0.396 - 0.252) (-0.431 - 0.211) (-0.182 - 0.399) (-0.36 - 0.247) 
25-34 
0.1624 -0.0747 -0.1235 0.0922 -0.0639 
(-0.156 - 0.48) (-0.423 - 0.274) (-0.47 - 0.223) (-0.22 - 0.404) (-0.391 - 0.263) 
35-44 
0.2701 -0.1935 -0.1437 0.1315 -0.0797 
(-0.066 - 0.606) (-0.569 - 0.182) (-0.518 - 0.23) (-0.202 - 0.465) (-0.43 - 0.271) 
45-54 
0.071 0.1738 -0.2929 -0.0052 0.2642 
(-0.288 - 0.43) (-0.213 - 0.56) (-0.706 - 0.12) (-0.358 - 0.348) (-0.102 - 0.63) 
55-64 ref ref ref ref ref 
65+ 
16.4299 -9.1643 -7.9722 17.5659 -14.9704 
(-6806.896 - 6839.756) (-227.051 - 208.723) (-279.891 - 263.946) (-12900 - 13000) (-3556.947 - 3527.006) 
Income 
1st quintile 
-0.312* 0.2414 0.2416 -0.2915* 0.1729 
(-0.598 - -0.026) (-0.075 - 0.558) (-0.116 - 0.599) (-0.578 - -0.005) (-0.13 - 0.476) 
2nd quintile 
-0.4909** -0.0145 0.6847*** -0.3876* 0.2212 
(-0.805 - -0.176) (-0.371 - 0.342) (0.315 - 1.054) (-0.7 - -0.075) (-0.109 - 0.552) 
3rd quintile 
-0.4454** 0.375* 0.2843 -0.3685* 0.3264 
(-0.763 - -0.128) (0.024 - 0.726) (-0.093 - 0.662) (-0.684 - -0.053) (-0.007 - 0.659) 
4th quintile 
-0.4351* 0.329 0.3238 -0.4863** 0.4784** 
(-0.781 - -0.089) (-0.054 - 0.712) (-0.079 - 0.727) (-0.83 - -0.143) (0.119 - 0.838) 
5th quintile ref ref ref ref ref 
Education None -0.5678*** 0.5427*** 0.1889 -0.4758** 0.6364*** 
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(-0.847 - -0.289) (0.243 - 0.842) (-0.137 - 0.514) (-0.753 - -0.199) (0.348 - 0.924) 
Elementary/lower secondary 
-0.6102*** -0.054 0.8021*** -0.3607** 0.287* 
(-0.869 - -0.351) (-0.349 - 0.241) (0.512 - 1.092) (-0.618 - -0.104) (0.014 - 0.56) 
Higher Secondary 
-1.0193*** 0.1059 1.0609*** -0.714** 0.638** 
(-1.482 - -0.557) (-0.389 - 0.601) (0.602 - 1.52) (-1.155 - -0.273) (0.187 - 1.089) 







0.1689 -0.5542 0.1556 -0.8489 0.3131 
(-0.74 - 1.078) (-1.889 - 0.781) (-0.863 - 1.174) (-1.755 - 0.057) (-0.754 - 1.381) 
2 
-0.6307 0.0199 0.7148 -0.6236 0.6605 
(-1.466 - 0.205) (-1.032 - 1.071) (-0.157 - 1.587) (-1.464 - 0.216) (-0.263 - 1.584) 
3 
0.619 -1.2769 -0.11 0.5062 -0.7381 
(-0.107 - 1.345) (-2.565 - 0.011) (-0.908 - 0.688) (-0.321 - 1.333) (-1.804 - 0.327) 
4 
-0.5779 0.0923 0.5766 -0.5979 0.444 
(-1.337 - 0.181) (-0.898 - 1.082) (-0.217 - 1.37) (-1.373 - 0.177) (-0.455 - 1.343) 
5 
-0.8149** 0.7719* 0.3055 -1.0685*** 1.0836*** 
(-1.317 - -0.313) (0.152 - 1.392) (-0.246 - 0.857) (-1.597 - -0.54) (0.483 - 1.684) 
6 
-1.1842** 0.7191 0.7247* -1.5551*** 1.4235*** 
(-1.879 - -0.49) (-0.067 - 1.505) (0.021 - 1.429) (-2.246 - -0.864) (0.686 - 2.161) 
7 
-1.0321** 1.0755** 0.2499 -1.4698*** 1.2092** 
(-1.672 - -0.393) (0.344 - 1.807) (-0.449 - 0.949) (-2.124 - -0.816) (0.496 - 1.923) 
8 
-0.6867* 1.1981*** -0.3701 -1.1414*** 1.4846*** 
(-1.24 - -0.133) (0.538 - 1.858) (-1.022 - 0.282) (-1.72 - -0.563) (0.841 - 2.128) 
9 
-1.0288** 0.856* 0.5018 -1.2862*** 1.2661*** 
(-1.65 - -0.407) (0.134 - 1.578) (-0.172 - 1.176) (-1.92 - -0.652) (0.569 - 1.963) 
RIGHT ref ref ref ref ref 
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Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref ref ref 
Protestant 
-0.4686*** -0.1878 0.7419*** -0.3264** 0.1427 
(-0.705 - -0.232) (-0.446 - 0.07) (0.491 - 0.993) (-0.556 - -0.097) (-0.094 - 0.38) 
Other Christian 
-0.1151 -0.6529 0.7003 0.0632 -0.4869 
(-0.92 - 0.69) (-1.658 - 0.352) (-0.144 - 1.545) (-0.735 - 0.862) (-1.381 - 0.407) 
Jewish 
34.3203 -13.5972 -26.4647 35.0549 -21.0421 
(-17000000 - 17000000) (-1442.782 - 1415.588) (-755000 - 755000) (-55600000 - 55600000) (-45500 - 45500) 
Buddhist 
-0.918 -14.9298 2.402* -0.2841 -0.5495 
(-3.202 - 1.366) (-2555.21 - 2525.35) (0.079 - 4.725) (-2.281 - 1.713) (-2.859 - 1.76) 
Ethnoreligions 
-0.2133 -0.2678 0.5028* -0.2145 -0.2406 
(-0.656 - 0.23) (-0.781 - 0.245) (0.044 - 0.961) (-0.648 - 0.219) (-0.712 - 0.231) 
Non-Believer 
-0.162 -0.2583 0.4569* -0.0914 -0.131 
(-0.49 - 0.166) (-0.641 - 0.124) (0.1 - 0.813) (-0.418 - 0.235) (-0.483 - 0.221) 
Agnostic 
-8.7806 12.1436 -18.1572 -11.8484 14.2106 
(-301.136 - 283.575) (-654.504 - 678.791) (-20900 - 20800) (-1131.726 - 1108.029) (-2522.536 - 2550.957) 
DK 
0.0834 0.5481 -14.5218 -0.0441 0.2986 
(-2.724 - 2.891) (-2.272 - 3.368) (-4501.181 - 4472.137) (-2.85 - 2.762) (-2.51 - 3.107) 
Rural   -0.1409 -0.1866 0.4378** -0.1537 -0.1356 
    (-0.408 - 0.126) (-0.476 - 0.103) (0.119 - 0.757) (-0.419 - 0.112) (-0.411 - 0.14) 
Constant 
1.3695*** -1.7187*** -2.5001*** 1.8142*** -2.1092*** 
(0.805 - 1.934) (-2.404 - -1.033) (-3.16 - -1.84) (1.222 - 2.407) (-2.774 - -1.445) 
N   2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
R   0.0616 0.0458 0.0878 0.0484 0.0446 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001 
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Table 9.7. Logistic Model Brazil’s 2014 Election 
    PT PSDB OTHER PT 2nd PSDB 2nd 
Intercept                 
  
1.6999*** -2.599*** -1.8491*** 1.6055*** -2.4852*** 
(1.126 - 2.273) (-3.244 - -1.954) (-2.457 - -1.241) (1.039 - 2.172) (-3.094 - -1.877) 
Sex Woman 
-0.0721 0.0412 0.0563 0.0127 0.1079 
(-0.228 - 0.084) (-0.124 - 0.207) (-0.11 - 0.223) (-0.14 - 0.166) (-0.052 - 0.267) 
Education 
18-25 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
25-34 
0.1943 -0.2017 -0.0287 0.2718* -0.2281 
(-0.052 - 0.44) (-0.461 - 0.058) (-0.284 - 0.227) (0.031 - 0.513) (-0.478 - 0.022) 
35-44 
0.1043 -0.1452 0.0234 0.1874 -0.1738 
(-0.154 - 0.363) (-0.417 - 0.127) (-0.245 - 0.292) (-0.065 - 0.44) (-0.436 - 0.088) 
45-54 
0.0656 0.0741 -0.1647 0.1088 0.1631 
(-0.204 - 0.335) (-0.205 - 0.353) (-0.449 - 0.12) (-0.155 - 0.372) (-0.107 - 0.433) 
55-64 ref ref ref ref ref 
65+ 
-0.2177 0.0314 0.2172 -0.2464 0.2592 
(-0.546 - 0.11) (-0.317 - 0.38) (-0.124 - 0.558) (-0.569 - 0.076) (-0.074 - 0.593) 
Income 
1st quintile 
-0.4877*** 0.3677* 0.2868* -0.4493** 0.4453** 
(-0.746 - -0.229) (0.061 - 0.674) (0.001 - 0.573) (-0.708 - -0.191) (0.158 - 0.733) 
2nd quintile 
-0.6755*** 0.5005** 0.3724* -0.6572*** 0.5583** 
(-0.981 - -0.371) (0.155 - 0.846) (0.043 - 0.702) (-0.96 - -0.355) (0.231 - 0.886) 
3rd quintile 
-0.7838*** 0.8252*** 0.1366 -0.7067*** 0.879*** 
(-1.082 - -0.486) (0.5 - 1.151) (-0.191 - 0.464) (-1 - -0.413) (0.567 - 1.191) 
4th quintile 
-0.8688*** 0.8895*** 0.1303 -0.7695*** 0.8697*** 
(-1.157 - -0.58) (0.577 - 1.202) (-0.18 - 0.441) (-1.052 - -0.487) (0.57 - 1.169) 
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5th quintile ref ref ref ref ref 
Education 
None 
-0.4686** 0.3367* 0.2936 -0.3893** 0.4429** 
(-0.742 - -0.196) (0.017 - 0.657) (-0.019 - 0.606) (-0.663 - -0.116) (0.137 - 0.749) 
Elementary/lower secondary 
-0.7965*** 0.6203*** 0.369* -0.6122*** 0.9049*** 
(-1.098 - -0.495) (0.276 - 0.964) (0.03 - 0.708) (-0.912 - -0.312) (0.575 - 1.235) 
Higher Secondary 
-0.9842*** 0.6399** 0.5182* -0.7945*** 0.9415*** 
(-1.371 - -0.597) (0.233 - 1.047) (0.108 - 0.928) (-1.171 - -0.418) (0.547 - 1.336) 
Universitary ref ref ref ref ref 
Ideological placement on the political spectrum 
LEFT 0.1947 0.0084 -0.2228 0.2432 0.2113 
 (-0.756 - 1.145) (-1.048 - 1.065) (-1.257 - 0.811) (-0.701 - 1.187) (-0.738 - 1.16) 
2 -0.408 0.1611 0.2919 0.54 -0.2864 
 (-1.218 - 0.403) (-0.73 - 1.053) (-0.508 - 1.091) (-0.264 - 1.344) (-1.144 - 0.571) 
3 0.2385 -0.1684 -0.1445 0.4639 -0.8256* 
 (-0.413 - 0.89) (-0.917 - 0.58) (-0.841 - 0.552) (-0.193 - 1.121) (-1.573 - -0.078) 
4 -0.3708 0.1282 0.2701 -0.1515 -0.1374 
 (-0.994 - 0.253) (-0.541 - 0.797) (-0.35 - 0.89) (-0.758 - 0.455) (-0.768 - 0.494) 
5 -0.4766* 0.2815 0.2573 -0.2671 0.2083 
 (-0.943 - -0.011) (-0.217 - 0.78) (-0.209 - 0.724) (-0.722 - 0.187) (-0.254 - 0.671) 
6 -0.3315 0.7971** -0.476 -0.2536 0.4186 
 (-0.824 - 0.161) (0.277 - 1.318) (-1 - 0.048) (-0.737 - 0.229) (-0.073 - 0.91) 
7 -0.2417 0.6014* -0.3364 -0.08 0.287 
 (-0.74 - 0.256) (0.076 - 1.127) (-0.857 - 0.184) (-0.567 - 0.407) (-0.208 - 0.782) 
8 -0.2354 0.7435** -0.5418* -0.1422 0.3314 
 (-0.732 - 0.261) (0.22 - 1.268) (-1.076 - -0.008) (-0.629 - 0.344) (-0.164 - 0.827) 
9 -0.3892 0.9807** -0.6694* -0.4238 0.6975* 
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 (-0.974 - 0.196) (0.382 - 1.579) (-1.323 - -0.016) (-0.998 - 0.151) (0.122 - 1.273) 
Right ref ref ref ref ref 
Religion 
Catholic ref ref ref ref ref 
Protestant 
-0.3838*** -0.2357* 0.6498*** -0.2897** 0.119 
(-0.567 - -0.2) (-0.432 - -0.039) (0.463 - 0.837) (-0.469 - -0.111) (-0.066 - 0.304) 
Other Christian 
-1.1832 -2.0597 2.1001*** -0.337 -1.5062 
(-2.509 - 0.142) (-4.171 - 0.051) (0.927 - 3.273) (-1.438 - 0.764) (-3.089 - 0.077) 
Jewish 
-7.343 7.1544 -9.5869 -8.3622 7.7557 
(-141.19 - 126.503) (-43.252 - 57.561) (-293.23 - 274.056) (-201.878 - 185.153) (-76.194 - 91.706) 
Buddhist 
-0.0766 -1.0046 0.9211 0.1819 -1.3019 
(-1.833 - 1.68) (-3.171 - 1.162) (-0.722 - 2.564) (-1.473 - 1.837) (-3.447 - 0.844) 
Ethnoreligion 
-0.1659 0.1022 0.0626 -0.2668 -0.0383 
(-0.583 - 0.251) (-0.3 - 0.505) (-0.373 - 0.498) (-0.674 - 0.141) (-0.439 - 0.363) 
Non-believers 
-0.3893** -0.2941 0.6883*** -0.2707 -0.1988 
(-0.678 - -0.101) (-0.598 - 0.009) (0.409 - 0.968) (-0.548 - 0.007) (-0.49 - 0.092) 
DK 
-0.032 0.3725 -0.3564 -0.3642 1.0692 
(-2.244 - 2.179) (-2.257 - 3.002) (-3.061 - 2.348) (-2.547 - 1.819) (-1.092 - 3.23) 
Rural 
  
-0.1409 -0.1866 0.4378** -0.1537 -0.1356 
  (-0.408 - 0.126) (-0.476 - 0.103) (0.119 - 0.757) (-0.419 - 0.112) (-0.411 - 0.14) 
Constant 
1.6999*** -2.599*** -1.8491*** 1.6055*** -2.4852*** 
(1.126 - 2.273) (-3.244 - -1.954) (-2.457 - -1.241) (1.039 - 2.172) (-3.094 - -1.877) 
N  3136 3136 3136 3136 3136 
R  0.0491 0.0289 0.0186 0.0491 0.0289 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p< 0.001 
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9.2. APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL ESTIMATIONS MEXICO 
 
On tables 9.8 and 9.9, there are estimations about the evolution of poverty by income 
and correlations regarding non-incumbent parties in Mexico. 
 




Nutritional1 Capacity2 Patrimonial3 
1992 21.4 29.7 53.1 
1994 21.2 30.0 52.4 
1996 37.4 46.9 69.0 
1998 33.3 41.7 63.7 
2000 24.1 31.8 53.6 
2002 20.0 26.9 50.0 
2004 17.4 24.7 47.2 
2005 18.2 24.7 47.0 
2006 14.0 20.9 42.9 
2008 18.6 25.5 47.8 
2010 18.8 26.6 51.1 
2012 19.7 28.0 52.3 
Average 22.01 29.78 51.51 
1. Nutritional poverty its defined by CONEVAL as the incapacity to obtain one basic food 
basket even spending the entire household income. 2. Capacity poverty is not having 
enough income to pay for a basic food basket and to cover health and education expenses 
even spending the entire household income 3. Patrimonial poverty is not having sufficient 
income to pay for a basic food basket, cover health, clothing, housing, transportation and 
education expenses even spending the entire household income. 






Table 9.9. Correlation Table Non-Incumbent Parties. Presidential Election 1994-2012. 
 1994 2000 2006 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





















































Oportunidaes   










Seguro Popular   




N 409 409 379 379 526 526 377 377 
Calculations using data from IFE and INEGI.  




9.3. APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL ESTIMATIONS BRAZIL 
 
 
Tables 9.10 and 9.11 show the individual model per each party (PSDB and PT). 
 
             
  Table 9.10. PSDB Panel Data Regression 2002 - 2014 (Municipality Level) 
 (1) (2) (4) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
























































    
Observations 16,694 16,694 16,694 
R-squared 0.366 0.305  
Number of region  5 5 
Region FE  YES  
Region RE   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




       Table 9.11. PT Panel Data Regression 2002 – 2014 (Municipality Level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
Proportion of Families  








Governmental expenditure  







































































    
Observations 16,633 16,633 16,633 
R-squared 0.566 0.552  
Number of region  5 5 
Region FE  YES  
Region RE   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Tables 9.12 and 9.13 show the individual model per each party (PSDB and PT) following 
Zucco’s strategy using religion and race as controls. 
 
Table 9.12. PSDB Panel Data Regression 2002 - 2014 (Municipality Level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
Proportion of Families with 







Governmental expenditure in 







































































    
Observations 16,633 16,633 16,633 
R-squared 0.368 0.308  
Number of region  5 5 
Region FE  YES  
Region RE   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









Table 9.13. PT Panel Data Regression 2002 – 2014 (Municipality Level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects 
    
Proportion of Families  







Governmental expenditure  







































































    
Observations 16,633 16,633 16,633 
R-squared 0.566 0.552  
Number of region  5 5 
Region FE  YES  
Region RE   YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
